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ABSTRACT 
A MANIFESTATION OF ALL LIFE: 
INTERSECTIONS OF VIRTUE ETHICS, PHILOSOPHY OF EMOTION, AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE 
Derek L. Penwell 
December 2,2010 
This dissertation offers a brief survey of the rise of reason and the tum to 
the self at the expense of emotion in Western thought. This marginalization of 
emotion has had deleterious effects on two areas: the cultivation of virtue and the 
intersubjectivity necessary to sustain human flourishing. Using current research 
in neuropsychology the dissertation argues that reason and emotion form a 
dynamic partnership in the process of attaining reliable knowledge. Moreover, 
the dissertation argues that the emotional experience necessary for the cultivation 
of virtue, as well as the ability to attend to the emotional lives of others in the 
service of inter subjectivity, can be augmented by simulating emotional 
experiences through reading literature. 
The dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter One traces the 
history of the rise of reason and the tum to the self in the West, arguing that the 
preeminence of reason has pushed emotion to the irrational margins. Chapter two 
explores theories of emotion, contending that emotion is best understood as a 
process initiated by affective appraisal. Chapter Two also argues for an 
v 
understanding of emotion as a necessary part of the process of knowing. Chapter 
Three uses an Aristotelian analysis of virtue to argue for the need for emotion in 
developing virtue and sustaining community. Chapter Four sets down a theory of 
emotional attending that argues against viewing others as objects or as mirror 
images of the self. Chapter Five offers an argument about the simulation of 
emotion and the use of the imagination in reading literature, and why expanding 
emotional resources is an important goal. Chapter Six provides a practical 
example of how reading can enrich the fund of emotional experiences upon which 
one draws to attend to the emotional lives of others through analysis of Richard 
Russo's, Empire Falls. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ties that bind people to communities in Western society have 
undergone a serious challenge through the rise of scientific reason, which has 
evolved as the defacto preserve of true knowledge. Moreover, the turn to the 
individual self as the primary locus of meaning has also seriously jeopardized the 
kinds of communal attachments that are both formative and sustaining. The 
reasons for this privileging of scientific reason, as well as for the evolution of the 
modem atomic self require attention to the history of the development of Western 
thought in disciplines as diverse as epistemology and moral philosophy, theology 
and cultural history. In this work I will attempt to tell a story that seeks to braid 
various strands from these disciplines into a coherent narrative, which seeks to 
make sense of the ways in which emotion has been displaced by reason as 
legitimate knowing, as well as ofthe ways in which human intersubjectivity is 
endangered by the dislocation of meaning from communal sources to the 
sanctuary of individual interiority. Ultimately, I want to make an argument that 
the humanities, in general, and literature, in particular, offer a way to fortify the 
emotional resources necessary for human flourishing as a means of challenging 
the capacious imperialism of scientific reason, as well as the socially corrosive 
effects of the alienation of the individual from necessary social connections of 
community. More specifically, I want to call attention to the ways that reading 
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literature makes us more capable of attending to one another emotionally not as 
objects to be analyzed or targets upon which to project images drawn from human 
interiority, but as subjects who can only be known contextually through the just 
and loving vision of emotional attending. This emotional attending, I want to 
suggest, will help to foster an environment in which the intersubjectivity 
necessary for human community and flourishing can occur. 
On Avoiding Being an Organ Stop: Underground Man, Alienation, and the 
Corrosive Effects of Scientific Rationalism 
At that time I was only twenty-four years old. Even then my life was 
gloomy, disordered, and solitary to the point of savagery. I didn't associate with 
anyone. I even avoided talking, and I retreated further and further into my corner. 
At work in the office I even tried not to look at anyone. I was aware not only that 
my colleagues considered me eccentric, but that they always seemed to regard me 
with a kind of loathing ... No one was like me, and I wasn't like anyone else. 
"I'm alone," I mused, and they are everyone"; and I sank into thought. 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, 30-1 
So begins the second part of Dostoevsky'S novel, Notes/rom 
Underground, in which a nameless man narrates his isolation from society, and 
the bitterness he harbors against virtually everyone with whom he comes into 
contact. Cut off from meaningful human connections, Underground Man rails 
against both the slights he has endured at the hands of others, as well as the 
society that produces such injurious people. Regardless of the social rank of the 
people he encounters, he laments that "I almost always lowered my eyes when 
meeting anyone. I even conducted experiments: could I endure someone's gaze? 
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I'd always be the first to lower my eyes. This infuriated me to the point of 
madness" (Dostoyevsky 2001). 
It would certainly be tempting to see Underground Man as a visionary 
experiment in the chronicling of madness of an organic type. To understand it in 
this way would be to overlook the kind of social commentary implicit in the work, 
however. In fact, instead of psychopathology, Notes from Underground has the 
encroachment of scientific rationalism in its sights as the culprit that causes 
alienation. Underground Man is convinced that science is slowly corroding our 
humanity by marginalizing our desires and passions, labeling them irrational, at 
best, or madness, at worst. Underground Man decries the way he believes science 
reduces human action to the product of the rational calculation of self-interest. 
On his understanding of scientific rationalism, reason eventually clarifies what is, 
from an instrumental perspective, in a human being's self-interest. This 
clarification of reasonable options happens to such an extent that there can be no 
longer room left for the free exercise of the human will, since, according to 
Underground Man, no one knowingly does something against self-interest 
(Dostoyevsky 2001). Science, taken to its logical conclusion, Underground Man 
believes, will ultimately obviate the need for human agency, because all possible 
courses of human action will be accounted for by complex computation, leaving 
the most reasonable alternatives to be enacted. Human choice will be 
unnecessary because decisions, rationally derived, will make a final option in any 
situation so obvious and beneficial to self-interest that choosing will be 
unnecessary. Underground Man is convinced that once science is perfected and 
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rationality finally displaces the unpredictability of human passion and desire, 
humanity will have been "transformed from a person into an organ stop: because 
what is a man without desire, without will, and without wishes if not a stop in an 
organ pipe?" (Dostoyevsky 2001). In other words, scientific reason, should it 
colonize all of human experience at the expense of other ways of knowing that 
involve emotion, will leave us leave us less human, and certainly more isolated 
from one another. 
Underground Man, the product of the alienating force of rationalism, cries 
out to reclaim some scrap of humanity, some sense that his life transcends that 
which can be said propositionally of him. He realizes that life lived in a rationally 
pure ideal, as the sum of propositional statements, as a factor in an equation 
cannot but dehumanize us, cannot but leave us alone and disconnected from the 
community that makes human flourishing possible. Underground Man cautions: 
"Reason is a fine thing, gentlemen, there's no doubt about it, but it's only reason, 
and it satisfies only man's rational faculty, whereas desire is a manifestation of all 
life, that is, of all human life, which includes both reason, as well as all of life's 
itches and scratches. And although in this manifestation life often turns out to be 
fairly worthless, it's life all the same, and not merely the extraction of square 
roots" (Dostoyevsky 2001). I wish to suggest that art, literature in particular, is a 
counterbalance to science, not only because it engages "life's itches and 
scratches," but because it helps to shape and inform the emotional faculties that 
allow us to live together in meaningful ways, able finally to look into one 
another's eyes and not to lower our gaze. Moreover, I will argue that the "desire" 
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identified by Underground Man-and what I will refer to as value and emotion-
is not a distraction from that with which humanity should rightfully concern itself 
(namely, reason), but it is, in fact, at the heart of human flourishing. Value and 
emotion, far from being subjective irrelevancies in a scientific age, are central to 
what it means to be human; they are "a manifestation of all life, that is, of all 
human life." 
What Doestoevsky provides in Notes from Underground is an image of 
modem Western society's drift toward alienation, a society in which 
intersubjectivity is imperiled, in which humans are robbed of the emotional 
connections that make human flourishing possible, precisely because reason will 
finally have prevailed by making emotion unnecessary for navigating human 
existence. As Dostoyevsky's portrait of underground man demonstrates, within 
modem life exists the seeds of alienation from community, the potential effects of 
which ought to give us pause. For, the walling off of the individual threatens not 
only the community but the individual, who is untethered from both the normative 
and nurturing aspects of community. This retreat from social connection 
transcends an obvious decline in civility to foreshadow a more troubling set of 
problems that have to do with the deformation of character and the loss ofthe 
immediacy of inter subjectivity. Absent the morally formative influence of 
community, absent the emotional connection that helps to sustain community (as 
well as give rise to its necessity as a human endeavor)-human beings risk living 
in societies built upon a foundation of instrumental relationships, where morality 
and social interaction exist as problems to be worked out in terms of cost/benefit 
5 
analysis: "What do I get out of this?" "What's in this for me?" Shorn of 
meaningful interpersonal commitments, which are increasingly called into 
question as potential abridgements of personal freedom, discussions of morality 
or social responsibility devolve to questions of utility, or perhaps worse, personal 
preference. 
This work is an attempt to set down an account of how our experience of 
literature can provide an important resource in developing the emotional 
capacities that will enable us to pursue virtue in the midst of community. It is an 
attempt to stand over against the fragmentation of modem social life, over against 
the alienation of the individual by calling humanity to a recognition of the morally 
and socially corrosive effects of marginalizing emotional experience. Moreover, 
it is an attempt to challenge the assumption that my relationship to the world is a 
product of my interiority projected onto the world. I will suggest instead that, 
popular accounts of the rugged individual notwithstanding, I am located within a 
complex nexus of social relationships that helps, among other things, to shape and 
inform my identity-that my identity is not forged in the furnace of my own 
interiority. To accomplish this objective, I will have to sustain a fairly complex 
argument that includes an identification of the problem and how we have arrived 
at this point in Chapter One. I will then set down a survey of what emotion is and 
why it is important to see it as a partner rather than an adversary of reason in 
Chapter Two. Next, I will provide in chapter three a description of the need for 
community and the attendant virtues necessary to ensure flourishing, which have 
been threatened by the marginalization of emotion and the tum to the self, while 
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Chapter Four will look at the negative effects on intersubjectivity and means by 
which to counteract them in emotional attending. Chapter Five will then describe 
how literature can assist the process of expanding our emotional experience, while 
at the same time refining our abilities to attend to the emotions of others. Finally, 
I will use the novel, Empire Falls in Chapter Six to provide a literary example of 
some the arguments I have been making about how our vision of others has been 
distorted by the mental habits we have cultivated through our privileging of 
reason and the tum to the self, as well as to demonstrate how literature helps us 
creatively imagine the emotional lives of others. 
The goal of this work is to make a contribution to an alternative vision, 
one in which scientific reason occupies an important place, but is counterpoised 
by the necessary social and moral function emotion provides. I will suggest that 
literature, which traverses a landscape in which emotion figures so largely, offers 
an important resource for the kind of knowing that comes through emotional 
attending. And the kind of knowing that comes through emotional attending-
beyond the world that is open only to propositional description-stands as a 
crucial part of what it means to be human; it stands as a manifestation of all life, 
that is, of all human life. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE LENS AND THE MIRROR 
Introduction 
A particularly important technological innovation that shaped epistemology 
and the perspectival relationship of humans to the world was the development of 
pure, colorless glass sometime in the fourteenth century. 1 Prior to clear glass, to 
see out of a building or structure, one must look through a hole in the wall, which 
is covered by a shutter or fabric. The advent of clear glass lets people stay 
indoors out of the weather, and observe a mediated view oflife outdoors. Prior to 
clear glass, glass is colored (stained glass), letting in colored light, but not 
allowing an unimpeded view of life outdoors. This new perspective on the world 
has the effect of objectifying that upon which our attention is focused. 
The uses to which clear glass is put by science leads to a further 
objectification of the focus of our attention (the telescope and the microscope). 
Both the telescope and the microscope shape now what it is possible to think 
about the world.2 By allowing the sight of things previously unseen, these 
technological innovations mark out whole new realities. No longer are the stars 
and planets observable with only the naked eye, but with the telescope the 
mystery of space is at humanity's fingertips. Likewise, the microscope opens the 
door to a whole new miniature plane of existence that, prior to the invention of 
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clear glass, could not even have been conceived. Not only is the world more 
present through this innovation, it turns out to be infinitely more complex and 
layered than anyone could ever have imagined. Witnessing these new portals on 
reality gives us the impression that reality-because of our increasing ability to 
observe the world-can be framed and then studied objectively. 
Lewis Mumford observes: 
In losing color and ceasing to serve as picture-the function it had 
occupied in medieval church decoration-and in letting in, instead, the 
forms and colors of the outside world, glass served also as a symbol of the 
double process of naturalism and abstraction which had begun to 
characterize the thought of Europe. More than that: it furthered this 
process. Glass helped put the world in a frame: it made it possible to see 
certain elements of reality more clearly: and it focused attention on a 
sharply defined field-namely, that which was bounded by the frame 
(Mumford 126). 
Mumford draws attention to the symbolic way that the opacity of colored glass as 
a fixture in ecclesiastical settings seems to enshroud knowledge in theological 
mystery. The arrival of clear glass for use in everyday life signals, what seems to 
be, a straightforward, unobstructed view of the natural world-knowledge of the 
world available to all and unmediated by the special, theological knowledge of the 
clergy. If only metaphorically, the appearance of clear glass certainly aids the 
epistemic shift from divine revelation mediated ecclesiastically to a naturalistic 
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epistemology in which knowledge of the world is available to all through 
observation. 
Paradoxically, at the same time as the possibility of knowledge absent the 
mediating influence of the clergy suggests the possibilities of a new epistemic 
horizon in which the world can be investigated naturally-that is, without divine 
revelation-the appearance of clear glass also allows for observation that can be 
done at a remove. Instead of having to be in nature to observe nature, the distance 
allowed by clear glass encourages abstraction, inasmuch as one can observe what 
one views in the pre-defined field of the microscopic slide or through the view-
finder of a telescope isolated from its natural context. It is important to point out 
that the distance from the thing being observed, afforded in this case by glass, will 
eventually become an important component of the objectivity considered 
necessary for scientific knowing. Something as simple as the glass window 
provides a border around a particular field of vision, allowing the illusion of a 
bounded system that can be known apart from the broader nexus of complex 
relationships that make such a system possible in the first place (Mumford 125-6). 
Put another way, the frame ofthe window (or telescope or microscope), taken 
together with the glass that sets up an impermeable barrier to nature, encourages 
habits of the mind that permit the viewing of things as particularities 
unencumbered by the complexities of systems requiring interdependent 
relationships-trees can be studied as trees, for instance, abstracted from their 
role within a multifaceted ecosystem. 
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I wish to suggest that the same process of abstraction applied to natural 
systems can be extended to include human systems, about which I will have more 
to say throughout the rest of this chapter. In other words, the habits of mind that 
lead to abstraction in reference to nature-that is, to the goal of distance and 
objectivity in the observation of a particular thing abstracted from its context-are 
suggestive of what I wish to explore in this chapter in relationship to the 
ascendancy of objective reason at the expense of other ways of knowing, as well 
as the ascendancy of the autonomous individual self at the expense of communal 
attachments and commitments. Taken metaphorically, the process of abstraction 
encouraged by clear glass represents an increasingly common modem assumption 
that things in general, and the individual, in particular, can be studied 
objectively-and ultimately understood-in isolation from the nexus of 
relationships that comprise the context out of which particularities arise. 
As important as these technological developments prove to be in altering our 
relationship to the world, through a reinforcing of reason as the faculty through 
which the world can be apprehended, it is another technological innovation 
prompted by clear glass, I will argue, that stands as a central feature of the story I 
want to tell. The mirror is important to what I take to be two related 
developments in the Western intellectual tradition. First, the mirror stands as an 
historic and important metaphor of the ascendancy of scientific reason as the 
dominant model of knowledge, knowledge that is external to the human mind-
that is, knowledge that is objective, mind-independent, and unclouded by 
emotions and other subjective distortions. Put more simply, the metaphor of the 
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mirror in this epistemological sense betokens knowledge that is a clear reflection 
of the real world. Second, the mirror also stands as a metaphor of the turning of 
the focus of observation back onto oneself. It adverts to the modern shift from an 
external teleological source of meaning located in the polis or in the church, to an 
internalized meaning created in the interiority of the modern individual. That is to 
say, the metaphor of the mirror betokens knowledge that is a clear reflection of 
the true self. 
In the first instance, the mirror has served as a guiding metaphor for 
epistemology upon which the scientific model of knowledge is based-the 
paradigmatic form of knowing in Western culture-from Plato onwards. The 
scientific model, which has come to dominate as the arbiter of what can and 
cannot be considered knowledge, is predicated on the assumption that reliable 
knowledge is a reflection of that which exists in the world, independent of the 
observer. True knowledge, in other words, mirrors what is, in fact, the case. To 
put a finer point on it, an inadequate description of what is seen in the mirror 
focused on the world is prima facie evidence of inadequate knowledge. That is to 
say, if! report that what I see sitting at the end of my driveway-where there is a 
small three-wheeled vehicle down by the mailbox-is a troll instead of a tricycle, 
my status as a knower is put in question. True knowledge of the world, in this 
case, then, is the acknowledgment of an undistorted reflection in the mirror of a 
tricycle. 
In the second instance, the mirror ultimately has had an equally profound 
impact on human self-understanding. As surely as the other technological 
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applications of clear glass shift our gaze outward, in practice the mirror diverts it 
back on our selves. The development of the mirror fascinates people who had 
only seen passing glimpses of themselves (and distorted ones at that) in a 
reflection from the water of a pond, or in imperfect metal.3 Now, with glass 
mirrors, it is possible to look at one's face whenever one wishes. Where before 
one's position in the world was related to the world itself, with the advent of the 
mirror, it becomes possible to locate one's self interiorly. 
The relocation of the self from a small piece of a universal, exterior puzzle 
to a larger piece of a particular, interior one has had profound implications. The 
exterior world, though still meaningful, has found a rival in the interior world. As 
long as people are small parts of an enormous enterprise, individual psychic needs 
may be ignored to a certain extent. However, when I become the lead actor in my 
own play, the exterior world's significance comes to be defined through its 
relationship to me. The development of the mirror reveals a bounded world in 
which I am persistently the central character. 
In Chapter One, I will advance a two-pronged argument that will consider 
the Enlightenment divide between reason and emotion. The first prong of the 
argument will provide a brief description of the state of affairs in the West in 
which reason has displaced emotion as the primary way of knowing, 
marginalizing emotion as irrational. The second prong of the argument will 
suggest that, from the Enlightenment onward, at the same time as reason is 
eclipsing emotion as the standard for knowing, the individual is in the process of 
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becoming the central referent or final authority for value and knowledge in 
Western thought. 
My larger goal concerns the necessity of emotional resources for both virtue 
and intersubjectivity. To that end, I am trying to lay the groundwork for that 
argument by tracing the simultaneous developments in the West of the 
ascendancy of reason at the expense of emotion and the isolation of value to the 
individual. I will suggest that these two developments have had the crippling 
effect of cutting off morality from the emotions, while setting up barriers to 
intersubjectivity. In short, in this chapter I will contend that while scientific 
reason has sought objectivity in knowledge, there was another movement toward 
radical reflexivity that simultaneously relegated value to the domain of the 
subjective. In the first instance, emotions are viewed as an obstacle to knowing, 
while in the second instance, emotions represent the subjective values of the 
individual, who inevitably becomes the measure of what can be considered 
valuable, even-perhaps especially-with respect to other subjects. 
I must admit up front that my argument-though it makes use of cultural, 
intellectual, and religious history-is not a standard historical survey, given over 
to a comprehensive examination of the many forces at play in the development of 
history. To tell such a sprawling tale is certainly a worthy task, but it is not the 
goal I seek to accomplish. Instead, I am trying to tell a story of how we have 
arrived at a place where reason is believed to be the only reliable form of 
knowing, and the tum to the self has cast the individual back onto her own 
interiority to find value and meaning. In telling this story under the limitations of 
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space, I must necessarily make certain choices about what to include and what to 
leave out. Unfortunately, part of what I am unable to include in much depth, 
beyond tracing the development of certain ideas, is the cultural history that in 
some cases prepared particular cultures in the West to receive those ideas-and in 
other cases, was itself indispensible to the shaping and forming of those ideas. I 
would concede that there very well might be ways to tell this story by making 
different choices. However, the choices I have made are defensible, I think, just 
to the extent that the characters upon which I concentrate are, generally speaking, 
primary characters in virtually any account of the development of Western 
thought. That I have left out some arguably important figures and cultural trends 
is regrettable, but largely unavoidable. 
Reason, in particular scientific reason, has prevailed in the West as the 
privileged means of arriving at reliable knowledge-almost always at the expense 
of other ways of knowing. Emotion, for instance, has almost always suffered 
when reason is viewed as epistemologically paradigmatic. I will first set out an 
account of the mainstream view of reason as a superior way of knowing. On this 
reading, emotions are viewed as passions that must be controlled, so that true 
knowledge might manifest itself. This privileging of reason has resulted in the 
loss of a particularly important way of knowing about the world-a way of 
knowing that reason cannot apprehend apart from emotion. Furthermore, I will 
offer an analysis of how this disregard for the emotions operates as an ideological 
bulwark for the underwriting of scientific reason-which is the de facto preserve 
of those who occupy positions of power-usually, white males of a certain socio-
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economic and educational background. Moreover, the rise of reason also 
coincides with the shift of "meaning-making" from the communal to the 
individual. Both the polis and the church as authoritative makers of meaning will 
decline in the face of the individual's increasing attempts to make meaning for 
herself. 
At the same time as the epistemological priority of reason over the emotions 
was being established, the West experienced a turn toward subjectivity. I will 
offer a brief account of the ascendancy of the interior self in the Western 
intellectual tradition as the preserve of value and truth, arguing that a radical shift 
to the interior life of the individual as the referent for value has taken place. The 
effect of this subjective turn, I will contend in chapter four, is an inadequate and 
distorted view of the world, inasmuch as the reality of the world under these 
conditions cannot but be an analogical projection of the self. Furthermore, 
because of the split between reason and emotion, as well as a turn to the self, I 
will suggest that human beings are in danger of losing the kind of intersubjective 
connection necessary to human life. 
I. The Privileging of Reason 
The quickest method, 1 suppose, is to get hold of a mirror and carry it 
around with you everywhere. You'll soon be creating everything 1 
mentioned a moment ago-the sun and the heavenly bodies, the earth, 
yourself, and all other creatures, plants, and so on. (Plato 596e). 
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Beginning with Plato, and down through the Western intellectual tradition, 
reason has been privileged as that which identifies us as part of the human 
species. As such, reason has continued to occupy the privileged position in 
western epistemology. This privileging of reason has had the practical effect of 
legitimating the scientific model as a description of what is real, while at the same 
time being further legitimated as the true source of knowledge, through its 
investiture as the formal goal of science. The mutually reinforcing nature of 
reason as both the goal and the necessary means by which the goal is achieved 
makes the process of challenging reason as the sole constituent of that which is 
epistemically reliable much more difficult, because to do so would seem ipso 
facto to have offered an irrational argument. Moreover, this scientific model has 
pretensions not only to describe the world in which we live, but ultimately to 
colonize every conceivable form of human experience. By colonization I mean 
the sort of establishment of power implied by the ability to name and categorize. 
To the extent that science maps human experience in scientific terms, using 
scientific models, it operates as first order discourse-which is to say, as John 
Gunnell observes, "the primary ontological claims and assumptions, tacit or 
explicit, that define a universe of phenomena, constitute a vision of reality, and 
create a domain of facticity" (19). 
It is extremely important to point out that the rise of reason, and the 
scientific model to which it gave birth, have produced great benefits. Reason and 
science have allowed humanity to make a variety of technological improvements 
across a broad spectrum. From things we would consider necessities, like modem 
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medicine and improvements to agriculture to less urgent but no less useful 
innovations in modem transportation and modem conveniences like air-
conditioning and computers, science and reason have made human life 
considerably safer and longer-though, admittedly, in some cases (like weaponry) 
much more dangerous and shorter. Moreover, the ascendance of reason has 
provided a release from some of the more superstitious bonds of ancient and 
medieval religion. Hence, I do not want to be misunderstood to be staking out 
some form ofneo-Ludditism, or thoroughgoing subjectivism, or an anti-religious 
chauvinism. Instead, because of the way reason has been championed, I want to 
draw attention to some of the consequences this privileging of reason brings with 
it. 
The scientific model of knowledge depends for its intelligibility on there 
being an external world that corresponds to the description of it.4 C.S. Pierce in 
the late nineteenth century famously summarizes the optimistic belief of what he 
takes to be the epistemic pay-off science promises in its search for the truth: 
Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but 
the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves 
to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are 
carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the 
operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no 
selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable 
a man to escape the predestinate opinion. This great law is embodied in 
the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which fated to be 
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ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, 
and the object represented in the opinion is the real. That is the way I 
would explain reality (138-9). 
In other words, Pierce evinces the Enlightenment confidence that truth is what is 
available "to all who investigate" because it exists external to and independent of 
the observer. Hilary Putnam named the epistemological position, metaphysical 
realism. The existence of something very much like this understanding of the 
world is an epistemological necessity to underwrite the scientific model. 
Metaphysical realism asserts that reality exists "out there," independent of a 
perceiver. On this view, according to Putnam, "there is one true and complete 
description ofthe 'the way the world is,'" assuming the perspective of a "God's 
eye point of view" (49). Reason, therefore, is a matter of accommodating one's 
self to and reflecting the truth-that is, what is really there, external to and 
independent of the individual. In the search for knowledge reliable enough to be 
called truth, the knower must avoid subjectivity at all costs. Pierce suggests that 
"a person who arbitrarily chooses the propositions which he will adopt can use the 
word truth only to emphasize the expression of his determination to hold on to his 
choice" (137). The epistemic assumptions of metaphysical realism are the 
dominant assumptions about knowledge all the way back to Plato and Aristotle. 
The prevailing metaphor for knowledge, according to this traditional pre-
Cartesian account of reality, is vision (Rorty 39). That is to say, knowledge 
consists of viewing and correctly reporting reality as it exists independent of the 
viewer. In fact, correct vision of the order of things is "criterial for rationality" 
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(Taylor 124). I cannot truly be said to be exercising reason if my vision of reality 
is flawed, if my vision of reality holds gravity to be optional, for instance, or that 
the sun revolves around the earth. The mind, therefore, is both like a mirror and 
an eye in that it both reflects reality at the same time as it perceives that reality. It 
is not the case in this conception of reality, however, that the mirror that reflects 
the order of things is then viewed by an inner Cartesian eye, which occupies a 
neutral and unsituated position from which to examine these sense impressions; 
rather, the eye of the mind sees what is there, and reason is the process of 
adjusting itself to the reality the mind both reflects and views (Rorty 45). In 
Descartes, on the other hand, the mind's eye investigates the representations it 
finds in the mirror, and constructs reality from the basic building blocks of those 
representations. And inasmuch as it is Descartes who challenges the idea of a 
mind-independent reality, it is to him that we must first tum. 
i. Rene Descartes 
The move toward establishing scientific reason as the privileged form of 
knowing in the West begins in earnest with Descartes, who in the Meditations 
seeks to face down the niggling problem of the foundations upon which 
knowledge can be said to exist with apodictic certainty. In the wake of the 
Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation, and on the cusp of 
the Scientific Revolution, Descartes desires to establish knowledge on firmer 
footing than had been available in the church's reliance on divine revelation as the 
true source of knowledge. He is wary of the inadequacy of the senses, believing 
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that knowledge cannot reliably come to us through perception. Sensations, 
according to Descartes, are presented to the mind in the form of representations. 
He wants to make a distinction between the senses as wholly independent 
percipient faculties and the intellect that constructs the representations based on 
data it receives through the senses, believing that we confuse the senses with the 
judgments made by the mind, and that this is largely a linguistic problem. It is 
our habits of speech that confuse us into thinking that we see with the eyes or hear 
with the ears (Descartes 23). Descartes says that "we say that we 'see' the wax 
itself, if it is present, not that we judge it to be there on the basis of its colour or 
shape ... [but] what I thought I saw with my eyes, I in fact grasp only by the 
faculty of judging that is in my mind" (23). 
If our knowledge of the world does not come through our experience of an 
objective world viewed as if in a mirror, how then do we know the world? 
Descartes suggests that our knowledge of the world is, in reality, our knowledge 
of the ideas the world evokes in us. With the senses, for instance, what we take to 
be properties that inhere in a thing do not in fact inhere in the thing itself, but are 
intellectual judgments we map onto it. Closing out the Second Meditation, 
Descartes concludes that bodies (things) "are not perceived because they are 
touched or seen, but only because they are understood. I clearly realize 
[cognosco] that nothing can be perceived by me more easily or more clearly than 
my own mind" (24). The world can be known, therefore, not as an objective 
reality presented to the intellect through divine revelation or by the senses, but 
only as representations of the world that exist as ideas grasped by the intellect. 
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For my purposes, I will follow Alison Simmons' general definition that a "mental 
state is representational if it acquaints the mind with something existing in 
extramental reality.,,5 
The implications of Descartes' epistemological revolution center on the 
Theory of Ideas, which maintains that the world I perceive exists only in my 
mind. Flying in the face of traditional metaphysical realism, in which the real 
world exists outside, independent of the individual, whose life consists of trying 
to apprehend it, the Theory of Ideas suggests that a thing and the appearance of 
the thing are the same. That is to say, according to Descartes, what humans have 
immediate access to is not the world independent of the perceiver, but rather 
representations of that world to the perceiver. Edmund Husserl observes that 
Descartes "seeks apodictically certain ways by which, within his own pure 
inwardness, an Objective outwardness can be deduced" (3). Husserl rejects the 
Theory of Ideas just to the extent that it abandons the mind to functioning as a 
"closed sphere of interiority," the implications of which are that the mind is cut 
off not only from the world, but even from the body in which it is housed. This 
founding of the objective upon the subjective will have implications for the tum 
to the self shortly, but here it is important to note that Descartes' search for 
apodictic certainty built on the subjective nature of the ego-that is, the I 
antecedent to and necessary for the world to exist-is an attempt to allow science 
to be fixed indubitably upon the sure foundation of reason. The great irony, of 
course, is that under Descartes the sure foundation of reason rests on the 
subjectivity of the perceiver. 
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ii. John Locke and David Hume 
John Locke begins his work on empiricist epistemology, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, by taking aim at Descartes' belief in innate 
ideas, based on his observation that infants seem not to possess any ideas 
universally ---even the idea of God.6 Instead, Locke argues that the mind comes 
to be furnished through experience of perception (53-4). David Hume, following 
up on the work of John Locke also argues that meaning not only could come 
through perception, it must come through perception-that no synthetic 
proposition about the world can be known a priori. We cannot have knowledge 
of anything, in other words, that does not come to us through the senses. Here the 
shift is not away from the individual, but to a different faculty of the individual. 
In the empiricism of Locke and Hume it is not mind, rationally, analytically that 
constructs the world from its interior vantage point, it is the percipient 
impressions given to the individual that build the world experience by experience. 
Hume opens A Treatise of Human Nature by asserting that the mind's 
perceptions are divided into impressions and ideas (Hume 5). He sets down his 
first general proposition: "That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are 
derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which 
they exactly represent" (Hume 7). Hume argues that all knowledge is the result of 
ideas formed after being first presented to the individual through sense 
impressions. He realizes that one does not have sense impressions that represent 
only those things of which one has had sense impressions-like fairies and 
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dragons, for instance. Instead, the individual possesses an imagination, which is 
capable of modifying and recombining ideas from the stock of primary 
impressions and simple ideas (Rume 11).7 Knowledge is predicated on the 
priority of the impressions that come to the individual through the senses, which 
can then be formed into simple ideas, which can then be re-formed into complex 
ideas. The crucial point, though, centers on the insistence by Locke and Hume 
that all knowledge of the world that exists independent of the perceiver is 
empirically based, which is to say, knowledge of that world is still constructed by 
the individual not in a "closed sphere of interiority," but through representations 
of that world. 
The difference between Locke's empiricism and Hume's rests largely in 
their assumptions about divinity. Though Locke disagrees with Descartes about 
whether God can be known innately, both Descartes and Locke share the 
assumption that God is the creator who stands at the headwaters of all knowledge. 
Rume, on the other hand, accepts Locke's empirical epistemological vision, but 
remains uncommitted to the idea of a divine presence in the world. 
It is important to note, though, that what empiricism accomplishes by 
severing ideas from any innate foundation is the undercutting of teleology. 
Epistemological empiricism fits neatly with the scientific revolution taking place 
under Bacon, Gassendi, and Newton. The scientific method, with its emphasis on 
objectivity of observation and measurability of phenomena assumes that 
knowledge worthy of rational consideration is empirically based. Inasmuch as the 
world is known to us synthetically, through our experience, we construct a world 
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in which prior teleological meaning has been foreclosed. That is to say, truth and 
meaning are not something in the world awaiting discovery, but are syntheses of 
empirical knowledge. But because our construction of truth and meaning out of 
the empirical building blocks of experience are being shaped and influenced by 
"passion, custom and education, these syntheses are being made without 
awareness and without good grounds" (Taylor 165). Like Descartes, then, the 
empiricists want to disassemble the accretion of assumptions and return to a surer 
ground upon which to build knowledge. 
Notice, though, that while Locke and Hume disagree with Descartes on the 
possibility of innate knowledge upon which a reliable account of the world can be 
constructed, inasmuch as knowledge of the world is constructed on the percipient 
impressions of the individual, the individual (or some faculty or set of faculties of 
the individual) remains the referent for knowledge. The question, therefore, is not 
whether knowledge is mediated by the individual but, rather, how. In the case of 
Descartes, true knowledge is constructed rationally in the mind, prior to any work 
of the notoriously unreliable senses. For Locke and Hume, however, the 
establishment of reliable knowledge is reversed; knowledge is synthetic, a 
posteriori, the construct of the human mind based on sense impressions. In both 
cases, though, knowledge depends on the individual. 
iii. Immanuel Kant 
Immanuel Kant, in the wake of Locke's and Hume's empiricism, is dubious 
about the ability of the senses to establish knowledge on an epistemically reliable 
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foundation. While he believes that empiricism is the epistemological answer to 
the phenomenal world, there is another world that Kant calls the noumenal, which 
cannot be epistemically established by the senses-but must be established a 
priori. Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy, in which the mind does not 
conform itself to the world, but the world is conformed to the mind, suggests that 
for the sense impressions of Hume to be ordered in any kind of intelligible way, 
they have to be ordered through the a priori invariant categories of understanding 
(time, space, quantity, quality, modality, etc.).8 Sense impressions, in order to 
make sense, have to be constructed in the mind on the framework of conceptions 
that cannot be known experientially, but are the pre-conditions for those 
impressions to be organized into an understanding of the world. Hence, the world 
and our experience of it for Kant conforms to the categories present a priori in the 
mind. 
It should be emphasized at this point in anticipation of what I will address 
shortly in the tum to the self that reason, which comes to have primacy in the 
West from Descartes up through Kant, has as its touchpoint in varying degrees the 
individual human mind. What Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant all share, in a 
departure from the metaphysical realism that had prevailed from the Greeks 
onward, is no longer a belief that true knowledge is a matter of correctly seeing a 
world that exists independent of the seer. Instead, knowledge of the world after 
Descartes, if not generated by the individual, is at least mediated by the 
individual. Vision continues to offer a fitting metaphor for true knowledge, even 
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after Descartes. Now, however, the balance has shifted from what is seen to the 
seer, at least in terms of the orientation of knowledge. 
A Brief Excursus on Ethics and Aesthetics 
It is important to the larger sense of what I want to do later to spend a little 
time now pointing out how the notion that reliable knowledge is a matter of 
correctly viewing an order of things that exists independent of the viewer-which 
has shaped the Western intellectual tradition-is not limited to epistemology. 
Reason as the mirror of nature also has important implications for ethics and 
aesthetics. If one has a correct understanding of nature, one also understands the 
proper ordering of one's behavior as a reflection of the natural order. Moreover, 
inasmuch as mimesis comes to define art as a faithful depiction of the natural 
order as it exists independent of the observer, a true grasp of the natural order is a 
necessary condition of art. 
Plato, for instance, understands morality as "doing one's job and not 
intruding elsewhere" (433b). That raises the question, though, about where it is 
that one goes to discover in what one'sjob consists. The answer, Plato says, is 
that nature equips each of us with a particular job (Plato 433a). But by what 
means will one be able rightly to discern what nature has equipped one to do? 
The answer to that question is mutually reinforcing: nature bestows on reason the 
wisdom to rule the self, while reason is the faculty by which nature is 
apprehended in order to understand the role bestowed upon the self (Plato 441 e). 
In other words, nature has endowed reason with a capacity, the function of which 
is to see nature correctly, and then to rule the non-rational parts of the self in 
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accordance with that knowledge. This state of affairs in the self mirrors the polity 
of the republic, in which there are guardians or rulers, auxiliaries (militias), and 
workers, since "morality is a property of whole communities as well as 
individuals" (368e). The guardians who rule the community have been given a 
job by God, which is to make certain that the separate functions of the community 
operate faithfully each according to its nature, rather than to some pretended 
function (415b). The successful political system requires that the militia protects, 
the farmer farms, the craftsperson exercises the craft appropriate to one's nature, 
and the ruler guards the good the of the community by making certain all 
functions are rightly fulfilled 434c). Plato lays out his full argument by 
concluding that "the constituent categories of a community and of any 
individual's mind are identical in nature and number" (441c). In other words, the 
self, too, is a political system in which reason rules over the non-rational parts 
(441 e). All of this, though, is a reflection of what is the case by natural design, 
"formed and nurtured deep inside the earth" (414d). That is to say, morality, as 
well as epistemology, is a matter not of human invention or social expediency, but 
of seeing and manifesting what is real in the nature of the cosmos. 
Aristotle, too, more or less agrees with Plato in understanding morality as a 
matter of correctly grasping through rational means the function and telos of a 
human life.9 The purpose that humans fulfill, Aristotle believes, is written into 
the order of things; the job of reason is to identify that purpose correctly, and then 
to persuade the non-rational part of the soul to act according to reason. He says in 
the Nicomachean Ethics that "the human function is activity of the soul in accord 
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with reason or requiring reason" (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1098a7).10 
Charles Taylor writes, "The good order of my life is essentially connected with 
my being rational, both in that as my rational life reason is the most important 
determinant of my ends, and also that it is through one of the excellences of 
reason,phronesis, that I can determine my life by this order" (125). "Presumably, 
then," Aristotle says, "the excellent person is far superior because he sees what is 
true in each case, being himself a sort of standard and measure" (EN 1113a35). 
Moreover, although the notion of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline 
does not come along until much later in history, art up until Kant is widely viewed 
as mimetic representation, that is, it consists of a faithful rendering of nature. It is 
worth noting that mimesis in art, even from early on, is not a monolithic concept. 
Between Plato and Aristotle, for instance, there exist differences in some 
fundamental respects. According to Plato, art is problematic, even socially 
disruptive, in part, because it is "two steps removed from truth" (602c). That is, 
according to Plato, truth exists in the world of the forms. Chairs, for instance, are 
all modeled on the perfect form chair. A manufactured chair, then, is one remove 
from reality. A painting of a chair is a representation of a manufactured chair, 
which is itself an imitation. Consequently, rather than clarify, artistic 
representation further obscures our knowledge of truth. Plato finds art's 
inexorable slide toward epistemological imprecision unacceptable, contributing to 
his overall case in which he argues that poets should be banished from the ideal 
republic. In other words, for Plato, art, as well as knowledge, is tied to a correct 
vision of what exists in nature. Therefore, to the extent that art (as a mimesis of 
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nature) distorts our vision of what is truly real in the world of the forms, Plato 
believes it causes more epistemological problems than it is worth-not to mention 
the almost certain morally corrupting nature of art, as in tragedy with its aim of 
evoking emotional response (unseemly passions best left unprovoked). 
Mimetic art, for Aristotle, on the other hand, never pretends to correspond to 
reality in a simple, one-to-one fashion. I I Were simple imitation to be the defining 
characteristic of art (namely, holding up a mirror to reality), art would then be 
history-a reporting or documenting of particular events-which, Aristotle is 
quick to argue, it is not: "The essential difference [i.e., between poetry and 
history] is that the one tells us what happened and the other the sort of thing that 
would happen. That is why poetry is at once more like philosophy and more 
worth while than history, since poetry tends to make general statements, while 
those of history are particular" (Poet 1451b).12 Instead, according to A. D. 
Nuttall, mimesis in an Aristotelian sense "involves the formal independence-the 
'non-reality'---{)fthe signifier," which makes "mimesis hypothetical.,,13 Of 
course, one must have some understanding of causal relationships about the world 
being portrayed mimetically. Nevertheless, it must be conceded, as Halliwell 
notes, that mimesis for Aristotle is a representation that contains the constituent 
parts of the world we inhabit. What mimetic art does, on this view, is to rearrange 
these parts into potential patterns or constructions that would be discernible as 
"possible reality.,,14 In other words, Aristotle's view of mimetic art understands 
the artist giving form and shape to material already available in the world, as 
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opposed to understanding the artist as performing creatio ex nihilo, that is, 
creating, through art, a new world from nothing. 
This brief excursus on ethics and art in Plato and Aristotle is meant to be 
suggestive of the relationship between the metaphor of vision as a means of 
describing the world as it truly is and, in addition to epistemology, what that 
means for moral and aesthetic engagement of the world. In essence, almost from 
the beginning of the Western intellectual tradition, human experience on a variety 
of level assumes correct vision of the world as predicated on a successful 
negotiation of life. That is to say, ethics and art are bound together with 
knowledge by a dependence on a correct vision as a necessary precondition of 
intelligibility. After Descartes not only is the relationship between the individual 
and knowledge reoriented, but ethics and art will also eventually become 
untethered from realities that exist "out there," independent of the individual. 
The Marginalization of Emotion 
As reason was becoming established with science as the standard of 
knowledge, the emotions were simultaneously becoming further alienated from 
the conception of true knowledge. Emotions suffered as the binary opposite, 
being characterized in purely essential terms. On this reading, emotions appear as 
instinctive urges-spontaneous and powerful. Even the words that we use to 
speak about emotions, words like feeling and passion, indicate the Western 
tradition of viewing emotions as contingent, particular, embodied impulses, while 
reason has non-contingent, universal, disembodied deliberation as its goal. 
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Emotions pull us not in the direction of what is true (or if they do, it is only 
inadvertently), but in the direction of our desires and cravings-often thought of 
as "animal desires." On this account, emotions are neither educable nor socially 
constructed; they are elemental compulsions that threaten to distract us from the 
important work of reason. The ways we popularly describe emotions suggest that 
they are like forces of nature: anger is volcanic,joy is irrepressible, sadness 
overwhelms, and surprise shocks; love is something Ifall into, and guilt washes 
over me like a tidal wave, I sink into despair, and I am overcome with relief. 
Certainly, as I will suggest in Chapter Two when I talk about primary 
emotions, there is a sense in which it is appropriate to speak of emotions as pre-
critical impulses over which we have no control once triggered. What I will argue 
is that there are basic or primary emotions with which humans are hard-wired-
that is, emotions such as anger, joy, fear, disgust, and surprise-which contrast 
with complex or secondary emotions-for example, disappointment, anticipation, 
empathy, resentment, and so on-and that these basic emotions are triggered 
automatically. It is the triggers of those basic emotions, however, that are socially 
constructed and conditioned. That is to say, although fear, for instance, is a 
primary emotion that seems to exist trans-culturally, that which prompts fear can 
be calibrated (and re-calibrated) on a social level. I may learn to react with fear to 
an animal native to my environment because I have been taught or have seen that 
it is dangerous, though a person from another part of the world may see the same 
animal and be indifferent to it, being without benefit of that conditioning. 
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The purpose of my bringing up the emotional essentialism passed down 
through the Western intellectual tradition is to call attention to the conventional 
hierarchy of human capacities in which reason occupies the top spot. On this 
reading, emotions are meant to be controlled by reason, so that they do not 
threaten reason's rule of the person. According to this view, we are at our most 
human when reason governs our thoughts and actions. The implication, then, is 
that we are somehow less human when we succumb to our emotions, that is, to 
the rule of those impulses that make up our "animal nature." I think this misses a 
hugely important point about our desire for emotional engagement as a central 
feature of human life qua human, as I will argue in Chapter Three. I bring it up 
here to suggest that this hierarchy of human capacities-when placed on a 
continuum in which human occupies one end of the spectrum in contradistinction 
to animal, which occupies the other-has implications not only for knowledge, 
but for the political ends that knowledge (especially in the form of scientific 
knowledge) serves. In this hierarchy, emotions get negatively defined against 
reason. Accordingly, emotions in this view are cast as irrational. 
The construction of knowledge on this model presents a series of binaries, 
the establishment of which is a not altogether benign one. These binaries include 
rationality/irrationality, reason/emotion, science/art, objective/subjective, 
epistemology/ethics, fact/value, culture/nature, mindlbody, as well as 
male/female. Those privileged concepts that are thought somehow to reside in the 
rational part of the human inexorably present a negative definition of the concepts 
on the obverse side of the binary. Hence, the emotions, for instance, are defined 
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negatively against reason. 15 Reason gets defined positively as rational, scientific, 
objective, factual, and, ultimately, male. In this relationship to reason, emotion is 
necessarily (if often unwittingly) defined as irrational, un-scientific, subjective, 
opinion-based, and, ultimately, female, which is to say, as anti-reason. To label 
the second half of these binaries anti-reason suggests a kind of active hostility 
toward reason, against which one should be vigilantly on guard. 
The process of arriving at reliable knowledge in the West, therefore, has 
come to assume a suspension of just these sorts of categories of anti-reason. It is 
worth quoting Kenneth Gergen at length on how this theoretical process of 
arriving at reliable knowledge unfolds: 
If the process is operating without interference, sensations serve as a 
mirror to the world, and the resulting categories are available for rational 
thought and communication through language. By implication, this set of 
presumptions suggests that any other form of mental process may 
potentially interfere with these essential functions of observation and 
categorization. Particularly suspect are any processes that link the 
individual to the external world in such a way that the individual's actions 
are altered, unsettled, or affected: for processes of this type are just those 
which may alter the individual's capacities for objective observation. 
Thus emotions, motives, values, and desires-as traditionally conceived-
are all potentially threatening to objectivity. All link the individual to the 
world in such a way that certain lines of action become imperative and 
others become abhorrent. In the resulting clamor toward action, the 
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sensitive instrument of sensation and the nuanced process of 
categorization may be unsettled. Biases and distortion are invited (281). 
Scientific reason, Gergen argues, receives--or at the least, sustains-its 
authoritative force through linguistic structures designed to remove the individual 
from perspectival participant to objective observer. Objectivity, which is central 
to the scientific enterprise, requires this removal of the individual from 
observation, just to the extent that the individual, who remains prone to the biases 
and distortions of subjectivity, is thought to be the weak link in the chain of 
empirical scientific observation. The difficulty, of course, centers on the fact that 
empirical observation requires situated individual perspectives of observation, if 
only because individuals are situated perspectival observers in virtue ofthe 
limitations of finite humanity. Scientific empiricism faces the difficulty of 
simultaneously having to affirm the necessity of human sensation, while at the 
same time attempting to deny through a shift in language the presence of human 
sensation as a necessary component of observation-in effect, adopting Thomas 
Nagel's "view from nowhere" (The View from Nowhere). Gergen points out that 
the subtle way this shift is accomplished in scientific writing is through the 
adoption of a perspective of "impersonal collectivity," giving the appearance of 
the observer as the "omniscient eye" (280). Objectivity is established through a 
slight alteration oflanguage from, for example, "I observed ... " to "It was 
observed ... " or "I found ... " to "It was found ... "-which effectively removes 
the subjective observer in favor of, what is meant to be taken as, an objective 
observer. "In effect," Gergen writes, "the well-wrought reality must first establish 
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the presence of the author within the scene, and then subtly replace the author 
with a transcendent standpoint" (280). 
Through this necessary shift from the establishment of a subjective presence 
to an objective observer, scientific empiricism sets up what I will call the paradox 
of the observer. This paradox of the observer stands at the heart of empirically 
based scientific knowledge. On the one hand, from Locke and Hume to the 
present day, empirical knowledge is built by the indispensible percipient 
individual, sense impression by sense impression, idea by idea. The individual 
constructs knowledge through perceptual information; but as thinkers from as far 
back as Plato to Descartes are aware, individual perception, because of distorting 
factors like emotion and evaluation, is not always reliable; it can be manipulated, 
distorted, miscategorized, or in certain cases, obstinately ignored. Therefore, the 
perspective of the subjective individual must be transmuted in ways that guard 
against its unreliability. Knowledge-as Descartes is convinced in the 
Meditations-if it is to be consistent and reliable must be established on firmer, 
apodictic ground than what is taken to be the inevitable unreliability of the senses. 
Since reason is continually presented with, what are taken to be by rationalists and 
empiricists alike, the potential distortions of emotion, and since humans are 
amazingly accomplished at self-deception with respect to the process at rational 
thought (e.g., It is no coincidence, I take it, that rationalizing is so closely related 
linguistically to rationality.), the irony with Descartes' rationalism is that the firm, 
apodictic ground upon which he seeks to establish knowledge is a hermetically 
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sealed off interiority, and is no less fraught with the peril of human distortion than 
the empiricists, the heart of whose claims the cogito anticipates. 
Leading up to the Enlightenment the search to establish scientific reason 
under either rationalism or empiricism is a project with a common goal: to set 
reason on surer footing than what is thought to be available in a system dependent 
upon divine revelation. To the extent that the new scientific revolution in many 
cases provides a superior model by which to describe the workings of the physical 
world and the relationships between organisms, it certainly outpaces a Medieval 
model dependent on miraculous reliquaries, cosmic crystal spheres, and bodily 
humours for comprehensive description. The argument I am making is in no way 
nostalgic about the time prior to the ascendency of scientific reason, which in 
many respects can rightly be thought of as the "Dark Ages." There is no question 
that the West, largely as a result of the Enlightenment championing of reason, has 
experienced great intellectual and social benefit-both in terms of the sheer 
descriptive power of science and some of the technological advances it makes 
possible, as well as the potentially less violent vision of human society built on a 
social contract, instead of on secular feudalism and religious vassalage. 
Instead, my aim is to point out some of the serious implications of viewing 
the world as correctly understood only through reason, a view in which emotion 
and evaluation are always to be treated warily, as potential distortions to the 
process of correct description that leads to reliable knowledge. In contemporary 
Western society, we have come to assume that the scientific model is the only 
model that can be counted upon to produce facts-where what counts as "facts" is 
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itself a product of the scientific method (e.g., Positivism). All other descriptive 
models (religious, social, artistic, etc.) are to be judged in relationship to their 
ability to produce output that meets the threshold standard of reason. If they 
make claims about the world that cannot be verified through the mechanism of 
scientific reason, these other descriptive models are discounted as subjective, and 
therefore, necessarily inferior. In that sense then, scientific reason stands above 
all other ways of knowing, presumably on the establishable ground of reason (if 
not apodictic, then certainly empirically verifiable) acting as a neutral referee, 
making non-evaluative judgments about the validity, or even possibility of all 
other truth claims. 
The historical nature of the search for knowledge that can be founded on 
incontestable grounds external to the individual and unimpeded by the distortions 
of emotion not only has epistemological implications, but also political ones. 
Plato, for example, says that "you also appreciate that when we're afflicted by 
trouble in our own lives, then we take pride in the opposite-in our ability to 
endure pain without being upset. We think that this is manly behavior, and that 
only women behave in the way we were sanctioning earlier" (605d)-that is, 
emotionally. Of course, the advancement of the idea that woman and 
emotionality are correlatives is consistent with Plato's larger project, which views 
the political rule of the republic and the political rule of the individual as 
commensurable. By lumping women together with children and slaves, all of 
whom "evidently experience the greatest quantity and variety of forms of desire, 
pleasure, and pain," Plato has announced his general belief in the inferiority of 
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women, equating women with the non-rational parts of the mind, both of which 
are fit to be ruled-by men and reason respectively (431 c ).16 
The equating of male and reason, female and emotion has become a trope in 
Western thought that creates an ideological subtext, underwriting the current 
political arrangements. 17 Genevieve Lloyd observes that "From the beginning of 
philosophical thought, femaleness was symbolically associated with what Reason 
supposedly left behind-the dark powers of the earth goddesses, immersion in 
unknown forces associated with mysterious female powers" (Lloyd 2). As 
ideologies do this one gains strength by going largely unspoken. Instead of being 
a self-conscious assertion of the truth (in this case, a malevolent one), ideology 
operates on the level for the most part transparent to the culture (in this case, 
Western). Because it is widely assumed to be the way reality is ordered, 
arguments need no longer to be made on behalf of its veracity. In fact, to the 
extent that feminism has made successful counterarguments against the 
assumption that reasonable equals male and emotional equals female, it is because 
those counterarguments call into question the already settled nature of a 
traditional understanding of "the way things are." One of the implications of this 
ideology is that that which cannot be accounted for by the scientific model gets 
discounted, relegated to a category understood to be less important, a category 
that does not readily lend itself to scientific description and mapping (e.g., 
emotion, value, irrationality, beauty, etc.).18 Alison Jaggar contends: 
In these circumstances, where there is a differential assignment of reason 
and emotion, it is easy to see the ideological function of the myth of the 
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dispassionate investigator. It functions, obviously, to bolster the epistemic 
authority of the currently dominant groups, composed largely of white 
men, and to discredit the observations and claims of the currently 
subordinate groups including, of course, the observations and claims of 
many people of color and women" (Jag gar 142). 
That is to say, white men are legitimated as knowers in virtue of the fact that they 
are white men. Clearly this is not considered universally true; people of color and 
women in many cases are also considered knowers. However, to the extent that 
people of color and women have been legitimated as knowers, it is in spite of, and 
not because of, the way the world is generally thought to be ordered. 19 
To raise the issue of ideology in the "differential assignments of reason and 
emotion," though, is not necessarily to assign evil intentions. Plato and Aristotle 
were not consciously seeking arguments to bolster male hegemony; they believed 
they were correctly describing the way reality is ordered. Instead, raising the 
issue of ideology in this instance is an attempt to highlight assumptions that 
generally operate beneath the horizon of awareness, the unremarked nature of 
which comprises much of its power as an ideology to establish what can be called 
"normal" and "real." 
In what has become the dominant epistemological model in the West, 
reliable knowledge is a product of disinterested rationality. Rationality is thought 
to be able to claim disinterest because of an abiding commitment to objectivity. 
True knowledge, on this reading, is always knowledge of what is really out 
there-without regard to the observer. Consequently, the acquisition of 
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knowledge comes through dispassionate observation that is value-neutral and 
non-perspectival. As Daston and Galison have observed, "First and foremost, 
objectivity is the suppression of some aspect of the self, the countering of some 
subjectivity" (36). The paradigm for this kind of knowing is physics (Code What 
Can She Know? : Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge 32). 
Viewing physics as the apotheosis of knowing carries with it some 
assumptions about how that unalloyed knowledge must be achieved. Mary 
Hawkesworth points out that knowledge constructed on a model of intellectual 
purity, unburdened by potential subjective human contaminants, runs into a 
problem-namely, that the attainment of "a decontaminated intellect presupposes 
that unwanted contaminants can clearly be identified" (1994, 158). But even if 
there were universal agreement on those parts of a person that obstruct rather than 
facilitate reliable knowledge, it would still have the effect of negatively defining 
everything else (that is, for example, emotions, values, sensations, imagination, 
desires, in short, human subjectivity) as not only unnecessary for knowledge, but 
as impediments to knowledge that must be quarantined, bracketed, subdued if 
knowledge is ever to be reliable. 
Emotions, on this view, are prescinded from successfully assisting us in the 
acquisition of reliable knowledge. The pursuit of knowledge allows only for 
disinterested or dispassionate (note the use of "passion" in drawing this binary) 
observation. In fact, it is always individual observers who threaten to get in the 
way of acquiring true knowledge, because they are prone (even if unwittingly) to 
inserting themselves into the act of observation. 
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As feminist epistemology has argued, though, the privileging of objective or 
dispassionate reason over subjective and uncontrollable emotion is ideological, 
precisely because the historical Western conception of reason is the domain of 
white males, while females and minorities are said to be controlled by emotion.2o 
That the primacy of reason operates as the most reliable source of knowledge in 
this epistemological model perpetuates traditional power arrangements. In the 
"real" world of science and ideas, male reason always trumps female emotion. As 
an ideology, then, this gendered epistemological model functions beneath the 
surface of everyday activity as the circumscription of reality. One of its primary 
ideological functions is to situate rival epistemological claims outside the bounds 
of "reality." Consequently, the privileging of reason is continually reinforced as 
the only way to arrive dispassionately at reliable knowledge by placing it in 
relationship to emotions-then describing those emotions as unstable and as 
continually failing to live up to the rigorous demands of objective knowing. 
This view of emotions maintains its epistemological authority by situating 
the entire complex process that makes up emotions as a pre-critical urge, which 
can only be subdued, but never educated. Jaggar argues that "the apparently 
individual and involuntary character of our emotional experience often is taken as 
evidence that emotions are presocial, instinctive responses, determined by our 
biological constitution" (134). The inference, of course, from the assertion that 
the emotional process is wholly instinctive is that no part of the process of 
emotional response can ever be modified or recalibrated, and that we are always 
at the mercy of our urges as they are; we either conquer them or succumb to them, 
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but we can never change them or that which triggers them. If I am seen to be 
"emotional," I will be seen to have deviated from the baseline of the highest form 
of human response-reason. And if knowing is the goal, this deviation will be 
viewed as prima facie evidence that I cannot have reached true knowledge, which 
is to say, knowledge that would pass muster in a physics lab, discounting it and 
making it a necessarily inferior form of knowing. And since, as I have already 
discussed, women and people of color traditionally occupy the emotion side of the 
reason/emotion binary, and since, according to conventional Western 
epistemological principles, emotions are obstacles to the privileged knowledge 
that comes from reason, the status of women and people of color as knowers 
cannot but be viewed as problematic. 
Referring to emotions asfeelings or as passions, seeing them as biological 
fate, then, further underwrites an assumption that emotions are aspects of our 
existence that are unconditioned and uninformed. In this way, we are always at 
the mercy of the emotions we have inherited, constantly working to contain those 
emotions without hope of ever changing them. What I will argue at greater length 
in Chapter Two, however, is not that somehow the phenomenology of emotions 
when experiencedfeels different to the one experiencing them, or appears 
different to the one observing their manifestation-that is, fear, pity, grief, 
compassion, and so on feel and look the same whether one assumes they are 
essential impulses, socially constructed, or some mixture of the two. In other 
words, I am not making any comment here about how the process of emotional 
response unfolds once it has been initiated. Instead, I am suggesting that we do 
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possess some control over how those emotions are formed, and therefore, what 
triggers a response. And if we do have some conscious control over our 
emotional formation, then we also bear a certain moral responsibility for 
consciously working to form our emotions in ways appropriate to the practice of 
emotional engagement. I am much persuaded by Lorraine Code's argument about 
"epistemic responsibility" as the responsibility to know certain things, and that to 
remain ignorant is not just an epistemic failure but a moral one. If, for example, I 
am going to Britain, it is incumbent upon me to know that people drive on left 
hand side of the road. Not to know what should be known in certain cases can 
constitute a moral failure. However, in the case of training appropriate emotional 
response, since I do not want to be misunderstood to be saying that emotions have 
cognitive content, I will confine myself at this point to speaking only of moral 
responsibility, laying aside arguments about epistemic responsibility. It is 
important to keep in mind, though, that in the argument I am making training our 
emotions does influence the kinds of things we can know; for example, to 
experience disappointment at being turned down for a job is in some way to have 
knowledge of the emotional responses of another in a similar situation. This 
knowledge of another's emotional response, if it is to be more than knowledge of 
potential responses to certain stimuli, if it is to be the kind of emotional attending 
necessary for intersubjectivity, it must be informed by something more than 
reason alone; which suggests that there are certain kinds of knowledge it is 
necessary to possess for life in community that are available as knowledge but 
which come to us through another faculty beside reason (see Code Epistemic 
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Responsibility). Hence, as Aristotle insists, the education of the emotions so that 
we experience them at the right time and in the right way is fundamental to 
eudaimonia. 
Inasmuch as reason, especially scientific reason, has gained preeminence in 
the West as a way of knowing, emotions have been pushed to the irrational 
margins, calling into question, as I have noted, the status of who can be 
considered knowers. Though our relationship to the world in which we live, as 
well as how we can know about that world, has been the subject of much 
contention, the status of reason as the finallegitimator of knowledge has remained 
fairly constant, moving in fits and starts from an external world we seek correctly 
to reflect (as ifin a mirror) to an interior world constituted rationally, to a world 
made available to the interior through sense perception, to a world constituted 
through subjective universality. From Descartes onward, though, the emphasis on 
the individual as the locus of value has also emerged as a crucial part of the 
conversation. Whether the world is presented to the individual as a series of 
representations that evoke ideas within the individual-a world constituted by the 
individual mind, as is the case with Descartes---{)r it is the other way around, that 
is, that ideas are themselves formed by the experience of sense impressions 
presented to the individual who constructs the world through those impressions, 
as is the case with Locke and Hume---{)r it is some mix of the two-that 
knowledge of the world comes through sense impressions that can only be 
intelligible after having been organized by the a priori categories attendant in the 
mind, as is the case with Kant, the centrality of the individual looms large. It is 
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important to keep this epistemological shift in mind-a shift from knowledge as a 
reflection of the world to which the individual must adjust to a state of affairs in 
which knowledge is, if not a construction accomplished at the hands of the 
individual, then is at least, mediated by the individual. This epistemological shift 
informs the turn to the self as the final arbiter of value claims, a turn which was 
simultaneously emerging as a phenomenon in Western religious and social 
arrangements. It is to this shift that we must now devote our attention. 
II. The Turn to the Self 
The time is now propitious, as he guesses, 
The meal is ended, she is bored and tired, 
Endeavors to engage her in caresses 
Which still are unreproved, if undesired 
Flushed and decided, he assaults at once; 
Exploring hands encounter no defence; 
His vanity requires no response, 
And makes a welcome of indifference (234-241). 
She turns and looks a moment in the glass, 
Hardly aware of her departed lover; 
Her brain allows one half-formed thought to pass: 
"Well now that's done; and I'm glad it's over. " 
When lovely woman stoops to folly and 
Paces about her room again, alone, 
She smoothes her hair with automatic hand, 
And puts a record on the gramophone (249-256. 
(Eliot 80-1) 
In this short section from T.S. Eliot's The Wasteland the implications of 
the turn to the self manifest in the picture of a bored lover who, even though she is 
engaging in what should be a significant intersubjective emotional encounter 
(namely, having sex), is merely "bored and tired.',2l Indeed, she is so self-
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absorbed that afterwards she is "hardly aware of her departed lover." Tellingly, 
her first act after sex is to look in the mirror, where presumably she will find the 
only object of emotional attachment she is able to engage, inasmuch as she is left 
to pace "about her room again, alone." This short excerpt from Eliot's Modernist 
masterpiece is suggestive of the tum to the self that, by the early Twentieth 
Century had firmly taken hold in Western culture. 
The rise of the individual in Western thought is well-plowed, if fertile, 
ground as a subject of intellectual history. The implications of the modem 
development that centers on the individual as the locus of meaning are broad, but 
no less significant for that breadth. By referring to the locus of meaning and 
value that centers on the individual I am suggesting that the final arbiter of what 
can be said to rise to the level of reliable knowledge and of what ought to be 
viewed as valuable has shifted radically from the community to the individual. 
Through this shift epistemology and ethics have gone from matters to be settled 
by communal discourse and deliberation to matters now finally settled by the 
individual through a series of interior interrogations. 
Epistemology and the individual have had an ambivalent relationship. The 
tension centers on whether knowledge is a stand-alone entity or a production of 
the individual. On the one hand, inasmuch as science in the West has come to be 
accorded the paradigmatic status of true knowledge, the goal of dispassionate 
objectivity would seem to marginalize the individual as the locus of meaning. 
However, the implications of Descartes' Theory ofldeas, in which the world, and, 
therefore, our knowledge of the world exists not objectively "out there," but as a 
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subjective reality ofthe individual, catalyzes a radical shift toward interiority by 
assuming an epistemological stance of the first person perspective. The 
relationship between the knower and what can be known, whether knowledge is 
adventitious and concerns a reality independent of the individual or knowledge is 
generated in the mind or through the percipient faculties of the individual, has 
placed the individual in a tentative epistemic relationship to knowledge. 
Complicating things further between the knower and what can be know, as 
Lorraine Code has pointed out, is that "the metaphysics of the person that 
underpins the objective model (and excludes knowing the person from its 
purview) depicts human subjects as essentially solitary, separate, self-subsistent 
beings, fundamentally opaque to one another.,,22 If Code is right, it is precisely 
the alienating effects of objective knowing that throw the individual back upon 
herself, thus creating, ironically, a dynamic in which interiority is the primary 
stance from which to negotiate human existence. Descartes set the modem course 
for what has often been called the tum to the self. In Descartes rationality, 
according to Charles Taylor, "is now an internal property of subjective thinking, 
rather than consisting in its vision of reality" (156). Without question a Cartesian 
philosophy of mind is viewed by most philosophers today as inadequate. There 
can be little doubt, however, that Descartes' influence is still with us. In moving 
epistemology from a search for what is really metaphysically "out there" to a 
reality that must be constructed by attending to the representation of impressions 
to the mind, Descartes has set the stage for the popular contemporary penchant for 
questioning the claims of all external authorities until they first past through the 
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epistemic filter of the individual. Indeed, on this popular contemporary reading 
even what or who can be considered an external authority is a matter of individual 
choice. The question is not always a matter of what the facts demonstrate, but a 
matter of what common standard can be used to adjudicate questions offacticity. 
The issue of the debate over facticity, for example, is illustrated by the 
contemporary chasm between scientific evolution and theistic creation. The gulf 
develops not with whether or not one side or the other is properly attending to the 
facts, but with who or what is in a position to determine the authority necessary to 
make factual claims in the first place. In other words, the argument is not over a 
common set of facts. The argument is prior to-and seemingly incommensurable 
with-Just what standard establishes the factual nature of facts. The argument is 
not over whether the facts of science or the facts of the Bible are more reliable, 
but over whether science or the Bible has the right to claim legitimating authority 
for the other. 
Kant retains some of the spirit of Descartes, and in the process 
demonstrates the link between epistemology and ethics in his essay, "What Is 
Enlightenment?" In it Kant argues that enlightenment is humanity's attempt to 
liberate itself from its "self-incurred tutelage" (3). That is to say, for Kant, 
humanity'S moral failure consists in its convention of continuing to take direction 
from some external authority. According to Kant, the remedy for this rational 
timidity lies in enlightenment-Sapere aude I-the determination to trust one's 
own reason. In contemporary terms, Kant seems to be offering the exhortation to 
take the initiative to "think for oneself." In other words, not only should morality 
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be grounded in reasons that seem fitting to the individual rather than imposed by 
some external authority, but that even the reason upon which that morality is 
based is apprehended by the individual. Kant moves away from a Greek 
conception of morality as tied to the polis or the Christian conception of morality 
as imposed by ecclesiastical mandate, arguing that true moral agency requires the 
unfettered freedom of the individual will-absent any exterior influence (either 
political or theological).23 In the process, Kant (unwittingly, I think) helps to set 
the stage in ethics for the popular contemporary understanding of the individual as 
the primary arbiter of what constitutes moral action. 
Additionally, although Kant raises the issue of the necessity of dispassion 
and universality in aesthetics, that universality in aesthetics is the sum of 
percipient subjectivities. So, although objectivity and universality are what Kant 
strives for, he leaves the door open to those who would come behind him to 
understand the movement of ethics and aesthetics as beginning with the individual 
and moving outward. Unfortunately, in a move Kant sought to prevent through 
his work on aesthetic judgment, as modernity takes hold, art increasingly becomes 
a matter of individual taste, failing to recognize an objectivity formed by a 
necessarily consensual collective subjectivity. 
Moreover, political philosophy, for instance, undergoes a radical 
transformation with the emergence of liberal democracy and the social contract as 
a way of empowering collectives comprised of individuals.24 In religion, the 
reforms of the Protestant Reformation are predicated on the assumption that 
ecclesiastical structures, more often than not, stand in the way of the individual's 
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access to God. Individual interpretation of scripture and the emphasis on the 
priesthood of all believers by the Protestant Reformation effectively moves the 
emphasis off of the church and its clergy as the primary mediators of divine grace 
and firmly onto the individual. Furthermore, the rise of critical theory in the 
1960s, in particular Postmodemism in its various forms, draws attention to the 
instabilities in structures that have traditionally been assumed to be established 
and constant. From questions of epistemology to questions of language, 
postmodem critical theory has challenged assumptions about what can be 
depended upon to provide meaning, even within particular cultures and linguistic 
systems. As a result, the individual is under mounting pressure to provide a 
meaning and purpose for life that emerges from a kind of radical interiority. 
My attention to the rise of the individual in Western thought as a 
phenomenon with broad implications centers not on viewing this phenomenon as 
an end in itself, but as an analysis of some of the problems inherent in so viewing 
the world. Ultimately, part of my larger argument is that regarding the individual 
as the locus of meaning and value has profoundly damaging implications not only 
for epistemology and ethics, or even for aesthetics, politics, and religion, but for 
the kind of emotional attention (described by Iris Murdoch as the "loving gaze") 
that is necessary for human intersubjectivity and, therefore, human flourishing. I 
point out the trajectory of the tum to the self and its implications in epistemology, 
ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, religion, and critical theory not because I 
intend to trace this tum in each discipline-a capacious, if not impossible task in a 
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single work (let alone in a chapter)-but rather to suggest initially just how 
sweeping this turn to the self is, and how far reaching are its implications. 
Once again, my interests in the survey of the turn to the self tend toward the 
illustrative, rather than the exhaustive. What I seek here is to be able to trace the 
story of the rise of the individual in Western thought in a general way as a 
necessary backdrop to the later explication of the threats to intersubjectivity in 
that development to which I will attend in Chapter Four. Locating meaning and a 
purpose for life within communities underscored by intersubjectivity, and beyond 
the realm of the individual, I would suggest, allows one to see others as subjects 
with their own projects and goals-rather than as objects to be viewed through the 
objectifying and abstracting lens of reason or through the reflexive lens of the 
individual. 
As I have indicated, I will have more to say about the necessity of a 
community that fosters the kind of emotional engagement critical to human 
flourishing in Chapter Four, but I want to take a moment at this point to say what 
I mean by community. By community I mean those sometimes formal and other 
times informal groups to which people belong, and from which people receive a 
variety of messages about what is real, true, beautiful, moral, and valuable. A 
community in the sense I am using the term here could be as large as a nation or a 
society, or as small as a family. A person may come under the influence of 
multiple communities at any given time-many of which overlap and offer 
competing messages about what is real, true, beautiful, etc. These communities 
construct webs of meaning that also contain within them often competing, or even 
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contradictory, claims. And while it is true that the individual frequently finds 
herself in the position of having to discern between the claims of different 
communities, it is also the case that much of what comes to be understood as real, 
true, beautiful, etc. by the individual comes through the influence of these various 
communities-without a conscious decision made by the individual; and it is this 
conscious decision that is presupposed in modem accounts of value that purport to 
be individually derived. 
At the same time that reason was becoming entrenched as the only path to 
reliable knowledge, the groundwork was being laid to establish the individual self 
as the locus of meaning and value, the true touchstone of reality-a state of affairs 
that persists in the west to this day. Charles Taylor identifies this epistemological 
shift, this tum to the self, as "radical reflexivity" (Taylor 131). Taylor avers that 
it is Augustine "who introduced the inwardness of radical reflexivity and 
bequeathed it to the Western tradition of thought (Taylor 131)." What we find in 
Augustine is an interiority that is radically reflexive in virtue of the fact that what 
becomes important "is the adoption of the first-person standpoint (Taylor 130)." 
Hence, radical reflexivity is not only an awareness of the self, but is an awareness 
of awareness; it is the illumination of "that space where I am present to myself 
(Taylor 131 )." Augustine, then, stands as the predecessor to Descartes and the 
radical subjectivity which was to follow. 25 Richard Rorty quotes Gareth 
Matthews to this effect, saying: 
The picture of human beings as having ... both an "inside" and an 
"outside" is so commonplace, so (as it may seem to us) commonsensical, 
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that we find it hard to realize how strikingly modem it is. But to 
appreciate its modernity one need only cast about for statements of it 
earlier than Descartes. One does find interesting anticipations of it in 
Augustine, but not much earlier, and not much between the time of 
Augustine and that of Descartes.26 
The relatively recent and "commonsensical" nature of the inside/outside binary 
suggests its ideological nature--that is, its nature as a construct has taken on such 
an air of reasonableness and taken-for-grantedness that it seems impossible to 
contemporary minds to imagine how it could be otherwise. And yet, it is the 
continuation of this inside/outside binary that makes preferable the nature of 
knowledge, as well as moral and aesthetic judgment, as generated within the 
interior life of the individual possible. Traditionally, identity was assumed to be a 
product of a network of social relationships, the appropriation of certain kinds of 
roles within a community, rather than a heroic act on the part of the individual. 
In this section I want briefly to trace some of the contributing factors in 
establishing the self at the center of Western epistemological and moral life. I 
will provide a brief sketch of how theology in the wake of Meister Eckhart and 
Martin Luther increasingly locates the important work of the spiritual life within 
the individual. Then, I will outline some of the developments within Western 
philosophy that also contributed to the process of interiorization, from Descartes 
through the Emotivists. 
Admittedly, many factors in the intellectual and cultural history of the West 
bear investigation beyond the few threads I intend to follow. The tum to the self 
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deserves a much more comprehensive exploration than space will permit me. My 
purpose in this chapter is not to trace all the possible contributing dynamics that 
have resulted in the tectonic shift to what I have called the tum to the self, in order 
to prove that this state of affairs has occurred. To do so would be a different and 
much more ambitious undertaking than I am able to do now. Instead, I will begin 
by reiterating my working assumption, one that is, I think, defensible and not 
terribly controversial, which is that the radical reflexivity described by Taylor is a 
contemporary Western reality, if not an inevitability. Taking that as an initial 
assumption, I am trying to weave together some of the threads that have delivered 
us to this place. The picture I am trying to draw in this section has to do with just 
a few of the various influences that illustrate the shift from a culture27 that begins 
with the Greeks and continues on through much of the Middle Ages. This shift 
highlights the movement from a time in which individuals understood themselves 
qua individuals primarily through their relationship to a larger community 
(namely, the Greekpolis, and later the Roman Catholic Church) to a modem 
liberal culture in which the individual understands himself qua individual by a 
freedom to choose-a freedom of choice that is believed to precede the exterior 
influence of a community. In fact, a common assumption is that communities not 
only do not precede the individual, but that communities exist only because 
individuals have corne to together and have chosen as to associate with one 
another. That is, on a contemporary liberal reading any commonalities that exist 
in communities are products of choices made by individuals who seek 
associations based on shared values, projects, inclinations, and so on. 
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And while Aristotle says something similar-that the polis "comes to be for 
the sake of living, but it remains together for the sake of living well" (Politics 
1252 b9),28 suggesting that the impulse to form social networks is an individual 
one, he is quick to point out that this impulse is not self-generated-that is, that it 
is not the result of an individual choice. Instead, he says that the social networks 
that form communities, beginning at their most basic level as the pairing for 
procreation, are natural impulses (1252a27). In fact, Aristotle argues that 
communities are prior to individuals, "since a whole is necessarily prior to its 
parts (1253a20).,,29 Aristotle is using "prior" in this case in the sense of prior in 
nature. That is to say, the polis is prior to the individual, according to Aristotle, 
because to speak of the individual apart from the polis is to speak homonymously 
(1253a22). It is, in other words, to speak of a part of the whole without reference 
to the whole that gives the part its function, like speaking of a hand that is 
detached from the body. Since a hand detached from the body can no longer 
fulfill its function as a hand, it no longer has meaning as a hand, making no sense 
to speak of it as prior to the body-because without a body a hand would not 
realize the purpose for which nature created it. To Aristotle, then, speaking of the 
individual's prior choice of the community is akin to speaking of the hand's 
choice to be a part of the body. The community determines the purpose of the 
individual, not the individual the community-admittedly a difficult word for 
contemporary ears to hear. 
The movement toward a viewing of the self as prior to and independent of 
the community, however, was a gradual one. I will now turn to some of the 
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factors that contributed to a general reversal of Aristotle's assumption about the 
relationship of the whole to the parts, various developments that, if they did not 
cause the turn to the self, then at least made it possible as a cultural eventuality. 
a. Theology 
In theology, Meister Eckhart's concept of Abgeschiedenheit (detachment) 
allowed for a mystical concentration on the internal person, which ultimately 
fueled Martin Luther's and, eventually, the Protestant Reformation's, focus on 
interiority. Traced through time, it is possible to identify this radical reflexivity in 
an increasingly fragmented Protestantism. 
With the growth of towns and cities in thirteenth century Germany, one 
seemed always to be surrounded by people.3o It was increasingly difficult to be 
alone in a physical sense. Eckhart focused on Abgeschiedenheit-that is, the 
detachment of the individual with her or his own thoughts. The solitude of 
detachment, Eckhart believes, fortifies the individual against the vagaries of 
everyday life. He writes: "Here you should know that true detachment 
[Abgeschiedenheit] is nothing else than for the spirit to stand as immovable 
against whatever may chance to it of joy and sorrow, honor, shame, and disgrace 
as a mountain of lead stands before a little breath of wind" (Eckhart 288). This 
detachment, for Eckhart, is a renunciation of this world in favor of the spiritual 
world in which one strives to achieve the unio mystica. Put differently, while one 
has to live among people, one does not have to live the most important part of 
one's life there. 
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Eckhart stands as a precursor to the Reformation inasmuch as he helped 
establish the idea in German intellectual thought of interiority and the unmediated 
experience of God, which Luther built on as a criticism of the Catholic Church's 
indispensability as a mediator of divine grace. When Eckhart suggests that "you 
must know that the outer man may be active whilst the inner man remains wholly 
free and immovable" (Eckhart 291), he is anticipating Martin Luther's two 
kingdom theory. 
In the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, Martin Luther, 
arguably the Reformation's most important leader, initially lays out a strong 
critique of the Catholic Church. One of the outcomes of Luther's attempt to re-
envision the church is his two kingdom theory, which is an extension of Meister 
Eckhart's understanding ofthe relationship of the inner and outer person to the 
state. Luther's two kingdom theory sets a theologically distinguishable line 
between the earthly kingdom and the heavenly kingdom. The earthly kingdom is 
the outer world that must function as a political reality, and which is, therefore, 
the realm of "reason and law" (Witte 5). The heavenly kingdom, on the other 
hand, is primarily spiritual; it is the realm of "faith and love" (Witte 5). The 
Christian necessarily lives everyday life within the realm of the earthly kingdom, 
fulfilling Christian vocation in the process. However, even though one's 
mundane existence in the earthly kingdom cannot be avoided, the life that has 
eternal significance is the one lived in the heavenly kingdom-which ultimately 
came to be identified (pace Eckhart) with the interior life of the individual.3 ! 
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In addition to the two kingdom theory, Luther also paved the way in 
theology for a turn to the self by the very issues he chose to champion. Of central 
importance to Luther's criticism of the Catholic Church, for example, was his 
belief that the Church had overreached in its role as the mediator of faith. Luther, 
for his part, saw faith ultimately as an experience between the individual and God, 
unrnediated by either the Church or its clergy. In other words, the traditional 
priesthood, which had mediated the relationship between the individual believer 
and God, ought rightly to be understood as a function of baptism, rather than 
ordination-namely the priesthood of all believers. Luther's cry of sola scriptura 
(scripture only), coupled with the priesthood of all believers, was a cry for 
liberation of the interpretation ofthe Bible from the hands of the clergy and into 
the hands of the laity, which led him to translate the Bible from the Latin Vulgate 
(the language of scholarship) into German (the vernacular). Consequently, the 
laity was given not only permission to interpret scripture for themselves, but also 
access to a readable version of scripture as a means to do it. This revolutionary 
development in Christianity further fueled the social and theological shift from 
dependence on an exterior authority to an emphasis on the adequacy of the 
individual as the primary seat of interpretation. 32 
Given Luther's belief in the importance of the individual, it is ironic, then, 
that Luther believed that the result of original sin was that the human soul is 
invcurvatus in se-that is, turned inward upon itself. In his Lectures on Romans, 
Luther argued that "due to original sin, our nature is so curved in upon itself 
[incurvatus in se] at its deepest level that it not only bends the best gifts of God 
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toward itself in order to enjoy them (as the moralists and hypocrites make 
evident), nay, rather, 'uses' God in order to obtain them, but it does not even 
know that, in this wicked, twisted, crooked way, it seeks everything, including 
God, only for itself' (159). Whether it was Luther's intention or not, the effect of 
the popular psychologizing of religion done in the wake of his reforms, which led 
to placing a greater emphasis on the individual as the access point to the divine 
certainly assisted the impulse of incurvatus in se that Luther believed was the 
result of original sin. 
Moreover, it is possible to trace the impulses toward interiority from Luther 
down through the Second Great Awakening revivalism of the 18th and early 19th 
century (e.g., Wesley and Whitefield, and the "strange warming of the heart"), to 
the indigenous American restorationist movements of the 19th century (e.g., 
Barton Stone and Alexander Campbell, the Baptists, and the emphasis on adult 
baptism as a function of the individual's choice), to the rise of the Pentecostal 
movement of the early 20th century with its emphasis on the ecstatic experience of 
the individual-all of which have culminated in the modem 
fundamentalist/evangelical emphasis on the radical individualization of faith as a 
"personal relationship" with God, over which no outside authority ought to have 
any power.33 The tum to the self as the primary stance toward belief among 
American Christians-as anticipated by Luther, and subsequently assimilated by a 
fragmented Protestantism-has left the individual Christian worshiping a God 
that is increasingly indistinguishable from himself. 
h. Philosophy 
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In this section, I will briefly trace these developments that set the stage for a 
radical turn to the self. In philosophy, Rene Descartes embarked on a 
philosophical investigation that would further cement reason in the place of 
privilege, as well as decisively alienate the individual from the world, and 
ultimately from herself. At almost the same time, Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke produced the framework of a political philosophy-the social contract-
which emphasized the individual as the fundamental unit upon which society was 
built, and which held inalienable rights in the face of that society. A century or so 
later, Immanuel Kant developed a moral philosophy in his Second Critique 
predicated on the autonomy of the individual to act morally without having that 
morality externally imposed. Then, in the early part of the twentieth century, the 
Emotivists reduced moral evaluation to assertions of preference. 
i. Rene Descartes 
Seventeenth century Europe, still reeling from the destabilizing effects of 
the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation of the sixteenth 
century, and now caught up in the Thirty Years War, underwent an 
epistemological and cultural crisis. The church, with God at its center, had 
offered a traditionally firm foundation for knowledge and social stability. God, at 
the center of the universe, mediated through the structures of the church, provided 
a model through which truth about the world could be reliably known and upon 
which society could be reliably organized. With the division, and resulting wars 
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between Protestants and Catholics, however, the fundaments of knowledge and 
culture were called seriously into question. 
Moreover, with the emerging belief in the seventeenth century that science 
rather than theology provided the best model for understanding reality, Rene 
Descartes' naturalism attempts to establish truth on a firmer footing than the 
theological model, which appears under threat of collapse. Through his 
naturalistic thesis, Descartes attempts to find truth by exhausting the things one 
can know through a process of doubting. In so doing, he helps locate the 
discussion about what it is possible to know within the mind of the individual, 
thereby reversing the epistemological process, which, as we have said, previously 
involved the receiving of information of an external world that would then be 
processed internally. 
ii. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke 
In England, shortly after Descartes' work in France, Thomas Hobbes, 
having witnessed the threatening instability of the English Civil War, thought it 
necessary to reflect on how a government might be ordered in such a way as to 
guarantee the safety of its inhabitants against civil disorder, while at the same 
time guaranteeing the autonomy ofthe individual. Hobbes saw the necessity of a 
government that would impose order on a society of individuals, who are always 
threatening to press their own self-interests at the expense of all of the other 
individuals-which, of course, leads to chaos. Even though the end is the 
preservation of a social order, the emphasis is still on the individual as an atomic 
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unit, who is freed to pursue his or her self-interest-but now within the 
constraints of a coercive government. 
John Locke, on the other hand, saw the establishment of government as 
necessary not because there were no values prior to the establishment of law and 
government, but because individuals were often incapable of rightly observing the 
natural law woven into the fabric of the universe. Interestingly, Locke's 
understanding of morality was that it was a product of reason in a very 
mathematical sense. That is to say, reason was the faculty that apprehended 
natural law, thereby making mathematical one about what must do. However, 
because Locke viewed government as also bound to the standards of natural law, 
he believed that when the government ceased acting in accordance with that law, 
those who established the government retained the right to dissolve it. In other 
words, once again, the social contract is developed to preserve the rights of the 
individual against unreasonable demands, whether issued by governments or 
anyone else. As with Luther, the practical result is the right of the individual to 
interpret truth--even in the face of overwhelming communal pressure. 
It is worth pointing out here that, arguably more than any other, Locke's 
philosophy of self-evident reason, especially as it is embodied in the social-
contract, is the foundational principle upon which American liberal democracy is 
predicated. Embedded within the text of the founding documents is the anti-
authoritarianism that holds the individual as "endowed by [his] creator with 
certain unalienable rights." These rights, which are presumably the responsibility 
of the government to uphold, can only finally be ensured by determined 
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individuals who value themselves more highly than any institutionalized 
authority. The Declaration of Independence lays out the foundation for a formal 
civic agreement among atomistic individuals whose ultimate loyalties are to 
themselves: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.-
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,-That 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it 
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its 
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness. 
iii. Immanuel Kant 
Immanuel Kant in Germany almost a century after Hobbes and Locke 
championed the unmooring of the individual from external authority. The 
practical effect of Kant's emphasis on the necessity of the autonomous human 
will from external influence was a further isolation of the individual as an 
indispensable function of moral agency?4 For agency to occur the will must be 
completely free from heteronomous constraints.35 This freedom of the individual 
from external authority Kant called enlightenment (Aujklarung). True 
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enlightenment, according to Kant, "is man's release from his self-incurred 
tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without 
direction from another" ("What Is Enlightenment?" 3). Therefore, any authority 
imposed on the individual will (even God's) is heteronomous. In fact, even God 
is bound by the categorical imperative to act only in ways that are universalizable 
for everyone: "Nay, it even includes the Infinite Being as the supreme 
intelligence" (Kant Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory 
of Ethics 18). What is privileged in Kant, then, is the individual and the 
individual's responsibility (for the purposes of moral agency) to look within 
himself to discern morality. Granted, because of his assumptions about subjective 
universality-that what Kant believes the individual will find internally will be 
found universally when other individuals, stripped oftheir presuppositions-Kant 
is rightly understood not be a thoroughgoing subjectivist. Consequently, I do not 
want to be understood to be implying that Kant was a subjectivist in the sense of 
private morality. Nevertheless, the cultivation of a habit of turning inward-
regardless of whether what one finds is produced by the individual or is a 
subjective discovery of what is universally the case-is still the cultivation of a 
habit of looking first internally as the access point to true knowledge. 
iv. Emotivism 
The search for meaning and truth as an expression of radical reflexivity has 
come to have perhaps its greatest expression, however, in the Emotivists. In the 
Humean tradition of the irresolvable distinction between fact and value, the 
twentieth century saw a new attempt to describe morality as a set of practices that 
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can have no connection with reason, but which must always be merely an 
assertion of individual preference or attitude. Following G.E. Moore's attempt at 
the turn of the century to issue a final, decisive blow to an objective morality that 
resides external to the individual in his Principia Ethica, a group of British 
philosophers offered an account of morality, called Emotivism. 
Emotivism, and its most significant advocate, C.L. Stevenson, suggest that 
there is no way to span the fact/value divide, and that, therefore, all evaluative 
statements (including moral ones) cannot be founded on any objective, external 
framework, but are merely the advancement of personal preferences or attitudes. 
If! say, "Barry Manilow's music is atrocious," what you hear me say is merely, "I 
don't like Barry Manilow's music." There is no pre-agreed upon standard of 
musical superiority to which we might return for the purposes of verifying this 
assertion as "factual." We say that matters like musical taste are not establishable 
as facts in the same way as whether or not water boils at 100 degrees Celsius. 
Moral statements, a species of evaluative statement, and thus suffering from 
the same incommensurability with factuality, meet with the same fate. Alasdair 
MacIntyre writes: "For what emotivism asserts is in central part that there are and 
can be no valid rational justification for any claims that objective and impersonal 
moral standards exist and hence that there are not such standards" (19). In other 
words, emotivists claim that moral statements, because they cannot be universally 
established as facts are also matters oftaste. If! say, "Love is good," emotivism 
contends that all I am really saying is, "I like love." Therefore, disputes over 
morals are endless and pointless, in the same way as disputes over Coke vs. Pepsi 
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are endless and pointless. The point for my purposes, though, is to show another 
instance in which, because of the impassable divide between reason and value, the 
individual is thrown back on herself or himself as a "closed sphere of interiority" 
to make of knowledge and morality what one may. 
Emotivism is an especially important instance of the tum to the self, because 
its assumptions about the subjective nature of moral discourse are so common. 
As Alasdair MacIntyre argues in After Virtue-a book given over largely to 
arguing that the heart of moral discourse (especially teleological moral discourse) 
has been undercut by the subjectivization of morality brought to its logical 
conclusion by emotivism-"To a large degree people now think, talk and act as if 
emotivism were true, no matter what their avowed theoretical standpoint may be. 
Emotivism has become embodied in our culture" (22). In other words, the 
contemporary world has embraced radical reflexivity and the tum to the self to 
such an extent that moral evaluation is rendered unintelligible, divorced like 
emotion from the objectivity of reason, and as merely the assertion of personal 
preference or opinion. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have set down a two-pronged argument regarding the 
historical currents that have brought us to the contemporary divide between 
reason and emotion. In the first prong, I described the Western epistemological 
shifts that resulted in the ascendancy of reason as the primary form of knowing. 
These epistemological shifts included the seeming displacement of the subjective 
in favor of the objective, while also moving from a metaphysical realist view of 
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knowledge as knowledge of what is really the case independent of the observer to 
knowledge as more intimately tied with the individual's construction of it. In the 
case of the second prong, I gave an account of the emergence in the West of what 
has become a contemporary commonplace, the seeming inevitability of the first 
person perspective as the primary perspective for negotiating questions of value. 
This turn to the self represents a shift from a view of reality and one's relationship 
to it formed communally to a view that reality is processed interiorly, after which 
choices are individually made about how to respond to that reality. 
In Chapter Four, I will discuss how the displacement of emotions by 
reason and the turn to the self affects the prospects for intersubjectivity and our 
abilities to view people as something other than objectified abstractions or 
projections of ourselves. However, before that it will be necessary for me to 
pause and provide an account of what I think emotions are. Moreover, I will set 
down an argument that rationality requires reason and emotion to work 
dynamically and not just antagonistically, to produce knowledge-that the 
complete absence of either reason or emotion signals a breakdown in rationality. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TOWARD A THEORY OF EMOTION 
Introduction 
But he could not taste, he could not feel. In the tea-shop among the tables 
and the chattering waiters the appalling fear came over him-he could not 
feel. He could reason; he could read, Dante for example, quite easily 
("Septimus, do put down your book," said Rezia, gently shutting the 
Inferno), he could add up his bill; his brain was perfect; it must be the fault 
of the world then-that he could not feel. 
Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway, 8 
Septimus Warren Smith, a World War I veteran, watched his friend, 
Evans, killed in Italy "just prior to the Armistice" (86). Witnessing the death of 
his friend, Septimus observes his own lack of emotion in the face of his friend's 
death.! Moreover, he "congratulated himself upon feeling very little and 
reasonably" (86). In Septimus's ability to approach the world exclusively through 
reason, without emotional attachment, Virginia Woolf makes a statement about 
what she seems to view as the dubious stance of modern optimism, namely, that 
science and technology are the height of human accomplishment-indeed, the 
height of that which identifies us as human. In framing Septimus's plight in terms 
of a void of emotion, Woolf offers a counterexample to a common post-
Enlightenment understanding of reason as the apotheosis of what truly counts for 
a fully flourishing human life. 
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Woolf recognizes that a key component of Septimus's chance at human 
flourishing has been forfeited on the battlefield. He can still reason properly-
reading Dante, figuring up his bill; indeed, "his brain was perfect" (88). With 
great irony, Septimus declares that "one must be scientific, above all scientific" 
(22). Nevertheless, he understands that reason is not sufficient for human 
flourishing. He heard his wife crying, for instance, but "he felt nothing," which 
because of his awareness of this void, drove him "another step into the pit" (90). 
Smith realizes that he is guilty of "the sin for which human nature had condemned 
him to death; that he did not feel" (91). Ultimately, the absence of an emotional 
life, his inability to feel, makes the negotiation of common human social 
interaction impossible. This deficit of emotional capacity finally drives Septimus 
to commit suicide. 
Septimus's life and, ultimately, his death embody the perception of the 
traditional Western trope that human beings can flourish in a world in which 
reason predominates and emotion languishes on the periphery of the irrational. 
Woolf, through Septimus, provides a persuasive argument about emotions. In the 
next chapter I will contend that a flourishing human life must include a rich 
experience of emotion, acquired in the social web of human relationships. As I 
have already argued in Chapter One, Western intellectual history, especially 
through the rise of scientific models that valorize objective reasoning, has viewed 
emotion as an obstacle to reasoning. This marginalization of emotion, 
accompanied by the tum to the self, has had the, perhaps unintended, effect of 
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isolating us from one another, becoming itself an obstacle to a fully flourishing 
life. 
Because I will make the claim later in this chapter that emotions are a 
necessary part of the process of knowing, it seems important, then, to offer up an 
account of what I consider emotions to be. Knowing, in the sense I am using it, 
describes a dynamic process that includes both reason and emotion to arrive at 
reliable knowledge of the world, as well as a way to negotiate life in it. I am 
using "knowing" in a broad sense to include both theoretical and practical 
reasoning, which, I will argue at the end of this chapter, require both propositional 
reason and emotion to function correctly.2 But first, I must explain what I mean 
by emotion. 
A central purpose of this chapter is a survey of various positions 
concerning the nature and operation of emotions. Along the way, I will offer what 
I take to be the strongest arguments for various positions, but I will not be putting 
forward new theories of emotions, because a theory of emotion is support for and 
not the purpose of the overall aim of this project-which is to argue that proper 
access to our own emotions, as well as a functionally accurate sense of the 
emotions of others, is necessary for a fully flourishing life. To advance my larger 
argument about how emotions are implicated in ethics and in the emotional 
attending necessary for intersubjectivity, I will defend a theory of emotion that 
will inform my subsequent inferences about emotional attending in Chapter Four, 
as well as the ways those emotions can be triggered by literature in Chapter Five. 
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To accomplish my purposes, I will briefly survey in section one some 
common theories of emotion: feeling theories, behavioral dispositional theories, 
and cognitive theories. I will point out what seem to be weaknesses with each 
theory. In section two I will argue that non-cognitive appraisals, seen as part of a 
process, better describes emotional response than theories that attempt to isolate 
the core component of emotional response-to the exclusion of other 
components. I will argue, though, that not all emotional responses need to be 
seen as being elicited by non-cognitive appraisals-that some emotional 
responses can be cognitively triggered. I will also suggest that emotions run 
along two tracks, one a quick and dirty mechanism whose primary virtue is speed, 
and the other a slower deliberative mechanism whose virtue is precision. In 
section three, I will argue that these two tracks of emotional response may map 
the divide between biologically essential (i.e., universal) emotions and socially 
constructed (i.e., localized) emotions. Finally, in section four, I will propose a 
view of knowing as a dynamic process involving cognitive (reason) and affective 
(emotion) input. I will contend that both in practical reasoning, as well as in 
theoretical reasoning, emotion is often a necessary component, the absence of 
which would severely impede knowing. 
I. Various Theories of Emotion 
A standard device found in books on philosophy of emotion is an initial 
survey of the various theories of emotion, and how all the theories that have come 
before are somehow lacking. The sheer number of nuanced theoretical positions 
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with respect to philosophy of emotion is vast and daunting. I will briefly outline 
some theories that attempt to answer the question of what emotion is---{)nly as a 
means of identifying the backdrop against which I will present my own theoretical 
position. William James, for example, is famously credited with advancing the 
theory that emotion is the registering of changes in the body. Gilbert Ryle, on the 
other hand, suggested that emotions, rather than feelings one experiences of 
bodily change, are prompts that dispose the body to act in certain ways. 
Moreover, there are those like Anthony Kenny, Martha Nussbaum, and Robert 
Solomon who argue that emotions are cognitive in nature, tied to beliefs, 
evaluations, or judgments. In addition, people like Antonio Damasio, Joseph 
LeDoux, Jesse Prinz, and Jenefer Robinson hold out for a version of emotion as a 
non-cognitive appraisal mechanism, by which a person responds to stimuli in the 
person's environment as positive or negative to the person's well-being.3 Before 
offering a constructive theory of emotion, though, I will set the context out of 
which the theory I defend arises, by pointing out some of the arguments lodged 
against the other general theories of emotion that have been popular-arguments, 
I believe, that show those theories to be ultimately unsatisfactory. 
If one were to pay attention to common language usage, one would 
assume that the word "emotion" carries a self-evident meaning available to 
everyone. Though people typically believe themselves to be in possession of 
enough information to identify emotion when it is manifested, if one were to 
inquire about the nature of emotion, one might be told that emotions are simply 
feelings we experience. Feelings and emotions are commonly dealt with as 
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interchangeable synonyms, as typified by such phrases as "How do you feel?" or 
"I feel lousy," which, loosely translated can often mean something like, "What 
kind of emotions, if any, are you experiencing?" or "The emotions I am 
experiencing are negative." Undoubtedly, feeling questions like the ones I have 
named can also be directed toward one's health. In either case, though, I would 
suggest that the references to feelings have to do with the subjective experience of 
somatic sensation (which by no means exhausts the range of processes involved in 
the manifestation of emotion, as I will argue shortly). That is to say, people 
commonly experience emotion as changes within the body. Told of the death of 
my loved one, for example, I get a hollow feeling in the pit of my stomach. If I 
am anticipating the appearance of my lover after a long absence, I feel may feel 
my heart all aflutter. Faced with the actions of an unjust boss, my face becomes 
flushed with anger. 
However, if one were to press a bit further by asking whether or not an 
emotion could be experienced without a corresponding feeling, one might get 
different answers. One possible answer to that question might be, "No. It is 
impossible to experience emotion absent any bodily sensation.,,4 Another 
possible answer to that question, though, might very well be, "Of course people 
can experience emotion without feeling anything in the body. Otherwise, people 
whose bodies have limited abilities for sensation (e.g., quadriplegics) would be 
precluded from having an emotional life." The confusion one finds when moving 
beyond the simple equating of emotion with feeling, then, begins to point up the 
complexity around what is truly meant by the word "emotion." I will define 
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emotions at this point as complex processes that involve somatic states caused by 
affective appraisals. These affective appraisals are responses to stimuli in the 
person's consciousness or environment. I will have occasion later to detail these 
complex processes, as well as to speak more thoroughly about affective 
appraisals. Suffice it to say, though, emotions act as evolutionarily advantageous 
triggers that seek to regulate mental and biological systems for the short-term 
purpose of thriving-not to mention the long-term purpose of survival. 
A theory of emotion based on feelings, like the one put forward by James, 
makes the claim that emotion is the individual's perception of changes within the 
body. Anger, for instance, causes an increased heart rate, a rise in blood pressure, 
and flushed cheeks, while joy can cause an increased heart rate, a feeling of 
lightness, and even tears. Emotion is the subjective experience of those somatic 
changes. I will follow Damasio, who differentiates between emotions and 
feelings, noting that, for one thing, not all feelings have to do with emotions 
(Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain 145). That my 
stomach feels empty as I write this does not immediately suggest an emotion that 
prompts this feeling or is prompted by it. Furthermore, depending on the context, 
I might associate a variety of emotions with the bodily sensation of hunger. I 
might associate that feeling of hunger with despair, for instance, if the prospect of 
eating seems a distant one. On the other hand, if I am fasting as a religious 
observance, I may associate that feeling of hunger with satisfaction at having 
accomplished a difficult task. Moreover, I might not associate the feeling of 
hunger with any emotional response, but merely as a tracking of somatic states. 
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Many feelings exist without an association to a particular emotion, including pain, 
sexual arousal, sleepiness, etc. As Robinson points out, it seems ridiculous to 
contend that love could be reduced "to an inner feeling such as butterflies in the 
tummy" (Robinson 5). 
Rather, a feeling-which I will define as the monitoring of bodily changes 
associated with thoughts about specific subject matter---emerges, then falls back 
below the horizon of awareness. If emotions are processes that involve somatic 
states elicited by affective appraisals in response to stimuli, then the feeling of 
emotion is a meta-tracking device that monitors the subjective experience of 
emotion. Feelings, on this account, are the subjective experience of emotion 
(Kringelbach 48). They are inextricably linked, but are not the same thing. 
LeDoux suggests "that the capacity to have feelings is directly tied to the capacity 
to be consciously aware of one's self and the relation of oneself to the rest ofthe 
world" (125). Damasio suggests that the feeling of emotion is an important 
component of the way we experience emotions, but that feelings are only a part of 
a more complex process (Damasio Descartes' Error 145). Emotions, then, are 
complex processes that involve physiological changes prompted by affective 
appraisals; feelings track these physical changes, allowing for a subjective 
experience of them. Feelings are a necessary, but insufficient condition for 
emotion. 
Another problem with the theory of emotion based on feelings arises 
immediately, then, as evidenced by the increase in heart rate for both anger and 
joy. That is to say, if two different emotions produce the same bodily change, 
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how is it possible for the perception of that change to act as determinative in 
discerning which emotion is at work? It is a problem of classification. If I were 
to assert that the common definition of cars centered on the fact that all cars have 
wheels, my definition fails when I remember that airplanes also have wheels. In 
their famous experiment, Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer proposed that 
emotions are the product of the cognitive labeling of physiological states. They 
argued that "cognitions arising from the immediate situation as interpreted by past 
experience provide the framework within which one understands and labels his 
[sic.] feelings. It is the cognition which determines whether the state of 
physiological arousal will be labeled as 'anger,' 'joy, 'fear,' or whatever" 
(Schachter 380). To prove their hypothesis about the cognitive labeling of 
emotions Schachter and Singer set up an experiment in which they gave 
participants injections of adrenaline. The subjects were told that they were being 
injected with "Suproxin," a vitamin compound to measure its effects on vision. 
After the injection, the subjects were then exposed to a "stooge," who either 
treated a twenty-minute waiting period as a time for play, or as an irritating 
inconvenience, depending on what the script called for. Schachter and Singer 
found that the bodily changes, including shakes, increased heart rate, and facial 
flushing were labeled as either euphoria or anger based on the stooge with whom 
they spent time. Their contention was that physiological changes, absent 
plausible explanations, were identified by the subjects as radically different 
emotions based on the context in which the experience of those physiological 
changes took place. They concluded that "to the extent that cognitive factors are 
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potent determiners of emotional states, it should be anticipated that precisely the 
same state of physiological arousal could be labeled 'joy' or 'fury' or 'jealousy' 
or any of a great diversity of emotional labels depending on the cognitive aspects 
of the situation" (Schachter 398). Hence, inasmuch as somatic states (and the 
monitoring of those states) can be associated with multiple emotions, it would 
seem that emotions are more than merely the feelings of bodily changes, 
However, though emotions and the subjective experience of emotions 
(feelings) are different things, if emotions are associated with the monitoring of 
physiological changes, what do we say about the experience of emotion in people 
with limited capacity for bodily sensation, those who appear not to have the 
capacity to "feel" physiological changes, like quadriplegics? Do they not also 
experience emotions? The important word here is "limited." While much bodily 
sensation in quadriplegics in the torso is lost, not all is. The physiological 
changes with which emotions are concerned originate in the sympathetic portion 
of the autonomic nervous system, which regulates bodily processes like blood 
flow, respiration, digestion, and so forth-some, but not all of which may be 
affected in quadriplegics, who can still experience things like a fluttering heart 
and flushed cheeks, or "butterflies in the tummy." 
Another theory of emotion, which views behavior as the primary focus of 
the make-up of emotion fails to withstand scrutiny. The contention on this 
account is that emotion is a mechanism-most likely the result of evolution-that 
disposes the body to some action. If I see a dangerous animal, for example, the 
emotion of fear certainly prompts changes in my body-adrenaline surge, 
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increased heart rate, drawing blood from certain parts of my body (e.g., away 
from digestion) to increase the volume of oxygenated blood my heart can pump-
for the purpose of preparing me to run or to fight. In other words, while feeling 
the changes in my body is a part of my emotional experience, those feelings are 
signals that my body is disposing me to act in a certain way. But might not anger 
or jealousy, like fear, also prepare me to fight? If a theory of emotion turns on the 
assertion that the primary purpose of emotion is its ability to dispose me to action, 
the fact that different emotions can dispose me to the same action causes the 
theory to lose force as a heuristic model. That is to say, if a theory of emotion 
does not allow me to distinguish between emotions, based on its primary premise 
(i.e., it disposes one to certain behaviors), its use as an over-arching theory of 
emotion is limited. Additionally, the question arises: What if the emotion requires 
no behavior? If, for example, someone I do not like receives a failing grade on an 
exam, I may feel schadenfruede, but it is not entirely clear for what behavior that 
emotion prepares me. Again, while behavioral dispositions may be a component 
of the work emotions do, it does not necessarily follow that at its heart emotions 
are simply a behavioral prompt. 
More recently, a variety of cognitive theories of emotion have been 
advanced, which theories view emotions as a series of judgments made about 
representations of one's relationship to one's environment.s On this reading, 
emotions are like thoughts that set off a variety of responses within the body, as 
well as within one's interior life. These thoughts may take the form of beliefs, 
evaluations, or desires about intentional objects, resulting in judgments that 
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trigger bodily changes and prepare the body for action. Additionally, particular 
emotions are identified not by physiological changes or behavioral dispositions, 
but by cognitive content. This cognitive content allows these theories to account 
for how two different emotions can have the same behavior. The difference 
between similar emotions (e.g., shame and embarrassment, or remorse and regret) 
is not necessarily characterized by differences in behavior but by cognitive 
content (Robinson 8). I may act and feel the same way whether I am ashamed or 
embarrassed; what differentiates the two is intentional objects. In the case of 
shame, what is at stake is my sense of self-worth, while embarrassment signifies 
only my being put in an awkward situation without respect to my self-worth (8). 
What is important to remember, however, according to cognitive theories, is that 
it is the judgments that are central to emotion and not physiological changes or 
behavioral dispositions. 
Some cognitive theories of emotion contend that emotions have cognitive 
content because they are the result of beliefs. 6 I might be sad, for example, 
because I believe my dog has been hit by a car, and my sadness is the way my 
pain manifests. However, ifI find out that it was my neighbor's dog, I can no 
longer cognitively hold the belief that it was my dog that was hit-and therefore, 
my sadness is no longer warranted (or at least sadness in the same way-ifI 
happen to know my neighbor and my neighbor's dog). I love my best friend, in 
part, because I believe him to be loyal to me, willing to defend my reputation. If I 
overhear him agree with someone who is disparaging my character, though, my 
belief in his loyalty is shaken, and, therefore, my love for him will be altered in 
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some way. I may not cease loving him or even love him less, for I may forgive 
him, but I cannot love him in the same way as I did before. 
On a cognitive reading of emotions, however, should my belief change my 
emotions must change (Nussbaum "Tragedy and Self-Sufficiency: Plato and 
Aristotle on Fear and Pity" 273). If! find myself enjoying someone's company, 
who before had been only a source of irritation, I may take it that my beliefs about 
that person have also changed (even if the change is not something I can 
immediately articulate). In fact, though, a change in my emotions may precede a 
change in belief, rather than be the cause of it. If one has the moral belief that 
homosexuality is wrong, and therefore disgusting, one's general belief in the 
wrongness of homosexuality may be altered by encounters of an emotional nature 
with a particular gay person that changes the emotional reaction from disgust to 
fondness, which then might cause a reassessment of general beliefs. 
Furthermore, it is possible for the emotional residue of beliefs to remain 
even after cognitive information shows them to be wrong-that is, I may still 
have the feelings associated with the emotion (Nussbaum Upheavals of Thought : 
The Intelligence of Emotions 36). If I were to have lived in a war zone, exposed 
to repeated gunfire, it would still be possible for me to react with fear to a loud 
noise-say, the lighting of a firecracker--even if I know it is not a gunshot 
because I am watching the person light the fuse. But in a case like this one, my 
continued response of fear in the face of cognitive information I know to be false 
is something I would eventually hope to modify. However, if beliefs about 
intentional objects are strictly causally linked to emotional response, then one 
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would expect the emotions should automatically change when my beliefs change. 
That they sometimes do not, presents a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. 
There are other cognitive theories that link emotion with evaluation. That 
is to say, according to this type of cognitive theory, emotions are evaluative 
judgments, in that emotions are prompted by the valence of evaluations. Were I 
to be disappointed, for example, at being turned down for ajob opportunity, my 
disappointment could be evidence that I placed a high value on getting that job. 
On the other hand, if! hear that the job has been offered to someone else, and my 
reaction is relief because it is ajob I felt obliged to apply for but did not really 
want, my relief also reveals my evaluative judgment about working at that job. 
But, as Alison Jaggar has pointed out, the evaluative nature of emotions is not 
only confined to the individual and her values. In fact, emotions are closely tied 
to more general evaluations (Jag gar 137). General evaluations have to do with 
things like cultural or communal expectations of a shared moral framework. 7 I 
experience joy at many of the same things that bring joy to most people: I do or 
witness a good tum done; I give or receive a well-intended gift; I watch people I 
love flourish. However, if someone I love flourishes and I do not experience joy, 
then because I have failed to meet a general evaluative expectation of emotional 
response, the cultural expectation would be that I must explain my lack of joy in 
this case (137). That people can argue about normative manifestations of emotion 
does seem to suggest that evaluations are at play. If! ought to feel joy at the 
flourishing of someone I love, then a kind of meta-evaluation would seem to have 
been made about the appropriateness of a particular evaluation. 
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Still other cognitive theories note that part of the cognitive judgment may 
not be representations of actual situations, but of situations that are the object of 
one's desires. I may experience anticipatory joy when I think about my children 
graduating from college, for example--even though there is no immediate cause 
for my joy. In other words, desire prompts me to imagine objects that are related 
to me positively or negatively, eliciting an emotion that cannot be prompted by 
my body's responding to actual situations. I may make judgments, therefore, 
about situations that have a beneficial or threatening impact on me only in some 
imaginary sense. The ability of a person to respond emotionally to imagined 
situations (about which I will have more to say in Chapter Five), I would suggest, 
also strikes a blow at feeling theories of emotion-inasmuch as in the case of 
desire it is not clear how a bodily sensation absent any immediate object could 
cause an attribution of emotion to a non-existent state of affairs. 
Cognitive theories of emotion, however, have come under recent attack, 
especially from those exponents of appraisal theories of emotion, who are quick 
to point out what they consider to be the shortcomings of making thought the 
central component of emotion. Several critiques have been made against 
cognitive theories of emotion, including the objection that, contrary to the 
assertion advanced that a judgment is an emotion, it is possible to make a 
judgment without experiencing the emotion that should correspond to it. If I am 
in an awkward situation, I need not necessarily experience embarrassment. I may 
find the whole thing funny, or pathetic, or of little moment (Robinson 14). 
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Also problematic to cognitive theories is the fact that cognition assumes 
the ability to conceptualize. If emotions are foremost cognitive in nature, then my 
anger that my neighbor stole the newspaper out of my box derives from a concept 
of what stealing means and how it is that a box can be conceptualized as 
belonging to me. These conceptualizations are the result of representations of the 
world grouped together and formed endogenously. Endogenous 
conceptualization in this case means that emotions can be prompted without any 
immediate external stimulation, as, for instance, when a picture of my dead 
grandfather pops into my head and I feel grief, even though he has died years ago. 
However, as Jesse Prinz point out, "Infants and animals may have no emotion 
concepts at all. Their affective lives may always be under exogenous control" 
(Prinz 50). That is to say, as is the case with infants and animals, it is possible to 
experience emotion without the corresponding cognitive concepts. If one were to 
say that emotion requires cognitive conceptualization, one would need to offer an 
account of the affective states of infants and animals that would differentiate those 
states from true emotion. Hence, if emotion can be experienced without 
cognition, cognition is not an essential, let alone central, component of emotion. 
Furthermore, the necessity of conceptualization present in cognitive 
theories encounters another serious problem: the physiology of cognition. 
Building on Antonio Damasio's work8, Paul Thagard and Fred Kroon present a 
model of cognition that integrates emotion input with higher-order thought to 
form cognition.9 According to Thagard and Kroon, sensory input is received by 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and the amygdala. The VMPFC, 
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receiving simultaneous input from the amygdala-which processes somatic 
states-encodes both sensory information and somatic response in what Darnasio 
calls, somatic markers. A somatic marker is a memory trace "that represents a 
given action and the expected consequences of that action" (Thagard and Kroon 
92). The somatic marker is housed thereafter in the VMPFC as a positive or 
negative reminder of the outcomes associated with similar sensory inputs. As a 
five year-old I ate a bad plate of goulash that made me violently ill. To this day, 
when I see goulash, my body, as well as my conscious mind, remembers the 
feelings associated with that illness-thus prompting me to steer clear of goulash. 
These somatic markers are not stored as cognitive constructs, but as quick and 
dirty appraisals that take into account both cognitive and somatic information, 
which are encoded in the somatic marker. Once a somatic marker has been 
triggered by new sensory and somatic input emotional reactions signal "the 
predicted outcome of a given event" (92). Thagard and Kroon take Darnasio 
further by offering up the nucleus accumbens, via input from the hippocampus, as 
the gate-keeper to higher-order cognition. They write: "Our extended mechanism 
describes how the nucleus accumbens narrows down the alternative choices by 
allowing only those behaviors that are consistent with the current contest to access 
higher-level cognitive processes and/or the motor effector sites responsible for 
action" (92). In other words, rather than let in all input, the nucleus accumbens 
limits the number of possible objects for cognitive processing. The outcome for 
the current action-which Prinz refers to as recalibration and calibration-then 
gets reintroduced to the VFPMC as a reinforcer of an already established somatic 
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marker, or as a new somatic marker in its own right, potentially to be called into 
action again in the future when a similar situation arises. 
This affective reaction to environmental stimuli described by Thagard and 
Kroon happens on a physiological level in a matter of microseconds. It would 
seem, then, that the sheer processing speed necessary for emotional reaction is the 
most devastating argument to cognitive theories of emotion. That is to say, there 
simply is not enough time for complex cognitive judgments to cause the somatic 
response in most cases where an emotional reaction is manifested. LeDoux 
argues that "prepackaged responses ... take place before the brain has had the 
chance to start thinking about what to do. Thinking takes time, but responding to 
danger often needs to occur quickly and without much mulling over the decision" 
(175). The amazingly small amount of time that elapses between sensory 
stimulation and emotional reaction, however, can be accounted for by a different 
kind of affective or embodied appraisal that relies on the triggering of somatic 
markers and not on cognitive judgments. Morten Kringelbach concludes that 
"conscious brain processing is serial and slow, and rarely can process more than 
nine elements at a time. Nonconscious brain processing can manipulate much 
larger amounts of information, which means that our decisions can be influenced 
by information from the senses that are not normally consciously available" (27). 
It is this "nonconscious brain processing" that I am calling affective appraisals-
to which I tum next. 
II. Affective or Embodied Appraisals 
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I have listed appraisal theories of emotion as another possibility in the 
challenge of understanding emotion. I must make an important distinction, 
however. Cognitive emotion theorists might very well be quick to exclaim that 
they too are employing an appraisal theory of emotion. What, after all, is a belief, 
an evaluation, or a judgment if not an appraisal? Taking into account this 
possible objection, it is now important to be more explicit about what I mean by 
appraisal theories of emotion. 
An appraisal, when the term is used by a cognitive theorist, acts as the 
rough equivalent of a judgment. The kind of appraisal I am describing, however, 
would be a non-cognitive appraisal that triggers a physiological response. 
Neuroscience is now relatively unified in claiming that an emotional reaction is 
the result of sensory stimuli that trip non-cognitive triggers-that is, somatic 
markers or memory traces (Kringelbach 68). What Damasio calls somatic 
markers act as encoded reminders of past experience and predictors of future 
experience that help to set the context for response to current stimuli. They do 
this by narrowing down the possible responses to those stimuli, which responses 
assist decision making. Craig DeLancey and Paul Griffiths refer to the triggering 
of emotions as affect programs, which programs operate as syndromes that "are 
coordinated collections of complex biological responses that occur together" 
(DeLancey 3).10 
Robinson and Prinz, also taking a cue from Damasio's concept of somatic 
markers, offer up this as a form of non-cognitive appraisal, naming it affective 
appraisal and embodied appraisal, respectively. Robinson writes: "We can think 
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of the affective appraisal here as a kind of 'meta-response', evaluating in a rough 
and ready way-for example, as bad for me or good for me-an already existing 
cognitive evaluation" (Robinson 62). Prinz argues for something similar, 
suggesting that the appraisals are embodied responses. Contrary to Thagard and 
Kroon who contend that the somatic markers are stored in the VMPFC, Prinz 
believes that the embodied appraisal elicits cognitive judgments through a non-
cognitive data structure located in long-term memory. In essence, Prinz wants to 
keep Damasio's somatic markers as the bridge between non-cognitive embodied 
appraisals and cognitive judgments. That bridge Prinz calls calibration files, 
which act as a repository for representations that track and store emotional 
experiences (Prinz 100). On the whole, though the terminology and a few of the 
details are different, both Robinson and Prinz offer up theories of emotion that are 
similar to the theory placed on offer by Thagard and Kroon, not to mention 
Damasio and LeDoux, which explains (at least some) emotion as prompted by 
non-cognitive appraisals. 
And while I believe these theories to be more or less good descriptions of 
emotion, they do raise questions about the broad range of emotions, many of 
which seem not to be prompted in this kind of involuntary reflexive way. I can 
grow fearful, for instance, over the course of time-not just in the event that I 
encounter an immediate threat. Given non-cognitive theories of emotional 
response times being registered in micro-seconds, then, someone might ask, how 
it is possible to account for emotions that take longer to manifest. We are 
suspicious of people, for example, who claim that they have experienced love via 
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the sort of rapid response mechanism I have just been describing. Love, it seems 
clear, is more nuanced and slow-forming than can be elicited by the lightning-
quick electrical impulses necessary for non-cognitive appraisals. 
Steven Horst, using evolutionary description, observes that there are some 
emotions that operate as "quick and dirty mechanisms that adapt the animal's 
behavior on a short time scale to potentially relevant environmental cues" (Horst 
46-7). This tracks the process of non-cognitive appraisal I have suggested. In 
addition to the quick and dirty mechanism, however, is a slower-developing 
mechanism that makes heavy use of cognitive appraisals. These more slower-
developing emotions are sometimes described as complex or secondary emotions, 
to distinguish them from what some understand as the sorts of basic or primary 
emotions that are elicited through the quick and dirty mechanism. 11 It is 
important to point out that quick and dirty non-cognitive appraisals are much 
more imprecise. Their virtue is speed, not accuracy. These are what Horst calls, 
"the junkyard dog ofthe soul" (55). Their task is a quick response, early warning 
system. However, because the trigger is so sensitive, there are a large number of 
false positives ("Oh, that was a garden hose, not a snake."). More complex 
emotions, on the other hand, use cognition much more extensively, which 
necessarily makes them slower response mechanisms. Many of the situations in 
which humans find themselves require precision in judgment that may take time. 
However, there are also situations in which extended deliberation would be 
potentially lethal ("Is that a car speeding at me at a high rate of speed? Should I 
move or will it miss me? Can I trust the driver to see me? Can I trust the driver 
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to pay attention to traffic laws? etc.)-and therefore, evolutionarily 
disadvantageous. 
If there are two different tracks of emotional response-one quick and 
dirty, and the other slow and deliberative-one might be tempted to conclude, as 
Paul Griffiths does, that there is no such broad category as emotion per se. Rather 
there are different affect programs that make up a series of independent 
mechanisms, with nothing like the category of emotion to draw them all together 
under the umbrella of a single, unifying concept (Griffiths 14-5). Of course, one 
might argue that the very fact that there is a conversation about whether there is a 
category called emotion suggests that there are enough similarities between 
different emotions to lead people in a commonsense, folk psychological way to 
speak about some larger inclusive grouping. On the other hand, the dissimilarities 
between emotions also suggest that not only do different emotions "feel" different 
from other emotions, but also that they may be elicited in different ways. I will 
suspend judgment, except to say that since emotion is widely considered to be a 
taxonomic reality, I will continue to speak of it in that way. 
The differences between quick-response and slow-developing emotions 
can be accounted for, though, by seeing emotion as a process. 12 So far, I have 
listed four basic theories of emotion, the central elements of which, comprise the 
process by which emotion manifests: bodily/feeling, behavioral disposition, 
cognitive appraisal, and non-cognitive appraisal. The first three theories typically 
make the claim that one component of emotion is constitutive of emotion. 
Whether it is physiological changes for the feeling theorists, action tendencies for 
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the behavioral theorists, or conceptualized thought for the cognitive theorists, one 
component is deemed to lie at the center of emotion. While the other components 
may be present when emotion manifests, they are considered to be attendant 
phenomena, not phenomena constitutive of emotion. 
The felt need to distill emotion down to its essence, while attractive in 
theory, may ultimately prove elusive just to the extent that the essence of emotion 
seems not to be localized within a single component of the emotion process, or, as 
is the case with physiological response, unique to emotion. If so, then none of 
those components of emotional response is the essence of emotion. Robinson 
argues that there is more to gain from viewing emotion as a process that 
incorporates a variety of components: 1) affective appraisals, 2) physiological 
responses, and 3) cognitive monitoring (Robinson 89). In making this claim, 
though, she affirms that there is a unifying category called emotion, while at the 
same time denying that there are two different species of emotion (i.e., quick and 
dirty, as well as slow and deliberative). She is committed to the claim that all 
emotion is experienced through the same process that unfolds each time in the 
same particular order-affective appraisal, which leads to a physiological 
response, which in turn is monitored cognitively. 
I would like to suggest along with Robinson that there may not be any 
essential emotional component-that neither feeling, nor the disposition to 
behavior, nor cognition is a sufficient condition of emotion---{)r that ifthere were 
an essential emotional component, it is unclear how we might gain from having 
identified it. Instead, seeing emotion as a process made up different components 
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seems to offer the best description of emotion. To the three steps in the process 
that Robinson names, I would add behavioral dispositions or action tendencies, 
which also seem identifiably present in most emotional responses. I suspect that 
Robinson would prefer to categorize action tendencies under physiological 
changes, arguing that action tendencies are only possible through physiological 
changes. In other words, anger causes a range of physiological changes that 
prepare a person for a confrontation, which raises the question about why it would 
be deemed advantageous to distinguish between the physiological changes and the 
behavior toward which those changes dispose the subject? Are they not of a 
piece? In the case of anger (and perhaps other "basic emotions"), I would agree 
that the connection between physiological change and behavioral disposition are 
clear and strong. The connection, though, between physiological changes and the 
disposition to particular behaviors seems much less obvious when dealing with 
"complex" emotions. If the physiological changes triggered in emotion have as 
their purpose a specific disposition to behavior, why would there be physiological 
changes when there appears to be no overt behavior necessary-like 
schadenfreude, to return to an example? I think the affirmative argument that 
physiological changes and action tendencies are inextricably linked is more 
difficult to sustain in the absence of a physiological change that seems to have no 
action tendency attached to it. 
Moreover, I would argue that the triggering of emotion need not always 
happen as an affective appraisal as Robinson suggests-that any cognition 
involved with emotion emerges retrospectively-that is, after the affective 
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appraisal (Robinson 89). I see no reason to grant Robinson's claim that all 
emotions are elicited by affective appraisals, nor what advantage is to be gained 
from denying that emotions can be elicited through another component-
specifically, cognition. Prinz proposes that emotions can "be triggered by 
cognitive states," inasmuch as cognition involves mental representations "under 
organismic control" (75). That is to say, if mental representations are not 
produced exogenously, then they qualify as cognitive states. To the extent, 
therefore, that emotion is triggered by an endogenous mental representation, it is 
cognitively induced. 
While I admit that cognitive appraisals typically require more time to 
unfold than affective appraisals (which because they act as triggers, are measured 
in microseconds) I can envision scenarios in which an exogenous stimulus 
necessary for an affective appraisal could be absent. Lying in bed, having 
problems sleeping, my mind randomly flits from one thought to another, with no 
discernible pattern present. Though I am not sleepy, I am not agitated. Pleasant 
thoughts mix with unpleasant thoughts. For whatever reason, I think about the 
wonderful time we had on vacation, the way my wife has begun to look more 
attractive to me recently, and how I wish we were able to spend more time 
together doing the kinds of things we have just enjoyed doing together on 
vacation. Then I make a note of the fact that, because of a pressing development 
at work, she has had to work a number of late hours-which is not a regular 
occurrence, but neither is it terribly unusual. Then I remember what I thought 
was a wrong number, because the caller hung up on me when I answered the 
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phone-noting a name on the caller LD. that I did not recognize. None of these 
experiences elicited any negative emotional response by themselves. However, as 
I begin to think of these occurrences in relationship to one another, a gestalt 
emerges. This new pattern of behavior that I have pieced together cognitively, 
elicits the first traces of an emotional response, or perhaps multiple responses 
(e.g., fear, jealousy, anger). Various events that when taken individually all 
seemed benign, not necessarily prompting affective appraisal or physiological 
changes tied to suspicion, when grouped together cognitively elicit an emotional 
response. Only then does my stomach begin to chum, my heart begin to race. 
When Robinson says that "cognitively complex emotions are triggered by 
the same non-cognitive appraisals as 'primitive' emotions, but they are succeeded 
by complex cognitive activity," her argument is unpersuasive just to the extent 
that cognition in the scenario I described would seem to precede affective activity 
(89). At heart, her assertion is that the cognitive activity in the example I give 
comes only after the affective appraisal-I just do not know it. How, apart from 
its being necessary to her theory of emotional process, she knows affective 
appraisal must always precede cognitive activity, is never entirely clear. Absent 
neuroscientific or physiological data that suggests cognitive appraisal in 
emotional response is always caused by and never the cause of affective appraisal, 
we are arguing from descriptions of emotional responses that are challenged by 
counterexamples. Nevertheless, I agree with Robinson that emotion is best 
thought of as a process that includes affective appraisals, physiological changes, 
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the disposition to behavior, and cognitive monitoring, rather than as a product of a 
single component within an emotional response. 
III. Nature vs. Nurture 
Finally, since I argue that the triggers for emotions are educable, an 
important question that must be discussed is the extent to which emotions are 
hard-wired physiologically or constructed socially. If it should tum out to be the 
case that emotions are hard-wired, what does that do to my thesis that emotions, 
in a certain sense, can be educated? 
That some involuntary emotional responses are a part of the makeup of the 
human seems undeniable. Recalling Charles Darwin's belief, Dolan and Morris 
offer that "it is generally accepted that facial emotional expressions represent 
innate and automatic behavior patterns determined by evolutionary selection" 
(Dolan and Morris 226). The apparent universal nature of certain facial 
expressions as a physiological change prompted by an emotional response, for 
example, is presented as an argument that human beings have at least some inborn 
emotions. Prinz contends that "it is incredibly unlikely that members of 
completely isolated cultures invented the very same facial expressions generations 
ago" (106). Moreover, the presence of emotion in animals and babies seems to 
suggest that at least certain emotions are the product of nature. Conceding that 
language about emotion is imprecise, and may not map the same experiential 
territory-especially when emotion terms are translated between different 
cultures-it is still possible to observe emotional responses that on a casual 
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reading appear to cut across cultural lines (e.g., anger, fear, happiness, sadness, 
disgust, etc.). I3 That is to say that there appear to be emotions that could not be 
the product of social formation, inasmuch as they seem to attend all cultures. I 
will follow convention and call these innate biological emotions basic emotions. 
A strict biological reductionist view of emotions as essential to human beings 
rejects all attempts to explain emotion through social construction. 
Someone might point out that basic emotions only cover a portion of those 
hundreds of words that name particular emotions. How can the rest of the 
emotions be accounted for? Robert Plutchik, using evolutionary biology as a 
platform, has proposed a variation on the "circumplex model," which looks like a 
color wheel, in which basic or "primary" emotions occupy the center in a bi-polar 
fashion, which he calls "primary dyads" (Plutchik 349). So, joy and sadness, for 
example, would be opposed, as would anger and fear, trust and disgust, and 
anticipation and trust. Secondary emotions, on Plutchik's account, would be 
formed by blending primary emotions, in much the same way that secondary 
colors would be formed by blending primary colors. Delight, then, might be 
formed by a mixture of surprise and joy, or irritation by a mixture of anger and 
disgust. Whether Plutchik correctly identifies the basic emotions is a matter of 
much debate. However, even ifhe does not get the particulars correct, his larger 





Figure 1 Based on Plutchik's basic 
emotions on figure 6 in Plutchik, p. 348. 
Damasio takes a different tack in talking about basic emotions. Focusing 
on the neuroscientific data, he posits that basic emotions (or primary emotions, as 
he refers to them) are processed through the limbic system, in particular, the 
amygdala anterior cingulate (Descartes ' Error 133). A stimulus, a mental 
representation, is affectively appraised (i.e., non-cognitively) by the limbic 
system, which sets off a series of physiological responses already preset to 
confront the particular stimulus. A mental representation in this case acts as a 
stand-in for the stimulus. I see out of the comer of my eye what looks to be a bird 
of prey swooping down at my head, and I duck reflexively; my heart beats 
rapidly, my muscles tense, I breathe more rapidly and deeply. However, what I 
may be reacting to is the shadow of a cloud or the wings of a songbird, rather than 
to the real threat. Hence, my body reacts not to the threat itself necessarily, but in 
a quick and dirty way to the representation of a threat. Though I am not being 
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attacked, my affective appraisal of the representation of danger initiates a process 
whereby I respond as if I were being attacked, and my body prepares me to fight 
or to flee. Again, these representations reside within us as memory traces-that 
is, as Damasio's somatic markers or Prinz's embodied appraisals. These markers, 
though they trigger innate responses are not themselves innate, are acquired 
through the unique experiences and the interpretation of the meaning and 
relationship of those experiences by the individual (Damasio Descartes' Error 
136). Basic emotions, such as fear responses, are predetermined processes 
activated through the amygdala (Damasio, Descartes' Error 133, LeDoux 303). 
Moreover, secondary emotional responses, which implicate the cognitive process, 
are activated in the prefrontal cortex. To return to my earlier illustration of a 
cognitively initiated emotional response, consider the process through which the 
more complex emotions of suspicion and jealousy are activated. 
However, there is not complete consensus about whether basic emotions 
truly exist. In their provocative 1990 article, Andrew Ortony and Terrence Turner 
call the premise of basic emotions into question, by noting the lack of agreement 
among scholars as to the number of basic emotions, as well as just what would 
qualify as a basic emotion (315). That is to say, ifthere are emotions that are 
universally biologically present, they ought to be fairly easy to identify. The fact 
that there continues to be disagreement over which emotions should be 
categorized as basic, they argue, weakens the case for innate biological emotions. 
That there is not yet a consensus on the definition of basic emotions or the make-
up of the subset of emotions called basic, though, does not appear to me to be a 
98 
fatal flaw in the theory of universal basic emotions. It may only mean that there 
is more to be worked out. 
A strict social constructionist theory of emotion, on the other hand, argues 
that emotions are the product of socialization with particular cultures. That is to 
say, I learn through a process of socialization how I ought to respond to particular 
kinds of stimuli, and what are considered appropriate ways of expressing those 
responses. 14 Moreover, not only are the emotions themselves, as well as the 
responses appropriate to the emotions, socially constructed, but even the kinds of 
emotions available to be experienced are to be found within a cultural palette of 
emotions. In other words, according to social constructionist theories, particular 
emotions are not located in a universal, essential way within the individual, 
waiting to be uncovered, but are rather complex products of particular cultures. 
In fact, different groups within the same culture can have a notably different range 
of emotional resources and experiences. Nussbaum argues that males, for 
example, may very well not have the same emotions available to them as females, 
emotions that are merely awaiting discovery within the male. It could be the case 
that males have a different "emotional repertory" made available to them through 
participation in a particular culture (Upheavals of Thought 150). On this view, 
then, emotions are not something that lie deep within the recesses of each 
individual, waiting only to be mined and brought to the surface for the purposes 
of experiencing them, but rather they are socially constructed emotional layers 
that corne to rest on the individual, and that are habituated over time. The process 
of socialization through social construction, then, offers general evaluative 
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information about the world the people inhabit within a culture; it helps to define 
the range of appropriate emotional responses to the world; and it even establishes 
which emotions are available to be experienced. 
Marcel Merleau-Ponty offers an example of the social construction of 
emotions. He argues that emotion is caught up in the structures of language. 
Human beings make meaning by being caught up in structures and frameworks, 
which are more or less capable of organizing information out of what appears to 
be chaos. Whether or not one is a metaphysical realist or a metaphysical idealist, 
information must be organized in such a way as to offer human beings access to 
it. There may be something "out there" in a real and objective sense, but 
humanity does not have unmediated access to it. Human access to knowledge is 
organized and expressed through social constructs, or webs of meaning. That is 
to say, humans need ways of organizing the seemingly endless array of unrelated 
bits of data, to produce coherent patterns of thought. Social constructs, or webs of 
meaning, can be thought of as templates that organize pre-defined groupings of 
data into identifiable patterns, which could, if not for the template appear as 
random and unrelated. If, for example, I should wander past a field in which 
twenty-two people seem to be throwing about a brown oblong object, while 
chasing each other around and tossing one another to the ground, I can apply one 
of the templates constructed by the society in which I live to this situation and 
conclude that what I am observing is a football game. I am able to make 
judgments about what I am witnessing because I have been given the conceptual 
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tools so to identify it. What might otherwise appear to the uninitiated as a 
potentially violent scene, or as a kind of staged drama, or simply as a series of 
unrelated acts among people, who mayor may not have any formal connection to 
one another, is given meaning by the social template football game superimposed 
onto the activity. In no case is the complexity of the action taking place on the 
field intelligible sub specie aeternitatis. The template in this case is a web of 
meaning that provides an organizing structure for knowledge, which then renders 
actions and gestures intelligible. In the same way, the framework of language 
provides a web of meaning in which I can understand the meaningful connection 
between words, and therefore, between thoughts. 
Merleau-Ponty extends this language/thought connection to include 
emotions as well. The reason that emotions, language, and thought are so closely 
tied in Merleau-Ponty is that they are all considered to be types of gesture. 
Moreover, he sees the first attempts at language "in the emotional gesticulation 
whereby man superimposes on the given world the world according to man" 
(219). Put more strongly, he writes: "It is no more natural, and no less 
conventional, to shout in anger or to kiss in love than to call a 'table' a 'table.' 
Feelings and passional conduct are invented like words" (220).15 
Like a language, I learn "emotional gesticulation" through a process of 
socialization-namely, how I ought to respond to particular kinds of stimuli, and 
what are considered appropriate ways of expressing those responses. Moreover, 
not only are the emotions themselves, as well as the responses appropriate to the 
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emotions, socially constructed, but even the kinds of emotions available to be 
experienced are to be found within a cultural palette of emotions. In other words, 
particular emotions are not located in a universal, essential way within the 
individual, waiting to be uncovered, but are rather complex products of particular 
cultures. Merleau-Ponty, in speaking about the way Japanese and Occidentals 
experience and express emotions, suggests that "the difference of behavior 
corresponds to a difference in the emotions themselves," because "it is not enough 
for two conscious subjects to have the same organs and nervous system for the 
same emotions to produce in both the same signs" (219). 
On Merleau-Ponty's account, then, emotions are not biologically essential, 
but are rather socially constructed and sedimented emotional layers that corne to 
rest on the individual, and that have been habituated over time. The process of 
socialization through social construction, then, offers general evaluative 
information about the world the people inhabit within a culture; it helps to define 
the range of appropriate emotional responses to the world; and it even establishes 
which emotions are available to be experienced. 
The problem with strict social constructionist theories of emotion is most 
compellingly argued by Paul Ekman and his work on facial expression. Ekman's 
life's work has centered on the study of how emotion manifests in facial 
expression. Over the course of decades of research, Ekman has concluded that 
certain emotional responses are cornmon universally, in virtue of the occurrence 
of shared involuntary facial expression across cultures. He did research, for 
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example, on facial expression in a pre-literate culture in New Guinea, "whose 
members could not have learned the meaning of expressions from exposure to 
media depictions of emotions," finding among them a commonality of facial 
expression corresponding to certain basic emotions (e.g., fear, anger, disgust, 
sadness, or enjoyment (Ekman 384). Commenting on Ekman's body of work, 
David Matsumoto contends: "The universality of emotion recognition has been 
replicated time and again across many studies and methodologies, not only in the 
face" (Matsumoto 46). 
Ekman, however, does not suggest that social construction of some 
secondary emotions does not happen. With respect to the question of whether 
facial expressions-and the emotions associated with them-Ekman says that 
over the course of his work he has "found more than one answer," and that 
"different aspects of expression are both universal and culture specific" (Ekman 
391). 
Neither, strict biological reductionist theories nor strict social 
constructionist theories, however, hold much attraction. Instead, like Ekman, I 
would argue that some blending of the two realities is more likely-namely, that 
some emotions are ones we are born with, while others are learned. Whereas 
biological reductionist theories emphasize the universality of certain emotions, 
social constructionist theories emphasize differences in emotional expression, all 
the way down to some apparently culturally unique emotional expressions. I 
would submit that one may draw the line between biological reductionism and 
social constructionism with respect to emotion by observing that it may very well 
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be that those emotions that are elicited as quick and dirty mechanisms (e.g., fear, 
anger, happiness, etc.), and could be considered essential to human nature 
correspond to what are often called basic emotions,16 while the slower 
deliberative emotions are largely informed by social construction. 
Damasio offers an interesting solution to the dilemma-one that I intend 
to assume as an important part of my thesis about our ability to educate emotional 
triggers. He contends that there are basic emotions, universally held, hard-wired 
into human beings, which are triggered by socially constructed inducers, which 
then respond reflexively (Descartes' Error 131). As LeDoux observes, emotions 
seem to have their own agenda, "one often carried out without our participation" 
(22). Additionally, it would seem that emotions often carry out their agenda 
against our attempts to subdue them. Damasio observes, "We do not need to be 
conscious of the inducer of an emotion and often are not, and we cannot control 
emotions willfully . You may find yourself in a sad or happy state, and yet you 
may be at a loss as to why you are in that particular state now" (The Feeling of 
What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness 47). In this 
sense, then, Plato seems to have been correct about the unruliness of the passions 
as irresistible urges that arise within us unbidden. However, Damasio points out 
"that while the biological machinery for emotions is largely preset, the inducers 
are not part of the machinery, they are external to it" (The Feeling of What 
Happens 57). In other words, (at least) basic emotions are induced or triggered by 
socially constructed cues. He goes on to say that "in all probability, development 
and culture superpose the following influences on the preset devices: first, they 
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shape what constitutes an adequate inducer of a given emotion; second, they 
shape some aspects of the expression of emotion; and third, they shape the 
cognition and behavior which follows the deployment of an emotion" (The 
Feeling a/What Happens 57). We have, in other words, some control, perhaps 
not over the emotions themselves, but over that which induces emotional 
response-that is, the emotional triggers. I will take up in Chapter Five a 
discussion of the implications of literature for helping to calibrate emotional 
triggers. But first, I want to discuss the ways in which, popular thinking to the 
contrary notwithstanding, emotions work together with reason to produce 
knowledge-in some cases, even scientific knowledge. 
IV. The Dynamics of Knowing 
The "high reason" view, which is none other than the commonsense view, 
assumes that when we are at our decision-making best, we are the pride 
and joy of Plato, Descartes and Kant. Formal logic will, by itself, get us to 
the best available solution for any problem. An important aspect of the 
rationalist conception is that to obtain the best results, the emotions must 
be kept out. Rational processing must be unencumbered by passion 
(Damasio Descartes' Error 171). 
In this quote Damasio provides a standard summary of what he calls the 
"high reason" view. As I have argued in Chapter One, the dominant Western 
view of knowing is that it is the process whereby potential distractions, such as 
emotion, are suspended, so that reason may operate from an objective standpoint 
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to observe, analyze, and offer judgments about propositions. This chapter seeks 
to challenge the traditional bright-line distinction between reason and emotion in 
Western philosophy, by taking into account the consensus claims of neuroscience 
that reason and emotion are inseparably entangled. Then, I will look at how it is 
possible that knowing is a dynamic process between reason and emotion, by 
viewing theoretical reason and practical reason not as discrete acts, but as a single 
activity with different objects in mind. 
As I explained earlier, emotion itself is a process that includes affective 
appraisals, physiological responses, and cognitive monitoring, in which emotions 
are not just "felt," but are also tracked cognitively. This cognitive tracking is 
what allows me to bring the "feelings" to consciousness, where they can be 
evaluated post hoc. Whatever one may think of the idea of emotion as process, 
the assertion of cognitive monitoring (i.e., reason) as the evaluator of emotions, as 
well as having an executive function in helping to modify the individual's 
relationship to emotional triggers, the idea continues, at least to a certain extent, 
the traditional view of the necessity of cognition as a key activity in the emotional 
life. Additionally, and perhaps more controversially given all that I have said so 
far, I want to suggest in this section that emotion plays a crucial role in the 
rational life that challenges the assumption that emotion needs the "grown-up" 
presence of reason to "mind" it, while reason is always better off when emotion is 
absent from its operation. 
The epistemological paradigm throughout the development of Western 
philosophy, as I have argued, assumes that only reason is reliable as the means by 
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which we come to knowledge. Thagard summarizes the traditional view, which 
suggests that "since Plato, most philosophers have drawn a sharp line between 
reason and emotion, assuming that emotions interfere with rationality and have 
nothing to contribute to good reasoning" (171). However, he continues by noting 
that "current research in cognitive science is increasingly challenging the view 
that emotions and reason are antagonistic to each other" (171).17 Damasio, 
drawing on the paradigmatic example of Phineas Gage, shows how neuroscience 
is concluding that emotion is crucial for practical reasoning (viz., reasoning that 
deliberates normatively on questions of what to do). 
A. Practical Reasoning 
In 1848, Phineas Gage, a construction foreman for the Rutland and 
Burlington Railroad, sustains a traumatic brain injury when a black powder 
charge he is setting blows up in his face. I8 The explosion launches an iron bar 
through Gage's head, which enters the left cheek, passes through the front of the 
brain and exits the top of his head, landing over one hundred feet away. Never 
losing consciousness, within a couple of minutes he begins to speak, apparently 
normally. His wounds are vigorously treated by a physician, and after multiple 
bouts of infection and one abscess, Gage's physical wounds heal completely. He 
regains all his strength, with no damage to his senses, his dexterity, his ability to 
walk, or to his speech. He is able, by all accounts, to think rationally 
Conventional wisdom suggests that Gage sustained a ventromedial lesion 
as a result of the bar passing through his brain. Though physically he was healed, 
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and though his rational capacities appeared unaffected (e.g., memory, language, 
intelligence, etc.), he exhibited personality changes. His character was drastically 
altered. Antonio Damasio says, "He could not make good choices, and the 
choices he made were not simply neutral. They were not the reserved or slight 
decisions of someone whose mind is diminished and who is afraid to act, but were 
instead actively disadvantageous" (Descartes' Error 11). Where before the 
accident he had been industrious, dependable, and organized, after the accident 
his life began to fall apart because he was erratic, unreliable, and seemingly 
unable to make good decisions. He used foul language indiscriminately, and 
could not keep a job because he was prone to quitting in fits of pique. He 
eventually wound up a circus oddity at Barnum's Museum in New York, showing 
his wounds and the tamping iron that caused them. 
The story of Phineas Gage, and the radical changes in his character, 
eventually prompts Antonio Damasio to begin studying people with ventromedial 
lesions that come about largely as a result of physiological developments like 
tumors. He describes one such patient, named Elliot, whose IQ remained in the 
superior range after the removal of a meningioma left lesions on the frontal lobe: 
"His knowledge base seemed to survive, and he could perform many separate 
actions as well as before. But he could not be counted on to perform an 
appropriate action when it was expected" (Descartes' Error 36-7). What strikes 
Damasio in working with people who suffer ventromedial lesions is the extent to 
which their intellectual capacities remain undamaged, but whose abilities to 
experience emotion are severely attenuated, resulting in significantly diminished 
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capacities for practical reasoning. They make consistently poor decisions about 
what to do. Damasio suspects that diminished emotional capacities and defects in 
practical reasoning are somehow related, prompting his landmark research on the 
relationship between reason and emotion. 
On this account, the deliberation initially necessary to the formation of 
intentions about what to do gets encoded in somatic markers with positive or 
negative emotional valence, which thereafter act as triggers for automated 
responses (Damasio Descartes' Error 167). These automated responses reduce 
the need for the time-consuming practice of full-blown deliberation, allowing for 
a kind of practical reasoning short-hand. If, for example, I have a bad experience 
at a restaurant, when I am making decisions about where to take my wife for 
dinner, that bad experience gets encoded as a negative emotional response to that 
restaurant (which can be either strengthened or mitigated based on additional 
experiences). This negative emotional response assists me in making decisions 
about where to eat by effectively limiting my options. Clearly, that is not to say 
that I cannot ignore those emotional responses, or try to add positive responses to 
the "recalibration file," to use Prinz's phrase. I may, for instance, want to 
cultivate a taste for the kind of food this restaurant serves, and so may go there 
repeatedly hoping to improve my experiences with the food they serve, and 
thereby attach positive valence to this restaurant. Whatever the case, though, my 
use of practical reason is made more efficient because of, rather than in spite of, 
emotional input. Damasio, and those who have followed his lead in the 
neuroscience of emotion, have shown that rather than always being an obstacle to 
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reason, emotion is often necessary to the application of reason to deliberations 
about what to do. Moreover, because of the potentially endless number of options 
available in a given decision, as well as the uncertainty of the outcomes of each of 
those options, the emotional valence of somatic markers in some cases may be 
necessary to make practical reasoning even possible. 
B. Theoretical Reasoning 
Someone will most likely offer the challenge at this point that, even if 
emotion may be a necessary component of practical reasoning, the arena of pure 
theoretical reasoning must continue its vigilance against the introduction of 
emotion. That is to say, at least in questions of theoretical reasoning, we can say 
with confidence that emotion is always a potential obstacle to reliable knowledge. 
In fact, though, neuroscience research is increasingly aware that "the neural 
systems of emotion interact extensively with those underlying cognitive 
processes" (Phelps 51). In a meta-study of Amygdala research-that part of the 
brain that, with the VMPFC, is "responsible for the formation of memory traces 
that allow the organism to predict the future outcome of a given response" 
(Thagard and Kroon 90)-Elizabeth Phelps argues that the Amygdala not only 
affects the formation of long-term storage of emotion events as memory traces, 
but that it also affects the initial processing of those emotion events by capturing 
and facilitating attention (60). She writes that while it is true that emotion can 
sometimes hinder attention, there are other studies that "have shown that in 
situations with limited attentional resources, emotional stimuli are more likely to 
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reach awareness, suggesting that emotion can also facilitate attention" (60). She 
recalls the classic example of the cocktail party in which, with stimulation all 
around through a variety of conversations, one's attention can be captured and 
facilitated when one hears one's name. The emotional attachment we have to our 
own names (whether because of curiosity, or flattery, or dread about the use of 
our names) allows us to filter through a variety of stimulation to attend to the one 
that has the most emotional force for us. In other words, because of the vast 
number of stimuli vying for our attention at any given moment, emotion helps us 
to attend to and process the stimuli carrying emotional import. Emotion, filtered 
through the amygdala, seems then to playa part in the cognitive process by 
prioritizing that to which reason will attend. 
It will most likely be objected that having the emotions highjack attention 
is precisely the problem that science, based on reason, wants desperately to avoid. 
This is a reaffirmation of the traditional argument from Plato that, because 
emotion is capable of redirecting the mind's resources to attend to emotionally 
charged stimuli, it is necessary for rationality to rule over irrationality. On Plato's 
account, reason should subdue the emotions so that attention can rightfully be 
restored to that toward which reason points. If, for example, I am in the midst of 
scientific observation and it becomes clear to me that the data I am gathering 
seem to suggest that my hypothesis is increasingly unlikely to be true, which 
because of the large amount of research funds at stake, will elicit within me an 
emotional response. I may be crestfallen that everything toward which I have 
been working seems now to be wrong; or I may feel anxiety about how this will 
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affect my career; or I may feel dread at the thought of having to face my 
naysayers and admit that I have been wrong, and so on. Because of those 
emotions (or a host of other possible emotions) I may be tempted to skew to the 
data fit my hypothesis. This, science says, is why emotion must be kept from the 
scientific process. Scientific reason dictates that I bracket my emotions and 
follow the data where it leads, without regard to the conclusions that will 
ultimately be drawn when the data is processed and analyzed. Emotion, in this 
case, would be a hindrance to achieving reliable knowledge-a conclusion with 
which I would not disagree. However, this is only one scenario, albeit an 
important and, I think, in many ways, paradigmatic one. I take as a settled matter 
that emotion can sometimes overwhelm reason, causing bad outcomes. One 
thinks of road rage, for example. 
However, there are other ways of drawing up scenarios about the 
interaction between reason and emotion that show emotion to be an important 
contributor to the cognitive process, even in science. Paul Thaggard points out 
that emotion is present in very important ways prior to scientific observation, 
even down to the original question the scientist must answer about what kinds of 
things to research. The decisions about where to invest one's scientific energies 
"are more frequently based on emotions than on rational calculation" (175). 
Because of the impossibility involved in trying to determine through completely 
rational calculation what research areas are most likely to produce results, for 
instance, researchers make these decisions about what to research based on such 
emotionally significant criteria as the passion, the interest, and the curiosity of the 
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researcher. My mother died of x, so this line of research has special importance 
for me. I am engaged in the study of this particular sub-set ofy, because I find it 
so fascinating. 
It might be protested here that various disciplines have predetermined sets 
of questions that lay down the parameters for the range of possible research areas, 
so that rational calculations about what to research are delimited at the outset. 
Leaving aside the issue of just how scientific revolutions can occur if everyone 
involved in the discipline engages in research rationally calculated from a pre-
defined set of disciplinary questions, one is tempted to ask how decisions are 
made about which discipline to enter in the first place. Do advances in physics, 
for example, come from individuals who are only concerned with physics at all 
because an aptitude test told them that they were good candidates to work in the 
field of physics? Or do those advances come more often from people who get 
into physics in the first place because they are passionate about physics? In other 
words, the reasons scientists take up a particular discipline, or a specific problem 
within a discipline, often has more to do with emotion and its power to motivate 
than with the calculation of pure reason. 
Still, someone might argue, surely the content of theoretical reasoning 
ought to be safeguarded against the distraction of emotion. Whatever else might 
be said, this argument suggests, two plus two always equals four-no matter the 
emotional investment in another answer one might possess. It is one thing to say 
that practical reasoning benefits from memory traces charged with emotional 
valence, or even that the commitments to research evinced by individual scientists 
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are sometimes motivated by emotional attachments, but it is another thing to 
allow emotional input into questions of theoretical reasoning in hard science. 
Practical reasoning is normative in nature-that is, it centers on the question 
about what one should do. Calling upon the old fact/value distinction, though, 
one might argue that theoretical reasoning is always fact-based; normativity is not 
at issue. And there is a sense in which this is surely right in a commonsensical 
way; otherwise, we would exist in a world of pure subjectivity where what was 
true would be based solely on what Ifeel is true. This kind of subjectivist world, I 
think it uncontroversial to assert, would be unmanageable. On a linguistic basis 
alone, we would lose the basis for meaningful communication based assertions of 
the truth, since we would always be tripping over personalized versions of what 
constituted the truth. 
On the other hand, our own commonsense understandings of the world as 
having objective truth untouched by subjective evaluations is not nearly so self-
evident as one might believe. To appeal to facts as value neutral raises the 
question about the evaluative frameworks in which theoretical reasoning takes 
place. If practical reasoning is normative deliberation about what one should do, 
theoretical reasoning can also be viewed as normative deliberation about what one 
should believe. That is to say, the conclusions at which theoretical reasoning 
arrives are often intelligible only in light of the larger framework of belief that 
organizes those conclusions into larger arguments as assertions of truth. Richard 
Moran contends that "very few of our beliefs about the world arrive as the 
conclusion of any explicit theoretical reasoning that we undertake," in the same 
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way that "very few of our desires come into existence as the conclusion of an 
explicit exercise of practical reasoning" (116). Instead, facts are processed 
according to frameworks of belief that provide an overarching account of how 
those facts make sense, or even why they should be considered facts. It is the 
organization and reorganization of facts under different conceptual frameworks, I 
will argue, that implicate emotion in theoretical reasoning. 
In Thomas Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he 
advances the argument that the kinds of scientific revolutions that can be called 
paradigm shifts are conceptual rather than factual, requiring a shift in professional 
commitments (6). The accumulation of facts can never, by itself, cause a 
scientific revolution, in part because that which provides the authority to grant 
factual status is conceptual. One's commitments to a conceptual framework have 
to undergo something of a conversion in order to accommodate new factual 
data-and the theories they generate-which conflict with the account of the 
world provided by the old framework. Once these conflicting data can no longer 
be accounted for by the old framework, the scientist may (or may not) make 
adjustments by adopting new theories that continue to solve the problems the old 
framework had previously solved, but that, in addition, draw a broader picture 
capable of including the new data. These newer theories need to be in place in 
order to process the discovery of new data as significant, requiring a new meta-
theory or conceptual framework in which to organize the new data and theories 
into an intelligible whole. 
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Kuhn gives the example of the discovery of oxygen. To understand the 
significance of how a gas like oxygen made better sense of the world, the reigning 
conceptual understanding of the phlogiston theory of combustion (viz., all 
combustible materials have within them a substance called phlogiston that is 
released during combustion) had to be overthrown. New facts that pointed to the 
reality of oxygen as a gas, if they were to be considered facts at all, had to be seen 
through a different conceptual lens. The formulation of this conceptual lens, 
however, took time. Kuhn writes, "Though undoubtedly correct, the sentence, 
'Oxygen was discovered,' misleads by suggesting that discovering something is a 
single simple act assimilable to our usual (and also questionable) concept of 
seeing. That is why we so readily assume that discovering, like seeing or 
touching, should be unequivocally attributable to an individual and to a moment 
in time" (55). Discovery, on Kuhn's account, however, is most often the result of 
a process that links the accumulation of factual data with the conceptualization of 
theory. Kuhn argues that it is only when conceptual categories are in place that 
the process of discovery can unfold, since raw data must be organized to 
understand what is important to attend to and what is not, and why it might be 
important to attend to it at all (55-6). 
Or take the example of the nomenclature changes surrounding the 
diagnosis of homosexuality as a mental disorder in the American Psychiatric 
Association's standard classification of mental disorders, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). This manual, now in its fourth 
edition, seeks to standardize diagnoses by offering scientific categorization of 
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mental disorders. In their chapter on the history of the development of the third 
edition (DSM-lII) Stuart Kirk and Herb Kutchins remark on the way "scientific 
issues took a back seat to political struggles about the appropriate place of various 
diagnoses such as homosexuality, neurosis, and post-traumatic stress disorder" 
(77). 
Beginning in 1970, gay activists began disrupting AP A conventions, 
agitating for the removal of homosexuality as a mental disorder in the DSM-II. 
Their protests shed light on what some believed to be the inequity involved in 
continuing to diagnose otherwise healthy homosexual individuals with a mental 
disorder. Homosexuality, they argued was not a disorder, but an orientation that 
no amount of psychoanalysis could "cure." Prior to 1970, conventional wisdom 
in the social sciences (with vestiges of religious disapproval) held that 
homosexuality was aberrant behavior. Following psychiatrists like Charles 
Socarides and Irving Bieber, the common belief was that homosexuality was a 
pathology that could be successfully treated by therapeutic means. Socarides, 
writing after the change in classification, cites "intensive study, research, and 
individual analyses of homosexual patients over the past two decades," 
contending that homosexuality has its origins in either oedipal or preoedipal 
conditioning, rather than as an inborn trait (Homosexuality: Psychoanalytic 
Therapy 63).19 What is interesting to note, however, is that after the protests the 
conventional wisdom of the science of homosexual classification was challenged 
as itself unscientific by those who wished to change it. 
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Kirk and Kutchins offer this observation, of particular importance for my 
purposes, on the way the change of classification unfolded, drawing attention to 
the "claim of the proponents on every side that they were being scientific and 
their opponents were not" (88). In fact, however, "few of the psychiatrists 
involved in the controversy had done studies that could pass muster as credible 
research, but before a decision could be made each side had to couch its 
arguments in the terms of science" (88). In essence, then, the argument about the 
classification of homosexuality took place largely beyond the scope of the kind of 
research that would produce the factual data necessary for theoretical reasoning as 
it is traditionally understood. It is only after what Kirk and Kutchins believe to be 
the political maneuvering is settled that factual data begins to affirm the paradigm 
shift that has already taken place. Admittedly, they seem to see this as an 
unfortunate methodological misstep in the advancement of science, but I am not 
so sure that politics is ever entirely removed from the kinds of shifts that lead to 
scientific revolutions-if by politics what is meant is the prior commitments to 
which the actors in the debate bear an emotional attachment. Both sides, while 
claiming scientific objectivity, had perspectives that allowed them to see factual 
data through specific kinds of conceptual lenses. Changing the conceptual lenses, 
however, required more than just the persuasive impact ofa raft of new data. 
That is to say, shifting the conceptual lens through which the facts were made 
intelligible required something like a conversion to a new set of beliefs about the 
way the world is situated, before the facts themselves could be interpreted as/acts 
marshaled in support of this new paradigm. 
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Even after the paradigm shifted to preclude the classification of 
homosexuality as a pathological disorder, Charles Socarides remained 
unpersuaded by the newly emerging scientific data. In a 1995 article entitled, 
"How America Went Gay," Socarides continued to argue that the AP A, in 
changing its classification from homosexuality-as-pathology, had succumbed to 
political pressure. Clinging to his belief in the pathology of homosexuality in the 
face ofthe overwhelming majority of the scientific community had left Socarides 
and his compatriots feeling like an "embattled minority" ("How America Went 
Gay" 20). Instead of processing hard scientific data, Socarides claimed, America 
had been cynically "brainwashed" to accomplish this paradigm shift ("How 
America Went Gay" 21). 
Ironically, the science Socarides had claimed in support of his view of 
homosexuality as a pathology-which had, prior to the change in the DSM, 
comprised conventional wisdom about homosexuality-was the same "science" 
that later marginalized him when the scientific paradigm shifted. What changed 
was not the scientific data, upon which Socarides based his claims, but the 
conceptual framework in which the "science" that had been done prior to the 
paradigm shift could not "pass muster as credible research" (Kirk and Kutchins 
88). In other words, Socarides and his science became "science" after the 
paradigm shift-which is to say, not really science at all. Like the supersession of 
phlogiston theory by the discovery of oxygen, what changed were not just the 
facts, but the very conceptual framework within which facts were given factual 
status. 
119 
My point in recounting this shift in the classification of homosexuality in 
the DSM is to indicate the extent to which science is based on, and continually 
influenced by, beliefs and commitments that arise prior to the factual data of 
theoretical reasoning. Those beliefs and commitments, though usually informed 
by factual input, are conceptual frameworks that have durability, because of 
emotional attachments. Commitments themselves are not emotions; but that 
which motivates their forming and the sustaining of them is. To change a 
conceptual framework in the fashion of a scientific revolution, one must undergo 
a kind of conversion, giving up the beliefs and commitments to which one is 
emotionally attached, in order to be able to embrace different beliefs and 
commitments. Even at its most theoretical level rationality cannot so easily 
bracket emotion, because the very framework in which facts are made intelligible 
are made up of beliefs and commitments, which in tum are often created and 
sustained by emotional attachments. 
In this section, I am seeking to illustrate just how entangled emotion is 
with reason, even with the most scientific of pursuits. To cordon off emotion as a 
pollutant in the otherwise pure enterprise of reason is to miss the extent to which 
emotion is inexorably bound up in rationality in ways prior and often transparent 
to reason. Both practical reason (reasoning about what one ought to do) which 
requires the input of emotion for the purposes of deliberating, as well as 
theoretical reason (reasoning about propositions) which is underpinned by 
conceptual frameworks of belief and commitment, undergirded by emotional 
attachments-in many cases have their effectiveness augmented, rather than 
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distracted, by emotional input. Contrary to the traditional view that rationality 
entails the sequestration of emotion so that reason can work unfettered by 
distraction, it is becoming increasingly clear as a result of neuroscience that 
emotion often works dynamically with reason to achieve knowing. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to layout the initial stages of a theory of 
emotion. In section one I surveyed the most popular theories of emotion, from 
feeling theories to behavioral disposition theories to cognitivist theories. Next, I 
offered the problems presented by each theory. In section two, I proposed a 
theory of emotion that sees emotions as a process, triggered mostly by affective 
appraisals, stored as somatic markers in the limbic system. Moreover, I suggested 
that emotions proceed along two tracks, one quick and dirty, accounting for what 
has been called basic or primary emotions, and the other, slow and deliberative, 
which makes up the category of secondary emotions. In section three, I argued 
that these two different tracks of emotion help to explain the historically 
contentious debate over whether emotions are biologically essential, and therefore 
universal, or socially constructed, and therefore localized. I proposed that quick 
and dirty emotions constitute a way in which humanity as a species has developed 
evolutionarily advantageous responses to our environment. Slow and deliberative 
emotional responses, on the other hand, also add evolutionary advantages by 
making up for in accuracy what they lack in speed. All in all, emotions are 
complex processes necessary not only for the cultivation of virtue or for the 
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possibility of intersubjectivity, but in very fundamental ways, for survival itself. 
Indeed, as I suggested in section four, rationality itself, both practical reasoning 





HUMANS ARE POLITICAL ANIMALS 
Aristotle famously made the claim that humans are political animals. 1 
Furthermore, since humans are "political animals," they gather in communities. 
The political organization of the polis, according to Aristotle, is a community, and 
"an impulse toward this sort of community exists by nature in everyone" (Pol. 
1253a31). He suggests that the polis "comes to be for the sake ofliving, but it 
remains in existence for the sake ofliving well" (Pol. 1252b29). In other words, 
human beings possess an inherent need for community (something modem 
psychological research confirms), and they order their common life with a view to 
fostering an environment in which a fully flourishing life is possible. Admittedly, 
not everyone agrees that flourishing is the goal of human life, or even that human 
life has a single distinguishable goal. However, I will set out the argument that on 
a practical level a community conditioned by a lack of commitment to 
intersubjectivity-being with and for others, which I will contend, is centered on 
emotional engagement, and is a necessary condition for human flourishing-
cannot but be Hobbesian in nature, with each member seeking only after his own 
interests. 
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I must pause at the outset to reflect on an important distinction that, were 
it left unremarked, could prove confusing. The temptation is to define polis as a 
synonym of community-and in many respects this would be accurate. For the 
sake of clarity, however, I will suggest that while both community and the polis 
are characterized by a collection of individuals bound together by a shared belief 
about a good or a set of goods, as well as the virtues necessary for the realization 
of the goods identified, the polis is a collection of individuals bound together by a 
shared belief about the highest human good, as well as the virtues necessary for 
the realization of that good. Under this definition, the American Lung 
Association or the Rotary Club or a local agricultural cooperative could comprise 
a community, in that they share common assumptions about a good or set of 
goods. They would not, however, comprise a polis in the sense I have suggested, 
to the extent that they do not claim to be organized around the highest human 
good. A community is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of a polis. 
A polis, which would also presumably contain agreement on a common 
set of lesser goods, organizes those lesser goods in relation to what it takes to be 
the highest human good. Certain religious and political groups might satisfy this 
definition of a polis, in that they make claims about what comprises the highest 
good humans should pursue-heaven, for example, in a Roman Catholic parish, 
communal ownership and control over the means of production and the 
distribution of goods in a socialist collective, or nirvana in a Buddhist monastery. 
However, as Alasdair MacIntyre notes,polis is a difficult concept for modems to 
,conceive of, since a normative identification (let alone an ordering) of goods as a 
124 
common project is prescinded by political liberalism-which sets individual 
choice as the basic condition for human political organization. He observes that a 
"modem liberal individualist world" has "no conception of such a form of 
community concerned, as Aristotle says the polis is concerned, with the whole of 
life, not with this or that good, but with man's good as such" (156). Political 
liberalism, in other words, fosters an environment in which each individual 
believes herself to be a determiner of the highest good. 
My purpose in introducing the polis as a concept is not to argue that a 
polis, as Aristotle conceived it, is even possible in a "modem liberal individualist 
world"-though I think that argument can plausibly be made? Instead, my 
purpose is more modest, seeking only to draw attention to the ways that 
communities participate in much of the same kinds of boulesis (i.e., laying down 
of ends [teloiD as a polis-only on a smaller scale, and with less universal 
ambition. A philanthropic organization like Doctors without Borders, for 
instance, views the bringing of medical relief to the impoverished as a human 
good. Consequently, such a community encourages and helps to cultivate the 
virtues ofliberality (i.e., generosity), courage, and righteous indignation, but may 
not necessarily feel the need-for the sake of its ends-to take a position on the 
virtues of wittiness, friendliness, or modesty. Communities, on my account, 
though they do not pretend to offer up a vision of the highest human good, or 
attempt to order goods toward a common telos in the manner of a polis, are still a 
critical means by which goods are identified and virtues are articulated and 
cultivated to meet those goods. A city, like the fictional Empire Falls-which I 
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will focus on in Chapter Six-is a community that shares many lesser goods in 
common (e.g., concord, a just economic system, friendship), requiring certain 
kinds of virtues to realize those goods (e.g., truthfulness, justice, friendliness, 
etc.), but makes no normative claims about the highest human good. "Lesser" as 
a qualifier of "goods," it ought to be pointed out, should not be misunderstood as 
meaning unimportant. Instead, "lesser" in this case means only "not the highest." 
As such, concord, just economic systems, and friendship are goods held in 
common, but none are normatively offered as the telos of human life. 
Even though communities do not make claims to setting down the highest 
human good, in order to endure and to thrive as communities they need to 
encourage intersubjectivity-a mutual and shared subjectivity in which people are 
with and for others. Consequently, that which binds the community together, 
according to Aristotle, is friendship--even above justice: "If people are friends, 
they have no need of justice, but if they are just they need friendship in addition; 
and the justice that is most just seems to belong to friendship" (EN 1155a28). 
MacIntyre writes: "The type of friendship which Aristotle has in mind is that 
which embodies a shared recognition of and pursuit of the good. It is this sharing 
which is essential and primary to the constitution of any form of community, 
whether that of a household or that of a city" (155). 
Therefore, hereinafter, should I speak of a community in which its 
importance to my argument centers on its holding in common the highest human 
good, I will specifically use polis. Otherwise, I will use community as a generic 
term denoting collections of individuals who hold in common shared conceptions 
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of the good-both the highest human good, as well as various lesser goods. 
Smaller communities, rather thanpoleis, will be my primary focus in this work. 
Perhaps I should also take this opportunity to defend my choice of 
Aristotle as a foundational figure for my argument, in view of the fact that a 
considerable amount of time and philosophical work has come and gone since his 
writings first helped shaped the trajectory of West em intellectual history. I would 
make two comments in response to questions about my use of an ancient source. 
First, since part of my argument has to do with the ways in which virtue ethics is 
better positioned to focus the kind of attention on the emotions that lie at the heart 
of the intersubjectivity necessary for human flourishing, and since Aristotle is the 
foundational figure for virtue ethicists, Aristotle seems a likely enough place to 
begin. Second, because it is Aristotle who first responds to Plato in defense of the 
emotions-setting the stage for my contention that the emotions (at least as they 
are triggered in us) are educable-Aristotle's ideas must be dealt with. That does 
not mean, of course, that Aristotle is unchallengeable as an authority; only that his 
arguments-though often challenged and sometimes modified, should not to be 
dismissed lightly. 
Social organization in poleis whose goal is human flourishing requires a 
set of virtues or excellences that make that flourishing possible. The virtues of a 
polis, therefore, are directly tied to the conception of the goal of flourishing or 
"living well" of that polis. But in a benignly circular fashion one may also say 
that part of what it means to flourish is to be virtuous.3 According to Aristotle, 
the job of a polis, then, is to educate virtuous people with a view to human 
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flourishing. The job of a virtuous person, on the other hand, is to live virtuously 
so as to contribute to a polis capable of producing virtuous people. 
However, virtue seems to be characterized not only by virtuous action, 
according to Aristotle, but also by the emotional response a virtuous person would 
have by so acting. In other words, on an Aristotelian account, virtues "are 
concerned with actions and feelings" (EN 1104bI4). Emotions, to recall briefly 
my argument from Chapter Two, are complex processes that involve somatic 
states elicited by affective appraisals in response to stimuli in the person's 
consciousness or environment. Additionally, these complex processes are an 
important way we relate to other human beings, communicating our desires and 
projects, our fears, as well as our likes and dislikes through affective states and 
the expressions that result from these states. 
In this chapter I take up the issues centered on virtue and the emotions by 
making an argument that virtue ethics offers a more comprehensive ethical theory 
than deontology or utilitarianism, inasmuch as virtue ethics takes into account an 
expanded role for emotions in living a fully flourishing life. The purpose of this 
chapter is to begin to lay the foundation for an argument about the proper 
education of those triggers that induce emotions as a necessary component of 
virtue, and therefore, of a fully flourishing life. 
In the Poetics Aristotle challenges his old teacher, Plato, who contended in 
Republic that the poet must be banned from the ideal republic, in part because the 
poet encouraged the experience of emotion To say that Aristotle challenges 
Plato, however, is not say that he confronts Plato directly, but that the scope of his 
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argument addresses the issue of poetry, which Plato had denounced in the 
Republic. Specifically, Aristotle calls into question Plato's account of the value 
of the emotions. Whereas Plato contends that emotions are a potentially 
disruptive force, the power of which must always be controlled by reason, 
Aristotle maintains, as I will argue, that in addition to virtuous action the 
cultivation of the appropriate emotional response (i.e., the appropriate emotional 
response at the appropriate time) is essential to the development of virtue. 
Moreover, on Aristotle's view, the cultivation of appropriate emotional response 
has implications not only for the development of individual virtue, but for the 
health of the body politic. As a way of entering the discussion about the role of 
emotions in moral development through the experience of art, I will situate the 
medium of tragedy as an effective means of educating the emotions within the 
historical context of Plato and Aristotle's disagreement. As such, tragedy acts 
both as a way of introducing the traditional Western view of emotions and a 
possible response to it, as well as an instance of how narrative art can educate the 
emotions.4 
I must be careful to point out, however, that I am not attempting to elicit 
Aristotle's endorsement for a view that says reason is not somehow responsible 
for properly informing the emotions. Aristotle's position with respect to 
emotions-while different from Plato's in the belief that emotions can be 
educated-still identifies reason both as the faculty that differentiates us as a 
species, as well as the faculty that occupies the primary place in establishing 
knowledge and directing action (Pol. 1254b5).5 My point is much more modest: I 
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only wish to argue that an Aristotelian critique of Plato on emotions suggests the 
beginnings of a way of viewing emotions such that emotions have a significant 
role to play in moral development, rather than as unruly urges to be overcome on 
the path to moral development. A discussion about tragedy can assist in 
clarifying how emotions are a necessary part of virtue, and so playa positive role 
in a flourishing life. 
I. Humans and the Polis 
That human beings gather in collective social arrangements is a 
commonplace of observation. Aristotle noted the inclination of human beings to 
organize themselves in social arrangements in the Politics by suggesting that this 
inclination is essential to human nature (1252b29). Philosophers have tended to 
agree with Aristotle's assessment about the apparent human need for community. 
What they have disagreed about, however, is the reason for this phenomenon. 
Political liberalism, the assumption that individuated selves come together in a 
collective for the purpose of establishing an environment that conduces to self-
preservation and the advancement of self-interest freely chosen by the individual, 
through the establishment of just laws and regulations has been a staple of 
western political thought from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls. On this account, 
the autonomous individual seeks social arrangements that she believes will prove 
beneficial to her self-interest by subjecting herself to what she believes to be ajust 
system of government. The end (telos) oflife, unlike traditional conceptions 
inherited from the Greeks moving down through the Middle Ages, is not laid 
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down by the community (polis). In fact, according to Rawls, "as free persons, 
citizens claim the right to view their persons as independent from and not 
identified with any particular such conception with its scheme of final ends" 
(Rawls 30). Characteristic of political liberalism, then, especially for someone 
like Rawls, is the conviction that universal justice precedes any conception of the 
good-and that the conception of the good is a matter of individual choice and 
political indifference (as long as one's conception ofthe good does not threaten 
the ability of another to pursue her own conception of the good).6 Michael Sandel 
observes that Rawls' theory does not preclude community, only that any 
community is necessarily made up of "antecedently individuated selves" for 
whom community is "not an ingredient or constituent of their identity as such" 
(Sandel 64). 
Aristotle, on the other hand, suggested that social organization centers on 
the polis, which has a shared understanding ofthe good, and is capable of 
producing individuals, part of whose telos it is to foster a polis capable of 
realizing the good--defined antecedent to the individual. The good in this sense 
is a fulfillment of the function of the polis (that is, its telos) by individuals acting 
virtuously (or excellently). The virtues of a citizen, then, are derived from the 
conception of an excellent polis. In this sense, the excellent polis requires 
virtuous citizens-which it seeks to produce through education-if its function is 
to be fulfilled. The telos of an excellent person is to cultivate virtue to contribute 
to the excellence of the polis. The fulfillment ofthe telos of the polis and of the 
individual results in happiness (eudaimonia)--that is, a flourishing life. 
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Therefore, while Aristotle agrees that social organization offers protection to the 
individual, he thinks that the polis rather than the individual is capable of 
providing a framework in which what it means to live well is both intelligible and 
achievable (Pol. 1252b29). 
Aristotle is so convinced that human community is essential to humans 
that he makes the strong claim that "anyone who cannot form a community with 
others, or who does not need to because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a city-
state-he is either a beast or a god" (Pol. 1253a28). Why, though, is the life of 
the individual who is unable to "form a community with others" fit only for "a 
beast or a god?" Presumably, a person could master enough propositional 
information about the world to survive outside of human society. Finding enough 
food to eat and shelter to protect oneself is achievable by those who have been 
taught the skills for survival. 7 Clearly hermitages, for example, have existed 
throughout history.s However, what one gives up by voluntarily choosing to 
leave society is not the thinking of thoughts, nor the exercise of the will, but the 
sharing of emotional interaction with another human being, that is, the 
communication with other human beings of those affective states and the objects 
that elicit those states that help to identify us as individuals.9 Rationality and 
volition have utility, regardless of one's situation. Emotional interaction with 
others, though, because it social by nature, is precisely what is foresworn by the 
kind of self-imposed isolation I am describing. 
In his essay on the evaluative function of emotions, Michael Stocker 
contends that emotions are constitutive of what it means to be human, arguing that 
132 
"having and being the subject of reactive attitudes [i.e., emotions] is central to 
being and being recognized as a person" (Stocker 183).!0 The claim that emotions 
are constitutive of what it means to be human is perhaps too strong. After all, are 
people who have certain kinds of emotional blindness not also human, even 
taking into account the emotional deficit? It seems clear to me, nevertheless, that 
a profoundly important characteristic of the human species is an ability to 
experience emotion, as well as to understand the emotions of others. P.F. 
Strawson calls "the fact" of our "natural human commitment to ordinary inter-
personal attitudes [i.e., emotions]" one of the key components "of the general 
framework of human life" (Strawson 198-9). In fact, Stocker asserts that our 
most fundamental knowledge of what it means to relate to other people comes on 
an emotional level. Understanding only the rational propositions put forward 
about another person takes one only a short way, if at all, down the road to 
knowing that person. Much of what counts for knowledge of another person as a 
subject (rather than as an object) is emotional.!! 
Having knowledge of what another person knows, or having the 
knowledge that another person knows a particular thing rationally is important in 
making all kinds of assessments about that person. For example, on an 
instrumental level it would be important to possess knowledge about another 
person's rational comprehension ofintemal combustion engines if what one 
desires in an interaction with that person is that she will fix one's car. On the 
other hand, knowing that she has a rational understanding of how to fix cars might 
also be foundational for pursuing a friendship with her involving emotional 
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interaction, if one also possesses the same knowledge of and apparent interest in 
cars. In this case, then, having knowledge of another's epistemic holdings could 
prove to be an important key to having true knowledge of the person. However, 
knowing what another person knows is not enough to establish much more than 
instrumental relationships. The most significant parts of knowing this person as 
another subject go far beyond knowing that-and what-she knows about cars, 
which is to say, far beyond a sort of basic accounting of the rational 
understanding she possesses. To know the most significant parts about her as a 
subject, it will be important to come to understand why she possesses this rational 
understanding of cars, what ends she believes this understanding serves, and 
whether or not she believes this comprehension is a good or a bad thing. 
Knowing what she values and despises, what brings her joy or makes her 
depressed provide the context in which emotional interaction can take place. The 
knowledge of the person as a subject gained through emotional interaction is the 
crucial information necessary for the intersubjectivity of a shared life. This 
emotional interaction with another I will call emotional attending. I will set out a 
more complete definition in Chapter Four. But for now I will suggest a simplified 
definition of what I mean by emotional attending: Emotional attending is the 
ability to understand and respond to the emotional lives of other subjects. 
If Stocker and Strawson are correct that emotions are an extremely 
important component of human life, and if Aristotle is correct that humans are 
essentially "political animals," then it does not seem too great a leap to suggest 
that some sort of emotional attending and human community are inextricably 
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linked in a fundamental way. That is to say, on a basic level, for emotional 
attending to take place, it must do so within the context of a community. 
Likewise, for a community even to exist qua human community-rather than as a 
conclave of individuals bound together for self-seeking or instrumental ends-
emotional attending must be present. Strawson, for example, has argued that "in 
the absence of any forms of these attitudes [i.e., emotions] it is doubtful whether 
we should have anything that we could find intelligible as a system of human 
relationships, as human society" (Strawson 210). 
For emotional attending to occur, the necessary social environment cannot 
be merely a Hobbesian confederation of atomic individuals, bound together only 
by a desire for social stability, each seeking her or his own needs, independent of 
all others. In some sense, this social environment supportive of emotional 
attending (and reliant upon it) must be a commonwealth in which one's 
commitments to the commonwealth transcend pursuit of a secure environment 
solely for the purposes of pursuing individual projects and goals. 
For the ancient Greeks, and for Aristotle in particular, this commonwealth 
is embodied by the polis. However, he links the polis and the individual as 
fundamentally analogous by suggesting that "the ways and means by which a man 
becomes excellent are the same as those by which one might establish a city-state 
... and that the education and the habits that make a man excellent are pretty 
much the same as those that make him statesmanlike or kingly" (Pol. 1288b41-2; 
see also 1333b35-7). Furthermore, he contends that "the best life, both for 
individuals separately and for city-states collectively, is a life of virtue sufficiently 
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equipped with the resources needed to take part in virtuous actions" (Pol. 
1323b40-2). The excellent polis, then, will make certain that it concentrates great 
effort on producing citizens of good character, capable of virtuous action (EN 
1099b29-33). As properly organized, the polis can correctly educate its young in 
the virtues, and can foster an environment conducive to the fully flourishing life. 
Because living virtuously is not only a moral achievement that strengthens the 
polis, but living a virtuous (excellent) life is what it means to flourish. To keep in 
mind my larger argument, I should point out that, as the virtue necessary for 
flourishing requires appropriate emotional response, so also one of the conditions 
necessary for an excellent polis-as well as for a flourishing life-is friendship, 
the enjoyment of which assumes some level of emotional attending if it is to be 
more than friendship of utility. In Chapter Four, I will suggest that emotional 
attending itself is very much like a virtue. 
To the extent that the polis undertakes to produce virtuous citizens, 
Aristotle argues that "it is not unimportant, then, to acquire one sort of habit or 
another, right from our youth. On the contrary, it is very important, indeed all-
important" (EN 11 03b22-5). Furthermore, he believes that there is universal 
consensus about the fact that one of the primary functions of a legislator centers 
on educating children in the virtues (Pol. 1337alO). But why does Aristotle come 
to this conclusion? Why should the education of citizens from a young age 
occupy such an important place in his understanding of the responsibility of the 
polis? He makes this claim as a result of his conception of human susceptibility 
to motivation by pleasure and pain. Since pleasure poorly trained can lead us to 
136 
contemptible actions, and pain poorly trained can lead to avoiding correct actions, 
Aristotle believes that education is necessary to teach children to experience 
pleasure and pain properly-that is, to find pleasure and avoid pain in the correct 
objects (EN 1104b10-3). However, virtue is not merely a matter of subduing the 
individual's passions, or of placing an onerous burden on the citizen. Rather, 
virtuous living offers itself as an excellent end, a sort of "salvation" (Pol. 
1309a34).12 
But how is this end established as a goal worthy of pursuit? It is important 
to say a word about how wishing (boulesis) functions in the individual. And since 
the individual and the polis are linked by analogy, it is possible to draw some 
conclusions about how the polis sets down ends for itself. The individual wishes 
"for the end more [than for the things that promote it], but we decide on things 
that promote the end" (EN 1111 b26). In other words, the act of wishing 
(boulesis) is laying down ends (teloi) and the goods that attach to those ends, 
which are associated with function (form, essence, etc). Practical reasoning, on 
the other hand, considers the ends laid down by boulesis and uses them in the 
process of deliberation to come to some decision (prohairesis). Prohairesis deals 
with how we achieve the ends laid down for us by boulesis. Hence, since 
identifying the best human goods is concerned with human telos and not only 
with a particular culture or constitution, and since the means promoted to achieve 
ends are virtues, there must be universal human virtues that are the means to 
achieving general human ends, and which transcend the particularity of 
convention. These goods are goods unqualifiedly. 13 
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Aristotle believes that in addition to its responsibilities in setting down 
human ends (feloi), the polis must also set down ends for itself as well-ordered 
community (Pol. 1278b15). The setting down of ends within apolis, however, is 
a matter of legislation. Having identified the end of a polis, for Aristotle it is 
possible to identify the virtues necessary to the completion of that end. As he 
says, "The virtue of the part must be determined by looking to the virtue of the 
whole" (Pol. 1260b14). However, each polis is differently constituted. 
Therefore, it must be remembered that there is "in each constitution the sort of 
virtue or justice that is suited to the constitutions (for if what is just is not the 
same in all constitutions, there must be differences in the virtue of justice as 
well)" (Pol. 1309a35-8). In other words, the polis, in addition to the individual, 
must exercise boulesis in setting down ends. 
However, it is possible to misidentify ends through faulty boulesis in the 
polis as well as in the individual. In this sense, then, that which is identified as a 
good is only an apparent good. The apparent good may be of either a universal or 
a particular nature. I might, for example, think that the goal of human life is the 
accumulation of wealth, so that I move closer to my completion as a human being 
in direct proportion to the rise of my net-worth. Or it may just be that I 
mistakenly believe that the goal of hygiene is not health, but beauty. Aristotle 
concludes that "for the excellent person, then, what is wished will be what is 
[wished] in reality, while for the base person what is wished is whatever it turns 
out to be [that appears good to him]" EN 1113a25). With respect to the polis, bad 
ends can also be misidentified. It was possible in Nazi Germany to be an 
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excellent death camp commandant, for example, by killing more Jews than the 
quota necessitated. However, what could be construed in Nazi Germany as a 
virtue would be considered vicious elsewhere because of the misidentified ends of 
that state. 
Inasmuch as there are virtues thought to be necessary to the completion of 
the function laid down by a particular polis for itself, it seems that there must also 
necessarily be virtues thought to be proper for life in that polis. The goods toward 
which these virtues aim, however, are qualified goods, goods for the sake of 
something else, to the degree that what they aim at is not the best good. For 
Aristotle there are unqualified goods of a general sort, as well as qualified goods 
of a particular sort (EN 1152b26-27). Virtues that equip the human for a virtuous 
life in a certain polis are of a different and qualified kind from the virtues 
identified as necessary for completion of the human telos. Clearly, then, Aristotle 
talks about virtue in two senses-the virtue of a human and the virtue of a citizen 
(Pol. 1277aI2). In other words, he believes that there are identifiably specific 
human traits that are essential, and therefore, universal, which require virtues 
necessary to fulfill the function of a human being qua human being. At the same 
time, he believes that each polis will have particular needs unique to each, which 
require corresponding virtues for the fulfillment of the constitutive function of the 
polis (Pol. 1276b29). 
Since Aristotle views the individual and the polis analogously, and since 
the context varies in which individuals are called upon to exercise virtue, we may 
make inferences about the extent to which this is also true for the polis. In other 
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words, excellent communities vary constitutively relative to the ends laid down 
for each; hence, the virtues of a good citizen are varied, while the virtues of a 
good person are constant (1276b30-2). On this reading, it is possible to be a good 
citizen without being a good person. Nevertheless, an Aristotelian conception of 
the polis, while finding some agreement with political liberalism in the idea that 
there is a multiplicity of goods to be pursued-in addition to the best good-
suggests that those goods are not derivable in isolation, but are identifiable within 
the context ofthe polis. 
II. Virtue Ethics versus Deontology and Utilitarianism 
Though Aristotle believes there is a specific human telos, that is not to say 
that he believes a general comprehensive system of rules and regulations should 
result from this state of affairs, which may leave him open to the charge of 
relativism. A significant characteristic that distinguishes Aristotle's account of 
the virtues from Plato's account is his assertion that virtue is practiced in highly 
contextualized ways, rather than abstractly. As a consequence, an examination of 
the virtues will always be inexact when compared to the examination, for 
example, of a geometer (EN 1098a27). He prefaces his inquiry into the virtues, 
therefore, with the disclaimer that this sort of inquiry must necessarily be 
approximate (1104a1). This distinction between what is knowable to a scientific 
certainty and what is knowable to a virtuous person, is in some ways at the heart 
of my argument, and will therefore continue to be an abiding theme throughout 
the rest of this work-as, for example, when I speak of the difference between 
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knowing the propositions about someone (scientific reason) and knowing 
someone through emotional attending (virtue). 
The mean of virtue "is not one, and not the same for all" (EN 1106a33). 
As a result, Aristotle's conception of virtue seeks not to distill virtue into 
standardized rules to be applied without regard to context. MacIntyre argues that 
the laws of the polis are general, and therefore, "particular cases will always arise 
in which it is unclear how the law is to be applied and unclear what justice 
demands. Thus there are bound to be occasions on which no formula is available 
in advance.,,14 Hence, for an action to be recognized as virtuous, it requires more 
than that the action "have the right qualities" (11 05a31). Concerning the agent, 
Aristotle writes: "First, he [sic.] must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; 
second he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and, third, he 
must also do them from a firm and unchanging state" (11 05a31). For this reason, 
an action is considered virtuous not because it conforms to an idea of the good, or 
because it is accomplished fortuitously, but because it is the sort of action that 
would be performed by a virtuous person (1105b7). 
There can be for Aristotle, therefore, "no fixed answers"-which is to say, 
no universal set of rules to be applied in all cases, without regard to context 
(11 04a4). For if it were to be said that deliberation-which is examination of the 
means by which human agents seek to achieve some end (1112aI7)-concerns 
only the identification of a certain rule to be applied universally, that assertion 
would fail to take into account the various complex factors that must be 
considered in each particular instance where virtue is to be enacted. IS On the 
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contrary, inquiry into deliberation is inexact precisely because "the agents 
themselves must consider in each case what the opportune action is, as doctors 
and navigators do" (11 04a6).16 
Additionally, and more specifically for my purposes, virtue ethics 
provides an account of ethics that requires more than the rationality necessary for 
deontological ethics or the raw emotional energy that motivates moral action in 
utilitarian ethics. Part of what was at stake for Kant and Mill in turning away 
from a moral philosophy that was agent-centered, like the ethics of Aristotle 
subsequently modified by Thomas Aquinas, was the distrust of any centralized 
conception of the good-whether that good was identified by the polis or, more 
importantly for Kant and Mill at the time, the church. 17 
The Roman Catholic Church had seemed altogether too ready to impose 
its will on an increasingly secularized and an increasingly resistant European 
population, which ultimately helped set the stage for the Protestant Reformation. 
After the Reformation, ecclesiastical authority receded as an uncontestable last 
word on social and moral norms. IS In the process, many people began to search 
elsewhere for direction and for the material out of which to build a moral life-
both communal and individual. That is to say, if the church was no longer the 
uncontested locus of authority for establishing social and moral norms, where and 
under what conditions could those norms be established? And if norms for the 
intelligibility of moral action were not securable by appeal to church authority, to 
what extent was the individual now responsible for making decisions about moral 
behavior based on individual freedom? 
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Immanuel Kant argues that for morality to exist at all, freedom must be the 
conceptual ether in which it operates. 19 Like the fundamental categories 
necessary for theoretical reason (i.e., unity, totality, plurality, etc.) freedom 
operates as a fundamental category necessary for practical reason. Moral agency, 
which I will discuss momentarily from Kant's perspective as necessary for a truly 
enlightened society, requires that praise or blame be attachable to actions. 
Robots, for instance, are not accorded the status of agents. Because they are 
programmed to act by another, robots do not possess the freedom to choose how 
and when to act. It is only when I am free to make the choice to do something that 
I can be praised or blamed for so acting. That is why Kant's "humanity principle" 
becomes central to his argument about the nature of moral action (Kant 
Groundingfor the Metaphysics of MoralsJ5-6). That is to say, I am required to 
treat other human beings as ends in themselves, precisely because were I to treat 
them as means to my own ends, I would deprive them of their freedom as 
subjects, treating them merely as objects for the accomplishment of my own ends. 
In other words, I would be depriving them of the autonomy necessary for moral 
agency to exist. If I force someone to rob a bank for my own ends, I have 
preempted the free exercise of the will of another autonomous individual, treating 
that person as an object, a tool to be used, that is, as less than human. And if my 
actions were to be treated as universalizable, the concept of freedom-and 
therefore morality per se-would cease to exist. Therefore, Kant writes: "This 
principle of humanity of every rational nature generally as an end in itself is the 
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supreme limiting condition of every man's [sic.] freedom of action" (Kant 
Groundingfor the Metaphysics of Morals) 7). 
Indeed, for Kant, not only is the theoretical freedom of the moral sphere 
necessary, but for a truly enlightened society, there needs to be the practical 
exercise of human freedom. Kant contends that only by appropriating a space for 
free rational inquiry can humanity escape the bonds of its "self-incurred tutelage" 
to external authority (Kant "What Is Enlightenment?" 3). He writes that the motto 
of enlightenment is: "Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own reason!" (Kant 
"What Is Enlightenment?" 3). The emphasis with which modernity reads this, of 
course, is on your own. That is to say, Kant envisions a society in which 
individual freedom is cultivated so that people act morally not because they are 
forced to heteronomously-that is, by outside forces-but because each 
individual finds within her/himselfthe resources to act morally. Such a society of 
autonomous agents would be, Kant believes, a truly enlightened society. Notice, 
though, that the exercise of reason and moral action reside in the autonomous 
individual, antecedent to the influence of the community. 
In addition to relying on autonomy, moral agency, according to Kant, must 
rest on rationality, separated from the contingencies of emotion. Iris Murdoch 
points out that "Kant regards 'feelings' as dangerous to morality, sharply divides 
(noumenal) reason from (phenomenal) emotion, and stresses that dutiful action is 
something of which every man [sic.] is immediately capable" (Murdoch 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals 11). Not only are the emotions too unstable a 
platform to provide guidance, but Kant believes one can act morally only when 
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the motivation is a sense of duty-which is to say, motivation unalloyed by 
emotion. To be well-disposed to a moral act through the emotions renders the act 
extra-mora1.20 In Grundlegung Kant gives the example of a dealer who charges a 
fair price to everyone equally. The dealer does not act morally, however, if the 
reason for fair pricing is that fair pricing is good for the long-term environment in 
which the dealer hopes to continue to sell (Kant Groundingfor the Metaphysics of 
Morals 10). Moreover, the dealer does not act morally if offering a fair price is 
the result of some abiding feeling of love for the customers. He goes on to offer 
up a person, who, having lost all fellow-feeling through a preoccupation with his 
own sorrow, nevertheless acts beneficently. According to Kant, unmotivated by 
emotion, "for the first time his action has genuine moral worth" (Kant Grounding 
for the Metaphysics of Morals 11). Moreover, for the purposes of ethics, it is only 
when the emotions are not part of the motivation to action that things like love 
and beneficence can be commanded, as in the Biblical charge to love one's 
neighbor as oneself. Kant reasons that it is impossible to command someone to 
feel love toward another; therefore, what is being commanded in those cases is 
love that "resides in the will" not in the emotions-which brings it into the realm 
of morality, and not merely "tender sympathy" (Kant Groundingfor the 
Metaphysics of Morals 12).21 
John Stuart Mill, on the other hand, views ethics as a means of 
maximizing happiness. His Principle of Utility, or the Greatest Happiness 
Principle, "holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness" (Mill 
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Utilitarianism 2.1,55). Happiness, in this case, means pleasure, while pain 
consists of the deprivation of pleasure. That which is moral, then, is that which 
maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain. Aristotle also has something to say 
about pleasure and pain, which, he concludes, signifies not happiness and 
unhappiness, but the substance of feelings in general (EN 1252a31). Aristotle 
roundly rejects the idea that happiness (eudaimonia) is synonymous with 
pleasure, or that pleasure can be understood as a primary end, suggesting this sort 
of life is "slavish," fit only "for grazing animals" (1095b20). 
Furthermore, Mill thinks that emotions-what the ancients would have 
called passions, and what he calls desires and impulses-have a necessary 
function in the moral life. Unlike Kant who believes that the mixture of emotions 
with motivation precludes moral agency, Mill believes that impulses are the 
energy that drive moral agency-for good and for bad. The stronger the impulses 
the greater chance for evil, but also the greater chance for good (Mill On Liberty 
and Other Writings 60). Moral character, for Mill, consists not in having 
emotions appropriate to virtuous acts, but in harnessing strong emotions in the 
service of maximizing happiness. 
Like Kant, Mill views the free exercise of the will as a prerequisite for a 
liberal society, which society (at least on Mill's account) seeks neutrality with 
respect to people's conception of the good. He believes that society has no direct 
interest in people's lives in areas that do not affect other people. That is to say, 
private thoughts, conduct, and aspirations should remain the preserve of the 
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individual-unencumbered by external influence. He suggests that the 
"appropriate region of human liberty" consists of three things: 
1. Freedom of thought and opinion in "the inward domain of 
consciousness. " 
2. Individual "liberty of tastes and pursuits" in "framing the plan of 
our life to suit our own character." 
3. The free establishment of communities "for any purpose not 
involving harm to others" (Mill On Liberty 15-6). 
For Mill, a truly liberal politics allows the individual the primary place in 
social arrangements, requiring that boulesis be the province of the individual, and 
not a communal enterprise. To Mill's understanding, humans, if they are to be 
civilized must develop individuality as a necessary pre-condition of things like 
education and culture (Mill On Liberty 57). Although individuality should be 
limited to the extent that it does not harm others, the cultivation of the idea of an 
individual self, responsible for all its own choices, puts the will outside the 
influence of others. Mill, though nodding to traditional conceptions of the 
education of the young, suggests that "it is the privilege and proper condition of a 
human being, arrived at the maturity of his [sic.] faculties, to use and interpret 
experience in his own way"-unencumbered, presumably, by the prejudicial 
presence of moral education (Mill On Liberty 58). Like Kant, Mill asserts that 
heteronomous influence in the exercise of the will precludes human moral 
agency: "He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life 
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for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation" (Mill 
On Liberty 59). On Mill's account, then, both individual moral activity and the 
telos toward which that activity is ordered are understood to originate at the 
individual, rather than the communal, level. 
An Aristotelian reading of virtue ethics, on the other hand, believes that 
emotions should not be extirpated for the purposes of moral agency, but that they 
should be educated. Aristotle suggests that a disposition to virtuous action is 
insufficient for the cultivation of virtue, because an Aristotelian account of virtue 
concerns both actions and feelings (praxeis kai pathe) (EN 11 04bI4). And for 
Aristotle feelings have to do "in general [with] whatever implies pleasure or pain" 
(1252a31; 1260a4-23 ).22 Feelings for Aristotle are not just involuntary impulses 
with which we must simply cope. We bear a certain responsibility for the 
emotions we have, as well as for how those emotions are cultivated, and to what 
ends they are ordered. He says that "we need to have had the appropriate 
upbringing-right from early youth, as Plato says-to make us find enjoyment or 
pain in the right things; for this is the correct education" (EN 1104bll). 
Emotions, then, are not only educable, on an Aristotelian reading, but this 
education is indispensable if we are to "find enjoyment or pain in the right 
things"; because pleasure experienced in the wrong way "causes us to do base 
actions," while pain wrongly experienced "causes us to abstain from fine ones" 
(1104blO). 
Education in the virtues combines training in acting and feeling in the 
right ways and at the right times, while avoiding acting and feeling in wrong 
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ways, at the wrong times. According to Aristotle's linkage of action and emotion, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that, in order to cultivate virtue, one cannot learn 
only to act in the right way without also learning to experience emotions in the 
right way, or vice versa?3 Whereas for Kant, emotional motivation precludes 
moral agency, and for Mill, emotions are the energy of motivation, emotions in 
Aristotle exist in critical relationship to our actions as finely calibrated and 
necessary components of moral action (11 05a7). And though there are animal 
appetites (epithumia), these are what the incontinent person acts on (EN 1111 b 
15). He calls these appetites nonrational feelings, to differentiate them from 
rational decisions. He makes the claim, though, that "nonrational feelings seem to 
be no less human than rational calculation; and so actions resulting from spirit or 
appetite are also proper to a human being. It is absurd, then, to regard them as 
involuntary (EN 1111 b 1 )." Even though it is possible, for example, to act in 
ways a virtuous person would act (i.e., they accord with reason), if the emotions 
that a virtuous person would experience do not attend the action, then one cannot 
be counted as virtuous, according to Aristotle, but merely continent (l145b13). 
Taken in this way, Kant's conception of moral action as requiring an absence of 
emotional motivation argues for something very nearly resembling Aristotelian 
continence.24 Aristotle, however, believes that the absence of the appropriate 
emotional response-that is, the reaction to environmental stimuli, about which I 
spoke in Chapter Two-makes continence ultimately unreliable as a long term 
state (hexis), just to the extent that the acknowledgment of a correct course of 
action without the fortification of an appropriate emotional underpinning is not a 
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stable platfonn of character-which is the definition of virtue. Hence, 
inappropriate emotional response is an obstacle to virtue.25 
It is worth pointing out that Aristotle does not view emotions as the equal 
of reason. He believes that reason ought to order the emotions to virtuous ends 
(Pol. 1254b5). Where he differs with Plato is in his belief that the emotions are 
educable, whereas Plato believes that they are only capable of being controlled.26 
Another set of competitors against whom Aristotle differentiates himself with 
respect to the emotions are the Stoics, who claim that virtue must be purely 
rational, absent of the passions. Aristotle argues that "they are wrong, however, 
because they speak of being unaffected without qualification, not of being 
unaffected in the right or wrong way, at the right or wrong time, and the added 
qualifications" (EN 1104b25). That is to say, Aristotle believes that the Stoics 
paint with too broad a brush on the issue of the emotions, because "for good or 
bad enjoyment or pain is very important for our actions" (11 05a7). This is so 
because virtuous actions are products of a state of character that disposes us 
correctly to the experience of pleasure and pain (11 04b29), whereas the Stoics 
believe that emotions are not necessary for virtuous acts inasmuch as virtuous 
action can be motivated by duty alone (Nussbaum "Morality and Emotions" 
http://www.geocities.com/AthenslRhodes/3 724/Cytrixlcdrom5/Routledge _ moralit 
y _emotion.html). 
L.A. Kosman addresses the issue of emotions and moral action from just 
this perspective-that is, the dispositional nature of virtuous character. As I have 
noted, what is at issue for Aristotle in moral action has to do with the 
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development of character, which is a "firm and unchanging state" from which 
moral action proceeds (EN 11 05a31). Kosman argues that character has to do 
with disposition-that is, "how I am to become the kind of person readily 
disposed so to conduct myself, the kind of person for whom proper conduct 
emanates characteristically from a fixed disposition" (Kosman 103). These 
dispositions, which are understood as potentialities, do not dispose us only to 
action, but also to feeling.27 While action concerns what I do (i.e., they are 
active), feelings concern that which affects me (i.e., they are passive) (Kosman 
105). I must be well-disposed to the appropriate feelings when faced with 
particular situations, so that I might act virtuously. 
In order to be said to have a virtuous character with respect to what 
Aristotle called "mildness," for example, when faced with a situation where anger 
is necessary, I must be angered by the right thing, in the right way, and at the right 
time (1125b32). It is possible to manifest either too much anger or too little-
either of which is to miss the mark of virtue. The accompanying actions for the 
virtuous person manifesting mildness are a necessary correlative of feeling anger 
in the right way, at the right time, and so on. Neither acting nor feeling in 
isolation are enough to comprise a character disposed to virtue. If I were to come 
upon a child being abused (assuming child abuse is a bad thing-something I will 
assert rather than argue), to be virtuous I would need to be angered in the right 
way. Ifmy anger at this injustice is limited to internal seething without any 
external manifestation, my anger is impotent (i.e., lacking potentiality for action). 
To have these feelings, according to Aristotle, is in some sense to have entered 
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into a state of affairs in which the end result is to be moved to action (11 06a4). 
The realization of actions and feelings are linked by a character disposed to 
certain actions and feelings, which when rightly ordered result in virtue. 
A Kantian analysis would suggest that injustice is wrong on 
universalizable grounds, and that I have a duty to confront it-regardless of 
whether or not I feel anger. In fact, assuming this analysis is correct, if anger is 
the motivation for any subsequent action in response to this injustice (e.g., I lash 
out at the unjust), my action loses force qua moral action, as I have already said. 
The question, though, is whether it is possible to confront injustice without being 
motivated by anger, and why this should be viewed as morally advantageous. If 
we take injustice to be a state of affairs in which inequity gives rise to grievance, 
then somehow emotional response seems implicit in the reaction injustice so 
identified elicits-that is, to identify something as unjust is already to have 
asserted the implicit assumption of a state of grievance. By Kantian standards-
in which acting morally must be done only from a sense of duty-moral action 
would be a rare and difficult achievement, if only because our evaluations are so 
closely tied to our emotions. 
Mill would most certainly agree that anger in the above example acts as a 
genuinely good motivator to a moral action that would maximize happiness. 
Anger operates for Mill not as an educable correlative of action, but as an urge 
that assists action in the moral sphere. Anger is the irresistible passion that must 
be controlled to carry out rationality's purposes. Mill follows Plato in this 
respect-that emotions act as potentially disruptive forces, which must always be 
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controlled lest they wreak havoc. Mill differs from Plato, however, in that Plato 
has much greater confidence in the community to form the individual whose 
reason is called upon to harness the passions. Mill believes, on the other, hand 
that moral character requires that the desires and impulses "under the government 
of a strong will" ought only to reflect the individual's self-determined evaluations 
(Mill On Liberty 61). As such, the impulses and desires I have are not subject to 
any standard external to myself, save the Greatest Happiness Principle. Viewed 
in this light, any emotion I have is considered neither good nor bad, but rather 
helpful or unhelpful, inasmuch as it impels me to action that maximizes 
happiness. Emotions on this reading "are but another name for energy" (Mill On 
Liberty 60). That they are correlatives of certain kinds of moral action is, for Mill 
beside the point; whatever emotions are present that motivate moral action need 
not be emotions experienced in the right way, and at the right time, and so on. 
Rather, they must merely meet a threshold of intensity necessary to motivate 
action. 
In contradistinction to Kant, Aristotle's theory of virtue as not solely 
action, but the combination of actions and feelings, recognizes the reality of the 
way human beings confront many situations in which a moral outcome is 
anticipated, offering, I think, a more realistic assessment of the moral life. In 
Mill's case, Aristotle's understanding of emotion as a correlative of action offers 
a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between "actions and feelings," 
an understanding that views virtue as a state of character well-disposed to both 
actions and feelings manifested rightly. Just any emotion-even if it is strong 
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enough to motivate action-will not do for Aristotle; one must manifest actions 
and feelings appropriate to the situation. These feelings are not, according to 
Kosman, "merely the occasion for actions that are the proper realization of the 
virtue; they are part of the concept of that virtue considered as a disposition" 
(Kosman 109). Kosman is quick to add, however, that neither are these feelings 
themselves the realization of virtue, "but they are a part ofthe set of 
corresponding actions and feelings for which virtue is a disposition" (Kosman 
109). 
An Aristotelian understanding of virtue, I would suggest, offers a more 
complete theory of moral action than either Kant or Mill by combining action 
with feelings in ways qualified by their appropriateness to the situation. To see 
how, from an Aristotelian perspective, the emotions can be educated, I will tum to 
the historic debate occasioned by Aristotle's implicit response in the Poetics to 
Plato's proscription of tragedy in the Republic. For it is in the Poetics that 
Aristotle addresses the whole issue of appropriate emotional response through a 
discussion of the emotions elicited by tragedy. 
III. Tragedy: Plato and Repulsive Emotions 
Plato, in Book X of the Republic, opens a discussion that has fueled debate 
for over 2,500 years on the nature of art and the place of the artist within the ideal 
republic. In addition to the epistemological inexactness art engenders (Plato 
Republic 602c) Plato argues that art, through its evocation of the emotions, 
encourages injurious moral habits. Poets, in general, and tragedians, in particular, 
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draw Plato's criticism for contributing to social corrosion by obscuring our 
knowledge of the truth through their representation of reality. Of particular 
concern to Plato is the way poets becloud the truth through appeals to the 
emotions. In Plato's view, these pre-critical passions, if unchecked, cause us to 
do things that-if we would only "stop and think" about them-we would never 
do. We succumb to our passions, and are said to be "not in our right minds." On 
a Platonic reading, reason is privileged as the primary way of knowing. Reason is 
the tool used to uncover truth, while emotions, on the other hand, are precisely 
what must be avoided if we are to arrive at a reliable account of the truth. They 
are the "low-grade part of the mind" (603a). In Plato's view, the emotions are 
passions that threaten to overwhelm the good judgment of reason. Left 
unchecked, emotion will try "to dominate and rule over things which it is not 
equipped by its hereditary status to rule over, and so plunges the whole of 
everyone's life into chaos" (442b). Reason, on the other hand, is the taskmaster 
that is called upon to "ride herd" over (and, ultimately, to tame) the unruly 
emotions (Plato Phaedrus 253d9). 
A notable exception to Plato's suspicion of the emotions as unmanageable 
is his positive view of love, which moves the whole person toward beauty through 
reserved contemplation of the beloved. In Phaedrus Plato writes: 
The irrational desire that has gained control over any judgement 
urging a man towards what is correct, and that is carried towards pleasure 
in beauty-in tum being forcefully reinforced by the desires related to it in 
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its pursuit of the beauty of bodies-and that wins victory by its drive, 
taking its name from its very force: this is called love (238blO). 
Nevertheless, as Plato points out later, the good horse of love (which works 
seamlessly with the charioteer of reason) is always in danger of being overcome 
by the bad horse of hubris (253-256). It is to this hubristic passion that Plato 
refers when he says of the poet that "he's concerned with the petulant and varied 
side of our characters, because it's easy to represent" (Plato Republic 605a). 
But, it might be objected, notwithstanding the potential problems created 
through the poetic encouragement of excessive passions, does not Plato hold out 
for a limited use of the poet's art-in particular, for my purposes, stories that 
reinforce the appropriate moral responses? It is true that Plato understands the 
need for edifying stories as a process of the education of children who would be 
guardians of the ideal republic (e.g., 377/378). However, it is not at all clear that 
the kind of poetry Plato is prepared to allow for the purposes of moral 
education-relying as it does on stories which are not false portrayals that impugn 
the gods or appear to glorify viciousness-is even art. Indeed, he concedes that 
"it's not because the lines are not good poetry and don't give pleasure to most 
people; on the contrary, the better the poetry they are, the more they are to be kept 
from the ears of children and men who are to be autonomous and to be more 
afraid oflosing this freedom than of death" (387b). Instead, what Plato proposes 
is the use of stories that portray the gods in a predetermined and imitable way, or 
true stories that display human virtue-the definition of which seems to be the 
history that Aristotle is keen to contrast with poetry (Poet 1451 b). In short, the 
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role Plato sees for art in the republic abjures art qua art in favor of morally 
edifying object lessons. It is important to note at the outset that my discussion 
will be focused primarily on literature. Inasmuch as both Plato and Aristotle have 
mainly poetry in mind, and inasmuch as aesthetics as a formal philosophical 
discipline comes much later in history (e.g., it is not entirely fair to ask either 
Plato or Aristotle to respond to something like modern abstract art-an aesthetic 
innovation they could not have anticipated), we are justified in so limiting the 
scope of our discussion. 
Plato recognizes that mimetic art (particularly art that relies on narrative 
construction) is unfortunately liable to misuse as a medium, because its primary 
appeal is to the emotions (604c). Mimetic art poses a threat to good order, 
because whereas reason is stable, capable of withstanding manipulation, the 
emotions are susceptible to change (605a). Literary stories thrive on conflict, for 
example, which is due, I suspect, to conflict being inherently more interesting.28 
The intellect is calm and stable, and, therefore, aesthetically boring (604e). 
Presumably, no one wants to read a book (see a play, movie, etc.) about a nice 
law-abiding family to whom nothing ever happens. The conflict represented in 
narrative forms of art is largely emotional in nature: emotional in the sense that 
either the conflict itself is emotional (e.g., the betrayal of friends, the jealousy of 
the lover, the hatred of an enemy, etc.) or some other kind of conflict (e.g., 
military, political, individual violence--even intellectual) that evokes emotional 
conflict, as a result of having to come to terms with the initial conflict. Therefore, 
because emotional conflict is more interesting than the absence of conflict-thus, 
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causing it to be a central aspect of tragedy-poets who portray emotional conflict, 
in Plato's view, are forever appealing to the lowest part ofus.29 In fact, according 
to Plato tragedy encourages the very emotions that virtuous people continually 
attempt to subdue through the application of reason (606a). "We are," according 
to Iris Murdoch, "infected by playing or enjoying a bad role."(Murdoch The Fire 
& the Sun 5). 
Poetry, therefore, promotes a state of affairs in which, instead of subduing 
emotions through reason, emotions are intentionally evoked, and thereby 
strengthened through their exercise. Hence, according to Plato, the poet should 
not be admitted into the city, because "he destroys the rational part by feeding and 
fattening up this other part" (Plato Republic 605b). Emotions here are imagined 
as the errant forces in a city to which the poet cedes political power. Plato notes 
that "this is equivalent to someone destroying the more civilized members of 
community by presenting ruffians with political power" (605b). The poet, 
therefore, "establishes a bad system of government in people's minds by 
gratifying their irrational sides" (605b). Furthermore, the political metaphor 
applied by Plato to emotion suggests that the triggering of emotions through 
poetry is not merely a matter of individual rational deformation. Society, as an 
aggregation of individuals, is also negatively affected when emotions go 
unfettered. That is to say that if everyone acted on the urges of anger without 
restraint, for instance, the fabric of society would unravel in short order, as the 
safety and security offered by society would cease to exist. 
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Additionally, Plato argues that reason and emotion are in conflict in other 
ways. For Plato, the divide between reason and emotion is as discrete and 
divergent as the divide between male and female. He writes: "However, you also 
appreciate that when we're afflicted by trouble in our own lives, then we take 
pride in the opposite-in our ability to endure pain without being upset. We think 
that this is manly behaviour, and that only women behave in the way we were 
sanctioning earlier" (605d). In other words, to allow reason to subjugate the 
emotions, to refuse to show emotion is manly, while succumbing to the passion of 
emotion, surrendering to the irrational is womanly-where manliness, of course, 
is the ideal. Hence, poetry is a feminizing force that threatens rationality. This 
privileging of reason over emotion, and the identification of rationality with 
maleness and emotionality with femaleness has shaped Western epistemology 
ever since.30 
For Plato, the emotions elicited by art are, at best unnecessary; because he 
believes that the good person is self-sufficient (387d). This self-sufficiency has 
implications for virtue, in that Plato understands virtue to be a product of 
individual achievement. External circumstances have no bearing on the virtuous 
person's practice of virtue. In a position that later came to be associated with the 
Stoics, Plato holds that nothing bad can happen to a good person. Plato writes in 
Republic III that "one good man will not regard death as a terrible thing for 
another good man-a friend of his-to suffer" (387d). On this account, one need 
not grieve the death of a friend because the goodness of one's life does not 
depend on external factors-in this case, neither on other people, nor on any 
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tragedy that might befall oneself or those close to one. Plato's understanding of 
the impropriety of emotional response for a self-sufficient person can reasonably 
be extended beyond grief to include the improper emotional responses of fear and 
pity: In the case of the death of "a friend of his," one is obliged not to extend pity 
to those who loved the good man, nor to fear that kind of death for oneself. 
Why, though, does the good person-the self-sufficient person-remain 
calm in the face of the death of a friend? Being emotionally detached, the good 
person is capable of looking dispassionately on events that might cause a lesser 
person to show pity or fear. 31 Pity and fear are repulsive to a self-sufficient 
person (605e). Pity, for example, is always bad, because if a bad thing happens to 
a person who deserves it, then pity is an inappropriate response; what is called for 
is blame. If, on the other hand, something tragic happens to a virtuous person and 
it is undeserved-then blame is inappropriate; it is only apparently tragic, for 
nothing bad can happen to a good person. Witnessing pity in another person 
should cause revulsion to the good person. Similarly, fear is inappropriate in a 
good person; it is always unmanly. The same logic applies: If nothing bad can 
happen to a good person, what is there to be afraid of? Seeing fear in another 
person should also cause revulsion. The tragedians encourage the experience of 
these two emotions through their portrayal of tragedy. Hence, according to Plato, 
tragedy ought to be banned.32 
Aristotle, to whom I tum next, takes a different view of tragedy, related in 
large part to his difference from Plato in the understanding of emotions. Whereas 
Plato views emotions as impulses always in need subjugation, Aristotle believes 
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emotions are educable-and that tragedy, instead of being banned, plays an 
important role in educating the emotions. 
IV. Aristotle and Necessary Emotions 
A. Emotion, Action, and Tragedy 
Aristotle offers an implicit response in the Poetics to Plato's denunciation 
in Republic X of the tragic emotions. Where Plato believes that the emotions 
educed by tragedy should be seen as disgusting in the individual and corrosive to 
the republic, Aristotle believes that emotions are crucial to the cultivation of 
virtue. I want to be clear that I am not suggesting a position for Aristotle on 
emotion that anachronistically imposes on him positions about which, not only 
did he never think, but positions about which he did not possess the conceptual 
resources to think. After all, Aristotle also held that the passions should be ruled 
by reason. Furthermore, he privileged reason with the same gender specific 
distinctions as Plato (Pol. 1252a31; 1260a4-23). Neither do I want to argue that 
Aristotle's position on emotions is the obverse of Plato's, but rather that Aristotle 
saw sufficient difference between his position and Plato's; this difference 
prompted him to respond to Plato's claim that poets ought to be banned for their 
ill effects on moral and epistemological order. 
However, even the assertion that Aristotle is offering an implicit response 
to Plato is not an entirely uncontroversial one. Alexander Nehamas, for instance, 
has argued that whatever Aristotle's disagreements were with Plato, they do not 
extend to his treatment of tragedy in the Poetics. Nehamas argues that "even if 
161 
Aristotle is confronting Plato on [the benefits and harms of poetry], he is not 
doing so through his very definition of tragedy itself.,,33 Interestingly, though, 
Nehamas pins his argument to a denial of the notion that Aristotle's use of 
catharsis in the Poetics "involves the emotions in any way"(Nehamas 293). That 
is not to say that Nehamas believes that emotions have no cognitive content. 
Quite to the contrary, he contends that emotions "involve both content and 
evaluation" (Nehamas 297). However, whatever value emotions possess comes 
as a result of their being persuaded by reason. In fact, he argues that unless 
Aristotle "shows how exactly one becomes habituated into virtue without relying 
on a literal model of reason persuading the emotions to agree with its choices, 
their non-rational status will remain in question; the precise mechanism by which 
emotion is trained into virtue needs to be made explicit" (Nehamas 299). What 
Nehamas's account of the rational habituation of emotion fails to take into 
account, however (which is crucial to the point he wants to make), is the extent to 
which much of habituation takes place in a pre-cognitive way. Aristotle's 
understanding of habituation into virtue does not assume rationality (nor does it 
need to) as a prerequisite. Habituation into virtue assumes that one does not 
possess the cognitive resources for rational deliberation prior to beginning the 
process-which is precisely why habituation is necessary. Education of the 
emotions and habituation into virtue begins with the very young, where rational 
persuasion is not even possible. In fact, the process of habituation may require 
actions or responses that appear irrational to those who have yet to be trained, but 
that can only appear rational after a habit has been established. If I have a 
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relationship with someone who is a gambling addict, for example, my first 
response to that person upon learning that gambling has brought on another 
financial catastrophe may be to respond with pity by rescuing that person. Pity 
toward those whom we love seems, at first glance, like a rational and morally 
defensible course of action. I may be told later, though, that an emotional 
response of pity in this situation that leads to some kind of rescuing behavior is 
precisely the wrong emotional response here. It may very well be that I have to 
cultivate certain counter-intuitive emotional habits before I ever understand 
them-that is, prior to being persuaded that they are reasonable or moral. 
B. Aristotle on Tragedy: Situating the Debate 
Having underscored the link between action and feeling for Aristotle, we 
are prepared to entertain his thoughts on tragedy, because it is tragedy as an art 
form that is explicitly concerned with action and emotion. In fact, a work of art 
has no claim to the title tragedy in the absence of action-which is why plot is 
more important than character in tragedy, inasmuch as plot deals with action, 
while character deals with a state of being: "In other words the end and aim of 
human life is doing something, not just being a certain sort of person; and though 
we consider people's characters in deciding what sort of person they are, we call 
them successful or unsuccessful only with reference to their actions" (Poet 
1450a).34 Possessing virtue, for instance, as a state of being is never enough. 
True virtue consists in "activity in accord with virtue" (EN 1 098b30-1 099a6). 
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However, tragedy deals with more than just action, because tragedy, like 
virtue, "is a mimesis not only of a complete action, but also of things arousing 
pity and fear, emotions most likely to be stirred when things happen unexpectedly 
but because of each other" (Poet 1452a). Hence, to the extent that the virtues 
principally are concerned with actions and emotions, tragedy seems especially 
suited to the task of educating the virtues. To make an assertion about how 
tragedy is well-suited to the task of educating the emotions, though, is to raise the 
inevitable question about whether Aristotle understands tragedy more or less 
instrumentally. I will speak at greater length in Chapter Five about the historic 
aesthetic dilemma over whether any use of art other than for aesthetic enjoyment 
risks making it instrumental to some other ends. At present, though, I will 
suggest that there is a way to understand Aristotle on tragedy that takes into 
account his appreciation of form, while still understanding the capacity of that 
form to offer imaginative possibilities for the training of the emotions through 
mImeSIS. 
Having acknowledged that Aristotle did not set out to propose an aesthetic 
theory, and that his view of art is not necessarily hostile to formal aesthetic 
accounts, we should ask about what it is he wants to accomplish in Poetics X. A 
straightforward reading of the text suggests that his primary intent centers on 
describing the function of tragedy-what it is meant to do, and how it 
accomplishes this task. I will argue that it is by no means a devastating admission 
to an Aristotelian mimetic theory to propose that the form of tragedy is 
inextricably bound up with its function. This sounds like a rather large claim, 
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which will be crucial to the account of the emotions I am proposing, and, 
therefore, one which I must now defend. 
To fulfill the function of tragedy, a work must first meet certain 
requirements of the genre, which Aristotle lays out in great detail in Chapters 6-15 
in Poetics X. Properly fulfilled, the function of tragedy shapes our understanding 
by helping to shape our emotions-in particular, pity and fear (A. O. Rorty 2). 
According to Aristotle the definition of tragedy is dramatic theater that contains 
"a mimesis of actions that rouse [pity and fear]" (Poet 1452b). 35 Having 
emphasized the function of tragedy, though, it should be remembered that in his 
exposition on tragedy it is precisely Aristotle's emphasis on the form of tragedy 
(i.e., the plot structure) that makes his position with respect to emotions 
intelligible. That is to say, the form of the genre tragedy is efficacious in 
fulfilling its function. Because the form of tragedy requires the evocation of pity 
and fear, a piece of work that fails to elicit the tragic emotions will, by definition, 
not be tragedy. Hence, on an Aristotelian reading of tragedy, form and function 
are inseparable. 
Put differently, the form of tragedy (or any other medium) is not 
reinvented with each work in some totally autonomous fashion, in which no claim 
external to the work has a claim on the work's meaning.36 The decision to use the 
genre tragedy, as I have said, already commits one to a particularly well-defined 
set of formal commitments external to the art object. The function of tragedy 
transcends particular works, such that changing the function of the particular work 
is already to have decided against the use of tragedy. As Richard Eldridge has 
165 
noted in describing a standard criticism of an formalist conception of art: "Which 
aesthetic properties a work has and displays is a function of which independently 
historically established class of works it inhabits. Aesthetic properties are not 
immediately evident in perception to the nonhistorical eye or ear alone" (Eldridge 
62). In other words, a piece of art stands within the precincts of particular genres 
and traditions, a knowledge of which allows a ground from which to judge 
whether a particular work is successful in fulfilling its function-or perhaps may 
even work to redefine what can now be said to rise to the level of success for that 
genre or tradition. 
On this reading, then, each medium has its own pleasure unique to itself.37 
Aristotle writes: "For every perceptual capacity and every sort ofthought and 
study has its pleasure; the most pleasant activity is the complete; and the most 
complete is the activity of the subject in good condition in relation to the most 
excellent object of the capacity" (EN 1174b21). A painting, for example, is first 
of all to be enjoyed as a painting, and not as an object lesson. Likewise, the 
pleasure associated with tragedy ought to be appreciated for its own sake, and not 
as a front for making points that stand alone, apart from tragedy. Tragedy, as 
Halliwell observes, "does not just confirm us in pre-existing comprehension of the 
world: it provides us with imaginative opportunities to test, refine, extend and 
perhaps even question the ideas and values on which such comprehension rests" 
(Halliwell 253). 
The broader function of tragedy, then, provides a clue about what Aristotle 
means in Chapter Nine in the Poetics, when he raises the issue of universality. 
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Aristotle draws a distinction between the historian and the poet, suggesting that 
the historian recounts what happened in a particular way, while the poet offers an 
account of what could happen given "a strictly probable or necessary sequence" 
(1451a). Aristotle clearly favors the poet over the historian in this comparison, 
saying that "poetry is at once more like philosophy and more worth while than 
history, since poetry tends to make general statements, while those of history are 
particular" (1451b). The general (kathalou) statements made by poetry are not 
just abstract universals-as opposed to concrete particulars. Rather, poetry 
(tragedy) is about giving a general structure (read plot structure) on which to hang 
particular instantiations of character. That is why Aristotle says that poetry tells 
us "the sort of thing that would happen" to particular people. The net effect of 
this is to produce a tragic plot structure that, because it properly arranges action, 
fulfills its function by educing the appropriate emotional response in the viewer-
namely, pity and fear. What purpose, though, does pity and fear serve, according 
to Aristotle? Additionally, if tragedy has its own pleasure when its function is 
properly fulfilled, it must be asked what that pleasure is, and why does Aristotle 
think that tragedy's ability to call forth pity and fear is important? It is to answer 
these questions that we must now tum to a discussion on the tragic emotions. 
C. Pity and Fear 
"I will have no man in my boat," said Starbuck, 
"who is not afraid of a whale." By this, he seemed to 
mean, not only that the most reliable and useful courage 
was that which arises from the fair estimation of the 
encountered peril, but that an utterly fearless man is a far 
more dangerous comrade than a coward. 
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Plato argues in Republic III, as I have said, that nothing bad can befall the 
truly self-sufficient person. Therefore, the emotions elicited by tragedy (i.e., fear 
and pity) should be the object of revulsion. Aristotle, on the other hand, believes 
that there are some things that can happen to the virtuous person that will impede 
the practice of virtue and the possession of eudaimonia. The eudaimon person 
"needs to have goods of the body and external goods added [to good activities], 
and needs fortune also, so that he will not be impeded in these ways" (EN 
1153bI5). Arguing against Plato, Aristotle says, "Some maintain, on the 
contrary, that we are happy when we are broken on the wheel, or fall into terrible 
misfortunes, provided that we are good. Whether they mean to or not, these 
people are talking nonsense" (153bI9). In other words, according to Aristotle, 
there are occasions that obstruct eudaimonia--even in a person who is otherwise 
self-sufficient. Admittedly tragedy is not concerned with random misfortune, but 
with a very specifically defined set of actions, the causes for which are prompted 
by the poor choices (hamartia) of the central character. Nevertheless, my point 
here is only to indicate that Aristotle, contrary to Plato, does not view even the 
good person as exempt from occasions that impede eudaimonia-occasions for 
which pity and fear are the appropriate emotional responses. Not only is their 
presence not an occasion for revulsion, as they are for Plato, their presence in the 
right way and at the right time is necessary for virtue to exist. 
Our task, then, on an Aristotelian view, is not to conquer emotions, but to 
train them properly. Being socialized emotionally is crucial to Aristotle's view of 
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moral training--especially the training of the young (Knuuttila 25). Interestingly, 
though, Janko makes the case that tragedy, while beneficial to discerning adults, 
is precisely the kind of literary form liable to mislead impressionable youths 
(Janko 353). Aristotle believes that the powerful effects of tragedy may reinforce 
poor emotional responses in the young, in the same manner that Plato says 
tragedy reinforces poor emotional responses in everyone (Janko 353). 
Regardless, though, of the age at which it is possible to benefit from exposure to 
tragedy, it is clear that Aristotle believes that having the appropriate emotions 
(made available by tragedy) at the appropriate time works dynamically with 
reason to produce reliable knowledge and to promote virtuous action. For 
Aristotle, as has been noted, correct action must always be accompanied by 
correct emotion to be accorded the status of virtue. Emotion and reason work 
collaboratively in this way to provide practical wisdom as well as reliable 
knowledge. This dynamic collaboration between emotion and reason in both 
morality and epistemology, as I argued in Chapter Two, problematizes the 
traditionally distinct line dividing emotion from reason. 
Hence, tragedy-the effects of which are the evocation of appropriate 
emotions-is a way to expand our moral and emotional imagination, allowing us 
to have the right emotions at the right time.38 As I will have occasion to argue in 
Chapter Five, the aesthetic space created by literature-tragedy for my purposes 
here-opens up new ways of inhabiting moral and emotional perspectives through 
our use of imagination. This simulation is important in helping us to experience 
emotions appropriate to the situation. Not to possess these emotions properly is 
169 
- - ---- --------------------------------
to be intellectually ill equipped, as well as to be ill equipped for the pursuit of 
virtue, particularly the virtues of bravery and justice. 
The virtue of bravery, for example, is concerned not with having no fear, 
but with having the right fear at the right time (e.g., fear of a bad reputation, fear 
of death in certain conditions, EN 1115a12; 1115a25-1115b6). Interestingly, 
Aristotle believes fear is an inextricable part of the cognitive process, requiring a 
developed imagination: "Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a 
mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future.,,39 Consequently, 
it is fear that "sets us thinking what can be done" (Rhet 1383a7). An Aristotelian 
view of fear sees fear as a trigger for the imagination, calling into play the 
creative resources necessary for meeting a potential threat with at least "some 
faint expectation of escape" (1383a6). Between Nichomachean Ethics and 
Rhetoric, it is possible to conclude that the emotion of fear, for Aristotle, prompts 
imaginative thinking in the face of a threat. Fear, when properly trained, can help 
rightly assess true danger-that is, when and of whom to be afraid. Knowing the 
situations appropriate to fear-more specifically, that which ought to trigger 
fear-allows us to bring reason to bear on the situation, so that we might uncover 
a solution. However, the education of the emotion of fear consists not only in 
correctly identifying threats, but also in practicing creative responses to those 
threats, by having considered imaginative strategies for dealing with the threat 
before it arises. The cultivation of the virtue of bravery requires that we respond 
appropriately when faced by a threat, neither brashly nor cravenly-that is, 
neither with too little or too much fear. As a result, to be brave we need to fear 
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the right dangers at the right time and in the right way, which requires practice 
and imagination. 
The necessity of the practice of imaginative thinking in pursuit of virtue 
also emerges when Aristotle speaks about the appropriate emotional response 
with respect to pity. On the whole, Aristotle says, "anything causes us to feel fear 
that when it happens to, or threatens, others causes us to feel pity" (1382b26). 
Fear and pity, therefore, are linked for Aristotle in an important way. Being only 
slightly oversimplified, then, one may say that we fear that which threatens us, 
while we extend pity to others who are threatened by that which-if it were to 
happen to us-would cause us fear. But it must be remembered that the pity we 
hold out to others is based on our assessment that what they suffer is unjustified. 
Pity should not extend to justified suffering. If the correct emotional response of 
fear serves the cultivation of the virtue of bravery, the correct emotional response 
of pity serves the cultivation of the virtue of justice. Aristotle contends that "it is 
our duty both to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel 
indignation at unmerited prosperity; for whatever is undeserved, is unjust, and 
that is why we ascribe indignation even to the gods" (1386b13). In other words, 
we feel pity when we witness someone receiving more or less than they deserve. 
And it is desert that is precisely what lies at the heart of an Aristotelian 
conception of justice, a concept I must briefly summarize. 
Justice, for Aristotle, on a special level, is of two types: distributive and 
rectificatory. Distributive justice deals with deliberations about what is due to 
another "in the distribution of honors or wealth or anything else that can be 
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divided among members of a community who share in a political system" (EN 
1130b31). The second species of justice, rectificatory justice, concerns redress in 
transactions (1131a1).4o Justice is said to be "whatever produces and maintains 
happiness and its parts for a political community" (1129b18). The cultivation of 
the correct emotional response of pity, which is an emotional response toward 
another within the political community that tracks desert, is therefore tied directly 
to the cultivation of the virtue of justice. 
"Justice," according to Aristotle, "is the state that makes us just agents-
[that is to say], the state that makes us do justice and wish justice" (1129a7). As 
such, justice "is the complete exercise of complete virtue" (1129b31). The 
exercise of this virtue is directed toward another person, and not just toward 
oneself (1129b27). In fact, Aristotle argues that many people are capable of 
exercising virtue when it comes to their own concerns. However, it is 
considerably more rare to find someone capable of exercising virtue when it 
concerns another (1129b34). Pity, on this reading, then, is a communal response, 
finely tuned to identify desert in a social way, and to respond to it. If pity is the 
emotion that we extend to another in the case of injustice, then, we must 
experience it in the correct way if we are to possess the virtue of justice. That is 
to say, if justice is the virtue, pity stands as an evaluative emotional response 
against injustice; it is, in other words, a way of negatively defining justice by 
identifying injustice. Furthermore, a failure to appropriately identify injustice 
through the emotional reaction of pity ultimately proves corrosive to the bonds of 
community, which rely on an accurate accounting of desert. 
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To sum up briefly, then, what I have said so far: fear and pity are 
emotional responses necessary to the cultivation of bravery and justice, 
respectively. Possessing fear and pity allows one to assess threats correctly-
threats either to oneself or to another. Having responded with the appropriate 
emotions, one is prompted by that response to offer imaginative solutions for the 
threat at hand, which may lead to appropriate action. Furthermore, one's current 
abilities to imagine possible solutions to a potential threat are directly affected by 
the opportunities one has already had to entertain possible imaginative solutions 
when faced by prior threats. The opportunity to consider imaginative 
possibilities, I submit, is at least part of what art, in general, and tragedy, in 
particular, offer us. I will say more about this in Chapter Five, when I give a 
fuller account of imagination and the experience of emotion in fiction. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have set down the argument that emotions are a necessary 
part of attaining virtue, and attaining virtue, in turn, is a necessary part of a fully 
flourishing life. Taking an Aristotelian view, I suggested that emotions (or at 
least their triggers), which are necessary to virtue, are susceptible to formation. I 
also suggested that a fully flourishing life is one lived in a community capable of 
producing virtuous people. Finally, I concluded by using the genre of tragedy as 
a way to show how emotions may be educated in an aesthetically creative space 
that exercises the moral and emotional imagination. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY: THE NEED FOR EMOTIONAL ATTENDING 
Introduction 
Up to this point I have argued that reason, understood as the engine of the 
scientific model, has been privileged in western conceptions of knowledge at the 
expense of emotion. The rise of reason as the preeminent form of knowing, as 
well as the attendant marginalization of emotion, creates an obstacle to the pursuit 
of virtue, which requires, according to Aristotle, not only correct action, but also 
the feelings appropriate to correct action. That is to say, on an Aristotelian 
account, to attain virtue it is not enough to act the way a virtuous person would 
act; one must feel the way a virtuous person would feel while so acting. 
Moreover, the displacement of emotion by reason as the only source of reliable 
knowledge has consequences for social and communal life, since one of the most 
important ways we interact with one another relies not only on the propositional 
knowledge about another provided by reason, but on our ability to understand 
another's emotional life. 
At the same time, Western thought has experienced a "turn to the self' that 
has placed the individual in the center of his or her own universe. This tum to the 
self has had a profound impact on morality, inasmuch as it leaves morality in the 
position of being popularly understood as the advancement of preference. It also 
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has profoundly impacted the possibilities for intersubjectivity-that is, being with 
and for others, by affecting our ability to know others, leaving us as free-floating 
"spheres of interiority." 
In this chapter, guided by Iris Murdoch, I will take up again the metaphor 
of vision. In Chapter One I argued that vision was the dominant epistemological 
metaphor for much of Western history. I want to suggest in this chapter another 
kind of vision, which I will call other sight, the goal of which is not the 
objectifying vision of scientific rationality, but a vision of subjects that undergoes 
constant refinement. 
Traditionally in the West, true knowledge was thought to consist in seeing 
the world as it is. The assumption that one could offer accurate reporting about 
the real world set the stage for the development of science-empirical science, in 
particular. Objectivity, the goal of which is to observe dispassionately, emerged 
as a prerequisite of the accurate reporting of reality. One of the consequences of 
objectivity as a prerequisite of true knowledge was the process of abstraction-in 
which it was assumed that the particular thing being observed could be 
understood in isolation from the complex web of relationships that made up the 
whole from which the thing derived. The study of things in isolation from their 
context produced habits of mind that, when transferred to human beings, made it 
natural to begin to think that human beings were also comprehensible as atomic 
individuals, abstracted from the various communities from which they carne. But, 
as Descartes was quick to point out, empirical knowledge operated with the 
disadvantage that carne from reliance on the senses. Descartes, in a move 
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designed to steer clear of the unreliable senses, turned that vision inward, 
believing that truth could only be found when passed through the interior filter of 
the individual, unencumbered by prior relationships to external authorities, like 
the church. 
Moreover, the turn to the self that was also unfolding further severed the 
relationship between the individual and the community by understanding external 
communities as merely tyrannical and oppressive, a threat to the freedom with 
which humans were endowed, and which was the necessary ether in which moral 
agency existed. It must be admitted that certain communities often did act 
tyrannically and oppressively with respect to the freedom of the individual, and 
that the reaction against that tyranny and oppression was a necessary corrective. 
The Medieval Catholic Church and the various European kingdoms and 
principates-which is to say, religious and political communities in the West-
often exercised tyrannical control over the life and aspirations of the individual. 
Consequently, a move to invest the individual with the resources to stand over 
against some of the external demands of the church and the state by asserting the 
autonomy of the individual-as Kant did, for example, in his seminally influential 
essay, "What Is Enlightenment?"-proved a crucial counterbalance.! However, at 
the heart of the problem I identified in Chapters One and Three is the popular 
Western assumption that community per se is necessarily tyrannical and 
oppressive. The issue of the locus of authority lies at the center of this tension; 
which is to say, who or what operates as the final moral or epistemological 
authority-individual or community? 
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People, encouraged by Kant, were exhorted not to look to heteronomous 
external authorities to know how to act morally, but to embrace autonomy-that 
is, to "think for oneself." Again, in a culture in which the church had 
autocratically bounded knowledge (e.g., Copernicus and Galileo) and had at its 
disposal the power to enforce a particular moral code (often with deadly force), 
the appeal to break free of the external bonds of authority was a crucial moral and 
epistemological development. However, although Kant was by no means 
advocating radical reflexivity, his cry, "sapere aude," has had resonances for 
those who are so inclined.2 Put more simply, the call to think for oneself that 
gave rise to the democritization of knowing, while a necessary response to 
ecclesiastical and political oppression, has proven to be potentially just as 
oppressive as an end in itself, casting the individual back on himself. The 
movement toward radical reflexivity, and the attendant focusing of one's gaze 
upon oneself, shifted the referent for value off authoritative communities and onto 
the individual, arguably trading one master for another. The result of this shift, I 
will contend in this chapter, is a distorted vision of the world, inasmuch as one's 
knowledge of the world, and-more importantly, for my purposes--other 
subjects, is the result of an uncritical analogical projection of the self onto the 
world, and once again, onto other subjects. My use of projection is not intended to 
rise to the level of psychoanalytical precision. By projection I am simply 
referring to the tendency to assume that what is the case with me must also be the 
case with you. That is to say, projection is my assumption that my experience of 
the world is normative. This projection operates as an unwitting supposition that 
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other humans are more or less just like me. By unwitting I mean that because of 
the habits of mind I have mentioned, which include the belief that knowledge of 
the world is a radically reflexive process and that such knowledge can be 
considered reliable only when it meets threshold levels of objectivity, individuals 
are prone to objectifying others. In other words, we are prone to viewing others 
as knowable in much the same way that the heavy metal makeup of soil 
composition or the migratory patterns of North American sparrows are knowable. 
Furthermore, by assuming that everyone else is "more or less just like me," my 
knowledge of others, rather than coming from attending to the complexities of 
their lives, begins with me attending to my own interiority. In this way, it is 
possible to misapprehend others as merely an extension of my interiority. 
Michael Stocker ties this kind of misapprehension of another to habits of mind, as 
well: "It could be held that if a self-absorbed person fails to see others' interests, 
or if having seen them fails to be moved by them, the real explanation would lie 
not in the emotions of self-absorption, but in the patterns of thought, attention, 
and desire that underlie self-absorption" (176). 
The mental habit of analogical projection-which is to say, an 
understanding of the world that begins with the individual and moves outward, 
considering reality to be an extension of or easily analogous to an individual's 
experience-coupled with the mental habit of abstraction through the goal of 
objective observation has in many ways made the individual's relationship to 
other human beings one of subject to object. In a world where value is subjective 
and the objectivity of reason exists as the only true knowledge, knowledge of 
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other human beings is potentially either abstract and objectifying, or a normative 
projection of the individual's experience onto others. 
I want to suggest that the problem I have described so far is a problem of 
vision. We do not know how to act morally inasmuch as we do not see clearly. 
According to Murdoch, our frame of reference on the world is the "fat, relentless 
ego" (Murdoch 51). On this description, we see others through the veil of our 
own interiority, projecting onto them our own inner life. That is to say, we see 
others only as objects in the world, extensions of ourselves, rather than as subjects 
with their own projects and aspirations. Hence, to the extent that we see only 
through the opacity of our own egoic projections, we see the world blurrily, and 
ultimately, incorrectly. And because whatever we can know about another is 
ultimately a variation on what we know about ourselves, any knowledge available 
to us of the world inhabited by other subjects can only tell us that which we know 
already (Jonas 245). As a consequence, since we have been taught to see true 
knowledge as commensurable with scientific reason, and insofar as scientific 
reason is conceptually incapable of providing us with the resources necessary for 
the negotiation of the world of value and emotion (which, according to my 
argument, is crucial to being human), we are in a very real sense, 
epistemologically handicapped. 
I will suggest a way of seeing others as subjects who are independent of 
us, and who should be known contextually-that is, as embedded within a 
complex web of relationships that comprise a life. The key to obtaining reliable 
knowledge of another, I will argue, comes through a practice I will call emotional 
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attending. Moreover, I will differentiate emotional attending from empathy, 
taking into consideration the kinds of social cues, called uptake, that demonstrate 
understanding of another. 
I. Emotional Attending, Other Sight, and Empathy 
Of real importance in Murdoch's argument about why our vision is 
distorted is her belief that we are capable of truly seeing reality only inasmuch as 
our attention is focused outward rather than inward. Knowing other people 
independently of ourselves, according to Murdoch, is essential to knowing 
ourselves. Instead of the typical Western understanding of knowing others-in 
which we know the other by projection as a result of knowing ourselves-we 
know ourselves only inasmuch as we are able to attend to others as emotional 
subjects-not as objects, mere extensions of ourselves and our own projects. 
Therefore, to the extent that, as heirs to the western intellectual tradition, we have 
undergone a "turn to the self," in which our gaze is focused primarily on our inner 
lives, we are alienated not only from others, but ultimately, from ourselves. 
Hans Jonas, on the other hand, argues for a different orientation of the self 
to the world. He asserts a reversal of the post-Cartesian understanding of the way 
an insular self can cross the social divide and engage another insular self. Post-
Cartesian assumptions about this ability to make an intersubjective connection 
rest on the idea of analogy and transference (Jonas 243). In other words, I am 
only able to know another by interrogating my own interiority, latching onto an 
analogy based on my own experience, and then projecting that onto the other-I 
180 
only know you inasmuch as you are like me. I am always the referent. However, 
Jonas points out that "already the knowledge of our own mind, even our having 
one in the first place, is a function of acquaintances with other minds. Knowledge 
of inwardness as such, whether one's own or that of others, is based on 
communication with a whole human environment which determines, certainly 
codetermines decisively, even what will be found in eventual introspection" 
(244). In a very real way, then, there is no self that exists essentially, or is prior to 
our interaction with others. Jonas observes: 
Thus we must be able to understand others before we understand 
ourselves, in order for us to become persons who may eventually 
understand themselves-for there to be anything in us to understand. An 
understanding of the inwardness of others, in advance of and beyond what 
'introspection' could have found in one's own inwardness, is a 
precondition for the very emergence of such an inwardness (244). 
Furthermore, inasmuch as one views one's interior life and experiences as 
universalizable, and therefore, worthy of projection, when one attempts to 
understand the emotions of another, one risks the temptation to reverse the order 
of knowing, seeing another subject with a different interior life and experiences as 
only a mirror projection of one's self. The problem with analogy in knowing 
others is not so much the process of analogizing, however, but our unwavering 
belief that our analogies are always accurate placeholders for the experience of 
others. We are good at superimposing our lives on the lives of others; however, 
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the process often produces inaccurate portraits of the other, but a palimpsest 
reflecting back to us our own lives. I will argue shortly that the experience of 
intersubjectivity is achievable not by adopting a stance in which I am the 
authoritative referent for all engagement by analogy, but only when I am capable 
of de-centering, of "willfully view[ing] the other as a subject in his or her own 
right" (Potter "Moral Tourists and World Travelers: Some Epistemological Issues 
in Understanding Patients' Worlds" 213). This act of de-centering and willful 
viewing of another as a subject I will call emotional attending. 
Emotional attending in the sense I am using it requires the viewing of 
another person as a subject with her own goals and projects, who has a complex 
emotional life. Moreover, in order to know this person more fully than as the sum 
of the propositions I am able to lay down about her, I must seek to understand her 
correctly. Correct understanding, of course, is a phrase seeking clarification. By 
correct understanding I mean the identifying of the person's emotion as what it is. 
If a person is sad, then I could not be said to have correct understanding of the 
person at a point in time were I to identify her emotional experience as anger. 
That is not necessarily to suggest that the person is even always able to identify 
her own emotional experience. She may confuse one emotional experience for 
another, or occupy an emotional state without being able to identify it at all. 
Indeed, to the extent that I am attending emotionally to another, I am attempting 
to understand the emotional experience in another, the knowledge of which not 
even she may possess-which is why introspection is not enough for self-
knowledge. Additionally, I must also be simultaneously capable of understanding 
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the emotional experience the person believes herself to be having. If! know, for 
example, that my friend has just received news that she has failed a test in school 
when I see her yelling at the waiter for not moving quickly enough, I am 
potentially able to understand her actions as related to her disappointment with 
her test grade--even though she is convinced she is angry at the waiter. 
Obviously, there can be no way at present scientifically to prove that an 
emotional experience is one thing rather than another. Therefore, reliable 
knowledge in the case of emotional attending is founded on some other paradigm 
than a rational/empirical model-more like the cultivation of a set of habits 
necessary for virtue. Rosalind Hursthouse defines a virtue as "a character trait a 
human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well" (23). By this 
definition the emotional attending I am arguing for could be classified as a virtue, 
complete with a mean-where one end of the spectrum is an inability to 
understand the emotions of others, and on the other end, the over-identification 
with others, resulting in a loss of self. I do not wish as present to defend all 
possible objections to such a strong claim, but viewing emotional attending as 
something like a virtue offers a way of regarding others that suggests a practice 
which is constantly being refined. 
Like a virtue, emotional attending is not foolproof. I must approach each 
encounter in which I am attending emotionally with a certain amount of humility 
that I may be misunderstanding the other's emotional experience, and knowing 
that confirmation of my judgment will not always be forthcoming from the other 
subject. To the extent that emotional attending is a virtue, the more practice and 
183 
experience I get, presumably, the greater the precision I am able to achieve in 
understanding. Thinking of emotional attending as a virtue raises the issue of its 
nature as what Iris Murdoch understands as, "an endless task" (23). Emotional 
attending, like virtue, is a contextualized practice that continually undergoes a 
process of fine-tuning; it is, in other words, neither universalizable nor rule-based. 
There is no general formula that, if applied uniformly and correctly, will 
unfailingly result in predictable knowledge of another. Instead, because human 
beings are constantly evolving, redirecting, starting over, knowledge of them as 
subjects will necessarily be provisional in nature. Emotional attending is a way of 
seeking to see others clearly, but without the pretense that it is ever possible to see 
them definitively. Another way of speaking about emotional attending I will call 
other sight which, because the one on whom I am focusing is always in motion 
(literally and figuratively) I am constantly called upon to readjust my focus. 
Since sight is a dominant epistemological metaphor, as I discussed in 
Chapter One, and since I wish to argue that emotional attending offers us a way of 
knowing that is different in nature from the kind of objectifying and abstracting 
sight that science employs, I want to appropriate the metaphor of sight for another 
way of knowing that takes emotion not as a threat to reliable knowledge, but (as I 
argued in Chapter Two) as a necessary component. This way of knowing is like 
the constant refocusing of a lens, a lens that strives less for definitive accuracy (as 
in the reportable, reproducible, empirical kind) than a lens that allows us to view 
others "justly and lovingly" (Murdoch 22)-which is to say, to see them clearly as 
subjects. Another way of putting it might be to say that instead of viewing 
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reliable knowledge of another through the traditional epistemological filter of 
propositional statements (that is, as a set of facts to be compiled, analyzed, and 
abstracted) the virtue of emotionally attending to another human being seems 
much more readily intelligible when viewed as a learned skill, something like the 
successful acquisition of language, or learning to play improvisational jazz. The 
moves and decisions, for instance, that an identifiably accomplished writer or 
improvisational jazz musician make do not necessarily admit of scientific 
descriptions of causality or necessity, but we take it for granted that those moves 
are based on reliable knowledge possessed by a skilled practitioner nevertheless. 
To see someone justly or lovingly admittedly requires a certain amount of 
accuracy, but it is an accuracy that is approximate, under constant revision. 
Emotional attending, or other sight, on this reading, seems to me to be better 
understood as a learned and habituated practice with intrinsic goods, the 
performance of which cannot be deduced propositionally step-by-step, but must 
be acquired initially through imitation. Clearly, rationality is useful to the 
development of this skill in the same way that learning the rules of grammar and 
syntax through formal teaching are useful in becoming a more skilled user of 
language. But the linguistic capacities of seven year-olds suggest that it is 
possible to embark on the mastery of a language through imitation and habituation 
prior to any explicit exposure to grammar and syntax. That is not to say that 
grammar and syntax are not present to the child implicitly through that which is 
imitated, only that possession of propositional statements about linguistics is not a 
prerequisite to the acquisition of language. Moreover, learning to play 
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improvisational jazz can be aided by, but is not dependent on, a formal knowledge 
of music theory. It is possible, for example to learn to play expertly "by ear"; 
which is to say, without ever learning the theoretical framework that undergirds 
music. Neither does the ability to attend emotionally depend on the mastery of a 
theoretical/propositional framework. Were that the case, one might expect Ph.D.s 
in psychology to be the most emotionally integrated of all human beings. Instead, 
the skills necessary for emotional attending or other sight depend less on a 
scientific model of the knowledge of emotion than on a set of practices and habits 
formed intersubjectively, in imitation of a master.3 The practices and habits of 
emotional attending, however, cannot be done in the abstract. 
To return to my friend who manifests anger toward the waiter, if! did not 
take into account the complex web of experiences and goals that mark my friend 
as a particular and unique human being, I could not begin to understand where the 
manifest anger originated. I may mistake her yelling at the waiter as having any 
number of different etiologies: maybe she doesn't like waiters in general; maybe 
the waiter reminds her of her high school algebra teacher who gave her a difficult 
time; maybe the restaurant elicits memories of a fight with her ex-husband, and 
she is reliving the fight when the waiter speaks to her. The point is, to understand 
my friend's anger and its source takes a certain amount of attention to the 
narrative of her life, and therefore, to her as a subject. People do not experience 
anger in the abstract, disembodied from set of experiences. Consequently, to 
attend to her emotionally, I must exercise a certain kind of imagination, in which I 
attempt to understand her anger as a product of her particular life experience. In 
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other words, if I am to practice emotional attending, I must, to the extent I am 
able, see the world through her eyes. I must adopt a certain kind of visual frame 
that is not just a repackaging of the frame through which I view myself. Although 
Nancy Potter speaks about the broader canvas of a person's beliefs or values, her 
description is apt when applied to emotional attending: "When one is genuinely 
trying to understand another's reasons for her or his beliefs or values, one is 
trying to grasp what the world looks like from the other's point of view" (Potter 
"Giving Uptake" 482). 
The question might be raised at this point about the extent to which I must 
already know a person to be able to attend to her. If I speak about focusing on the 
narrative of someone' s life as a necessary prerequisite for emotional attending, 
how can I attend to someone whose life I do not already know? This question 
once again draws attention to the issue of the infinitely perfectible nature of 
emotional attending, of the constant refocusing of other sight. Since what I am 
doing by attending to another's life as a subject is not primarily centered on 
definitive accuracy, I realize that my knowledge will be progressive, undergoing 
continual revision. The more I learn about her life-her history, her present 
situation, her future aspirations-the better picture I will have of her. Since I 
realize that the knowledge I receive through emotional attending is always 
unfolding, what is important is not so much how much I know her to begin with, 
but how committed I am to continuing to learn about the narrative of her life. 
Just now, I spoke of "the narrative of her life." I want to be careful to 
differentiate between the narrative of her life and the sum total of her experiences. 
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Although, by definition, to have a life is to have a repository of experiences, 
human beings are constantly editing those experiences into a larger life narrative. 
In fact, even the experiences themselves are not pure experiences, but are 
constantly being interpreted in light of other experiences that make up a life 
narrative. These life narratives generally have multiple plot lines (e.g., golden 
child, overachiever, bad with math, etc.) that draw upon episodes from a life and 
weave them together to support, or sometimes to contradict, the different plots. 
These plots are then woven together into a meta-life-narrative that identifies one 
as a particular individual. It is important to make the distinction between 
experience and a narrative about those experiences insofar as it is the narrative 
one assembles from those experiences that constructs meaning and confers 
identity.4 Therefore, in order to attend to my friend and her emotional response, I 
need to take into consideration not just the episodes that comprise her life, but the 
meaning that she attaches to those episodes through the life narrative she is 
constantly composing. That is to say, to begin to understand my friend it is 
important that I have some knowledge about how she understands herself. For 
example, she may be a person who is the first in her family to go to college, so 
that she places enormous pressure on herself to do well; and when she does not, 
she has intense feelings of failure that make her angry at herself, which are then 
potentially transferred to others. Consequently, when she fails the test, her anger 
at herself boils over onto the unsuspecting waiter. My attempts at emotional 
attending in this case require me to work at understanding my friend's anger by 
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monitoring not only her anger, but also to imagine how that anger is connected to 
her own understanding of her life narrative. 
But someone might object that knowing certain things about my friend is 
factual or propositionally determinate knowledge. To which I would respond, 
that is true. But I am not arguing that the only important things to know about 
another to whom I am emotionally attending are subjective in nature. On the 
contrary, objective "facts" about my friend and her life are significant in coming 
to have knowledge of her. Knowing that she is short, that she lost her father at 
thirteen, that she excels at yoga and failed ninth grade algebra are all important to 
understanding her life narrative. What I am arguing, though, is that even if it 
were possible to know all of the propositional facts about her, I would still be a 
long way from actually knowing her as a human being. I need to know how she 
understands herself. What does it mean to her that she is short? How did she feel 
when her father died, and how does that shape her understanding of relationships? 
Of death? What significance does she place on her ability to do yoga well? What 
does she believe her inability to pass algebra says about her? All of these are 
questions that involve her experience and the meaning she attaches to them-not 
all of it conscious. She might, for instance, not fully realize just how the death of 
her father continues to affect her. That there are facts about her life narrative is 
important to know. But perhaps even more important in coming to know her is 
the way those facts are woven by her into a more or less intelligible narrative. 
It is also important to point out that, in order to attend to another's emotional 
life, one need not necessarily be a trained therapist. On the contrary, what I am 
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proposing constitutes a set of skills that are possessed by educated and uneducated 
alike-at least educated in a formal sense. The skills necessary for emotional 
attending require a commitment to trying to understand the emotional lives of 
others-an understanding that is constantly being refined and recalibrated. This 
understanding is informed by some knowledge of the context of another's life 
narrative, along with a monitoring of the other's emotional response. Moreover, 
in the process of attending to another, we must be aware of our own emotional 
lives, and the ways in which we tend to foreground them-thereby inadvertently 
displacing the image of another with our own. Taken together, this is what I have 
chosen to call emotional attending. Emotional attending, as I have described it, 
helps render a potentially intelligible picture of another as a subject. I say 
"potentially intelligible" because the possibility of error is always present, 
inasmuch as emotional attending is more like a virtue than a science (i.e., open to 
calculation, replication, abstraction, etc.). 
How though, one might wonder, is emotional attending different from an 
established concept like empathy? Do they not amount to the same thing? I 
would suggest that though the difference is nuanced, there does exist a qualitative 
difference between emotional attending and empathy. 
Empathy, as I am using it, carries the positive valence of attempting to feel 
what the other person feels. 5 Although to have more than a theoretical 
understanding of a person's feelings I must have previously experienced similar 
feelings, I need not simultaneously feel the same feelings to be able to identify 
them in other subjects and to respond to those feelings as the product of another's 
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subjectivity. Emotional attending is the ability to understand and respond to the 
emotional responses in other subjects. On this account, every instance of empathy 
is an act of emotional attending, but not every instance of emotional attending is 
empathic. Julien Deonna makes a case for something like this by saying that for 
empathy to occur two conditions must be met: 1) I must understand another's 
emotion, and 2) I must "feel in tune" with that person-which is to say, I am 
aware of feeling something like what the other person feels, because she feels it 
(99).6 These are the necessary and sufficient conditions of empathy. Emotional 
attending satisfies the first condition (viz., awareness of another's emotions) 
without requiring the second condition (viz., feeling in tune with another person). 
I would argue that emotional attending, which sets a lower standard than 
empathy, is much easier to achieve than empathy, since the meeting of condition 
two in every encounter would be impossible. For one thing, feeling everything I 
feel, while also regularly feeling everything everyone else to whom I attend feels 
would be emotionally exhausting. Moreover, it may be the case that I and the 
person to whom I am emotionally attending witness the same act but have 
different feelings about it. My friend views the waiter as overly sarcastic, while I 
view him as witty. I can still understand her angry reaction to him (given all the 
other details about which I have spoken), without also feeling angry, or even 
annoyed with the waiter. 
II. Uptake and Emotional Engagement 
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It will probably be pointed out, though, that one can never be entirely certain 
that one meets condition one of empathy, and the foundational condition for 
emotional attending-namely, that I understand another's emotion. I will 
consider whether the concept of uptake as a form of social confirmation will be 
helpful in trying to establish a better understanding of another's emotional 
experience. That I am using uptake as a form of confirmation that I have 
understood another's emotional experience is not to suggest that uptake is 
applicable to all emotional experiences. By using uptake as a form of 
confirmation I want to make the point that dealing with emotions and the 
understanding of them is not necessarily to have moved from thinking objectively 
and rationally about the real world to thinking subjectively and, by extension, 
irrationally about an imaginary world. Uptake, as I will argue in a moment, is a 
way of substantiating my inferences about the emotions of another that does not 
rely on my own interiority for validation. 
But beyond uptake, though, which is not universally applicable, there 
remains the question of how I can be assured that I understand another's 
emotions-if there is no objective proof available to me that I have correctly 
understood. Once again, I want to argue that there are many things one can 
know-that would widely be considered knowledge-which do not have to meet 
the strict test of objective verifiability. That is not to say that there do not often 
exist standards independent of individual taste; only that even those standards are 
not scientifically verifiable. It is possible, for instance, for me to have knowledge 
that Bach's music is technically superior to Barry Manilow's-knowledge that 
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cannot be proved by computer modeling. A master painter can look at canvases 
painted by a host of others, and say with authority that this one is good, while this 
one is bad. To the untrained eye, the paintings may look indistinguishably 
similar, but to the one trained to see, the paintings contain perceptible differences, 
individual characters. The knowledge of a master painter is not reproducible by a 
scientist under laboratory conditions; it cannot be captured by equations; it is not 
contained within a set of physical laws; it is widely accepted as a certain kind of 
authoritative knowledge, though. In the same way, I would suggest that those 
who have learned to view human beings with other sight find themselves in 
possession of knowledge about the emotional lives of others, which has taken a 
great deal of honing to cultivate, and is not universally available to everyone else. 
Emotional attending, other sight, like other kinds of aesthetic and ethical 
disciplines, relies on another kind of knowledge that, while it is not scientific, is 
reliable as knowledge nevertheless. But there is at least one way of verifying the 
emotions of another that is independent of one's SUbjectivity. This is called 
uptake. 
Nancy Potter has expanded on J.L. Austin's concept of uptake, which is the 
transaction between the speaker and the listener in which the speaker cannot be 
said to have been understood until a certain kind of acknowledgement of the 
import of the speech act is signaled by the listener. In response to your inquiry 
about what I would like to eat for supper, in say, "A hamburger," and you say, 
"Of course," but then proceed to drive me to a seafood restaurant, you have failed 
to give me uptake. Even though you have responded that you understood what I 
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was saying, your action demonstrated that you did not. Potter writes that uptake 
"occurs when the second party, listening to my speech act, reorients herself to me 
and the relation between us 'comes off with an appropriate response. A proper 
response is one that conveys an empathetic attitude towards me or an earnest 
attempt to understand things from my point of view" ("Giving Uptake" 481).7 
Potter's expansion of Austin's concept of uptake, however, moves very 
quickly from a simple linguistic transaction-in which speech can be judged to 
have been heard-to the realm of the political, in which speech, because of the 
nature of the speaker as one of the marginalized, goes regularly unheard. She 
points out that the fact that people on the margins do not get uptake contributes to 
their ongoing exclusion from formative social discourse. If, for example, you 
continue to express frustration that certain people within our corporation 
experience barriers to advancement based on the fact that they are not white, 
male, and possessors of I vy League educations, I do not give you uptake just by 
agreeing. If I am in a position of power, I demonstrate that I have heard you by 
engaging your complaint, and working to address it. In fact, the act of continually 
ignoring your complaint while claiming to have heard and agreed with you is not 
only patronizing, but isolating--excluding your concerns from the very discourse 
that claims inclusivity. Potter understands the extent to which the failure to give 
uptake tears the social fabric, maintaining power arrangements that persist in their 
sense of inevitability by continuing to resist all attempts at change--often with a 
knowing and sympathetic smile. She writes: "Hegemonic institutions give rise to 
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conventions of language that render suspicious the consistent intersection of 
disagreement with subordination" (Potter "Giving Uptake" 482). 
I refer to the concept of uptake for two reasons. First, emotional attending 
requires an attempt to understand the other, which is done with varying degrees of 
success-and sometimes, not at all. However, the goal of emotional attending, 
though not infallible, moves toward an understanding of another that 
progressively views the other person more and more as she truly is. That is not to 
say that emotional attending, as I have previously indicated, is a scientific 
calculation. That admission, however, need not necessarily render it a totally 
subjective practice, unbounded by any recourse to verifiability-which would 
presumably be only an exercise in projection. Instead, the concept of uptake is a 
practice that instantiates dialogical authentication. I can receive confirmation that 
I have heard and understood you, because I have responded to your speech act 
appropriately. You express anger, frustration, desire, joy and we both know that I 
have attended to your emotions by giving you uptake. Emotional attending relies 
not merely upon my claim that I understand, but is confirmable by my speech and 
actions in response. In that way, I am not always left guessing as to the precision 
of my judgments about another's emotions; I receive validation. If, for instance, I 
am emotionally attending to you and you express resentment that I continue to 
forget your birthday, I demonstrate that I understand your resentment, as well as 
your original desire, by getting you a gift. Your response to my action 
communicates to me that I have understood you by giving you uptake. If I claim 
to understand you, but continually fail to remember your birthday, I show that I 
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do not, in fact, understand you-a continued misapprehension that you may then 
bring to my attention. That is not to say that every emotional experience is 
necessarily a good candidate for uptake. If, on the other hand, for example, you 
express resentment at your mother's failure to remember your birthday, there is 
not necessarily a particular action required of me to show that I understand your 
resentment. I am not suggesting that uptake is a universally confirmative practice, 
only that uptake is sometimes a way of helping to validate the understanding of 
another's emotional life that I reach through emotional attending. This discursive 
validation is part of the dynamic process that helps me to know if what I 
understand through emotional attending is a clear vision of another, instead of my 
own projection. 
Second, uptake anticipates the kind of discursive practices of mutuality 
necessary for sustaining communities capable of producing virtuous people. 
Once again, we flirt with circularity when speaking of virtue and polis. The polis 
is a social arrangement that produces the kinds of virtuous people necessary for its 
existence as a polis. Uptake according to Potter, like emotional attending, is a 
form of virtue that it is necessary to acquire to sustain the kind of community 
necessary for virtuous people to flourish. In other words, cultivating the virtue of 
uptake has implications not only for interpersonal relationships, but is a social 
necessity-if human flourishing is to be realized. She explains: 
To give uptake rightly, then, it is not enough simply to receive 
another's speech act with the conventional understanding. One must 
appreciate and respond to the spirit in which something is expressed, take 
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seriously what the speaker is trying to say and her reasons for saying it, 
and have the appropriate emotional and intellectual responses. 
Furthermore, one must recognize the responsibility attending social and 
political privilege. Indeed, giving uptake properly is partly constitutive of 
the kind of person one is-it requires cultivation of a certain kind of 
character (Potter "Giving Uptake" 483). 
As I argued in Chapter Three, successful emotional attending requires 
something more than a Hobbesian confederation of individuals forming a 
collective for the basic purpose of securing safety; it requires a particular kind of 
social environment, a commonwealth of sorts, in which the commitments to the 
commonwealth go beyond the barest form of seeking security from threats. This 
social environment will not be satisfied only by pursuing propositional rationality, 
concerned only to understand the factual claims of its inhabitants. Other human 
beings will be viewed fundamentally as subjects who possess their own projects 
and goals, and not merely as instrumental for our own purposes; this I will call 
"emotional engagement." Emotional engagement, on my account, will be that 
social environment where the emotional life of others is taken seriously, and 
where empathy and emotional attending can occur. Emotional engagement, in 
this regard, is a necessary condition for a fully flourishing life. Moreover, not 
only will emotional engagement require of the social environment a context in 
which the projects and goals of others are taken seriously, but it must also allow 
for the possibility that there will be times when another's projects and goals alter, 
transform, or even eclipse one's own. 
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Though, if this social environment must operate from the baseline 
assumption that others within this commonwealth should be considered as 
subjects, the question might reasonably be raised about whether or not all social 
interactions, on this reading, must necessarily be emotional engagements. That is 
to say, according to the way I have described the social environment necessary to 
foster emotional engagement of another, is it the case that what I am suggesting 
entails that all social interactions call for emotional engagement with another 
human being? Perhaps more to the point, even if it is possible to find examples of 
human relationship that do not require emotional engagement, am I making a 
prescriptive statement that emotional engagement ought to characterize every 
human relationship? 
As to the first question about whether I am suggesting that all human 
interactions require emotional engagement, one might argue that my line of 
reasoning does not oblige me to make such an assertion-merely that to flourish 
one must have some relationships characterized by emotional engagement. 
Aristotelian descriptions of friendship provide a way of speaking about the 
emotional engagement of others, such that not every human exchange requires an 
investment of emotion. Aristotle's concept of friendships of utility, for example, 
is not dependent on emotional engagement (EN 1156a15).8 If! have a friend with 
whom I share a ride to work, deep emotional engagement seems not to be a 
necessary pre-condition of that relationship. Though, as I have argued, on the 
most basic level I am required to view that person as a fellow subject with her 
own desires, attachments, and projects. In view of the moral position I want to 
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sketch, I may not regard my friend of utility as merely an object, or merely as 
useful to the fulfillment of my personal needs. Instead, I have a responsibility as 
a moral agent within this social environment-which will be conducive to the 
emotional engagement of others-to treat others as fully formed subjects, who are 
ends-in-themselves-beyond any utility they might have for me. 
Someone might argue, however, that what I have just described as necessary 
for a flourishing social environment is something like respect, and that claiming 
we ought to respect each other is a commonplace so obvious that is not worth 
repeating except in teaching manners to children. First, I am not so certain that 
respecting others is nearly as common or obvious as we would like to believe. 
One need only watch political advertising or listen to certain talk radio shows to 
know that respect often occupies a relatively quaint place in our social and 
political lives. Second, neither am I certain that respect is enough to create the 
kind of social environment in which human flourishing can occur. For one thing, 
respect is too commonly associated with tolerance. Tolerance, while lauded as an 
enlightened humanist response, often operates as the appearance of a political re-
shuffling of the deck, even though it forestalls any real political change by giving 
the surface impression that everyone already "gets along" well enough so that 
drastic change is not necessary. Tolerance, and to a certain extent by association, 
respect, can act as non-threatening ways of maintaining the status quo power 
arrangements by placing a thin veneer of civility over otherwise inhospitable 
sentiments. True respect is hard work. 
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That the bulk of human relationships seem to be transacted on the level of 
utility (my barber, the woman who registers my car, the child who delivers my 
paper), requiring no sophisticated emotional engagement appears fairly obvious. 
Furthermore, I think it is uncontroversial to suggest that we do not possess the 
resources necessary to engage everyone with whom we come into contact on a 
deep emotional level. It may very well be that what distinguishes us as humans 
from other animals is our ability to interact with others without seeing them 
merely as objects for our personal desires, in the way that a lion might see another 
animal as a source of food, or a potential mating partner, or as a genetic extension 
of itself into the future. A social environment that nurtures emotional engagement 
of others will set as a baseline responsibility of humanity that we identify one 
another first as subjects, before any calculation about another's potential utility. 
However, to create a social environment conducive to human flourishing, I 
would suggest that even in friendships of utility we ought be open to one another 
in ways that allow for emotional attending to be a possibility.9 I think it important 
to raise the question of why someone might be tempted to think that we should 
not enter into friendships of utility with the expectation that we will attend to 
another's emotional life. In other words, when I go to the division of motor 
vehicles to register my car, why should I not carry a certain responsibility to be 
open to the emotional life of the person standing behind the counter-a 
responsibility that goes beyond basic respect for that person as a human being? 
When I encounter another human being--operating under the assumption that 
each encounter I have with another carries with it the possibility for emotional 
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attending-I am free to be present in a way that allows for the kind of 
intersubjectivity that creates shared emotional/social space where meaningful 
human encounters can take place. P.F. Strawson makes the strong claim that 
sustaining an "objective attitude" (i.e., a detached or emotionless stance toward 
another) in a general way toward humanity is ultimately isolating, a stance that 
human beings seem incapable of (197). An emotional posture toward others that 
does not seek at least the potential for emotional attending as a primary stance, 
but instead views others merely as transactional partners for shared goals of 
utility, places potentially insuperable obstacles to intersubjectivity, by assuming 
out of hand that human beings are, for the most part, instrumental to achieving my 
own projects and goals-which is to say, human beings are with and for me, 
rather than the other way around. To enter any human encounter with the belief 
that I have no responsibility to offer myself to the other as a potential partner in 
attending to the other's emotions is to work against the social ties of community 
by opting for isolation. And if an Aristotelian read on human nature is correct in 
suggesting (as I think it is) that we are made for community, that to be able to live 
effortlessly in isolation goes against the very grain of what it means to be human 
(Pol. 1253a28), then to opt for the isolation of instrumental relationships is to opt 
for something that makes us less human. 
This emotional/social space is important in the fostering of community not 
only for those to whom I attend, but to me-since I come to know who I am not 
simply by interrogating my own interiority but in a dynamic relationship with 
others who provide a kind of mirror to reflect who I am in their eyes. The images 
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I see of myself through others, however, are multivalent, and sometimes in 
competition with one another. As such, my identity is not the straightforward 
product of relational transactions, not the sum of the images that I see reflected 
back to me from others. Instead, my identity is formed within the complex 
interplay of often competing images I receive through my social interactions, as 
well as my reflection upon those images and interactions. Once again, I feel it 
necessary to point out that I am not suggesting that one's interiority has no role to 
play, either in knowing others or in knowing oneself; only that the focus on 
human interiority in the West has been privileged in misleading, and, sometimes, 
even harmful ways-casting the individual back upon herself (incurvatus en se) 
as the final arbiter of what is true and what is valuable. In fact, I come to know 
what is true, what is valuable, who I am within an elaborate matrix of influences 
that is made up primarily of images I receive socially, as well as my own 
cognitive engagement of those images through reflection. To know, for example, 
what it means for me to be a man in our culture is a process of socialization (and 
my reflection on that process) that includes a wide variety of voices and social 
and emotional encounters. I cannot, in other words, know what it means to be a 
man simply by cross-examining the substratum of my interior. For that reason, 
opening myself up to the possibility of attending to the emotions of another is 
important also for my own identity formation. 
I must be careful to point out that there are interactions between people that 
are situations in which continued attempts to attend to the emotional life of 
another can be harmful. There are situations in which one person is either being 
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mistreated or the mutuality of commitment no longer exists-where emotional 
disengagement is precisely what is indicated. In cases of abuse, or emotional 
manipulation, or even emotional indifference it is sometimes necessary to refuse 
to attend to the abuser's emotional life. For the purposes of preserving an 
individual's emotional integrity, disconnecting emotionally is sometimes the 
appropriate choice, since the maintenance of one's emotional integrity is closely 
related to the dynamic by which one's identity is formed-or, in this case, 
malformed. If, for example, I remain engaged with another who is abusive or 
manipulative, to the extent that my identity is the product of the images of me 
mirrored back to me by those with whom I am in some relationship, the affect on 
my self-understanding will be distorted by the negative projections of that person 
onto me. Consequently, there are some emotional encounters that need to be 
avoided, due to a need for self-preservation. Nevertheless, as Nancy Potter has 
noted, this disconnection "as a social phenomenon ... is a loss" (How Can I Be 
Trusted?: A Virtue Theory of Trustworthiness 126). By "social loss," I take her to 
mean that since human social connection is fundamental to flourishing, any 
movement away from something like emotional attending (even for very good 
reasons) is just one more roadblock to human flourishing. 
III. Iris Murdoch and the Epistemology of Other Sight 
In Murdoch's now famous story ofM and D, a woman (M) has a daughter-
in-law (D) whom she believes to be unworthy of her son (Sovereignty of Good 
17). M believes that "D is inclined to be pert and familiar, insufficiently 
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ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresomely juvenile" 
(16-7). Yet, M never says a word about her feelings to anyone. 
Then, for whatever reason, one day D is no longer around M-whether 
because of death or re-Iocation. M, being capable of self-critique, subsequently 
revises her opinion of D; through deliberate reflection-which Murdoch believes 
is focused by love and justice-M' s vision of D has been altered, such that she no 
longer sees D as "vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, 
not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on" 
(17). Murdoch argues that no outward action has taken place-that the change in 
M's vision is what accounts for this new picture of reality. I would argue that M 
sets down a new narrative structure over the same set of facts, resulting in a new 
way of seeing the world. With this shift in vision, M receives not just a slight 
epistemological correction. Rather her whole history with D has now been re-
written. The world has changed in a very real way for M. But this new world and 
the change that causes it-and the change that is caused by it-are not open to 
empirical observation. 
First, a perceptive reader might point out that the transformation of M' s 
vision I have just described, since it required "no outward action" to elicit it, 
sounds like it was generated within herself-which is to say, through an 
interrogation of her interiority. On its face, that seems a plausible conclusion to 
draw. However, it is not entirely the case that no outward act took place. In fact, 
M draws upon a wide range of episodes that actually happened. What changes is 
the narrative she draws from those episodes. That the narrative structure is the 
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product of reflection is not damaging to the claims I am making, since the 
argument I am making is not that an interior life is bad, or even that it stands in 
opposition to that which is independent of the self. My argument is one of 
emphasis and orientation. The problem is not that we have an interior self, but 
that in the West it has become the primary resource for our engagement of the 
world, the fundamental repository of truth and meaning about the world. The 
point, with respect to M, is that she did not dream up her past encounters with D; 
she did not generate those experiences of D from within herself. Instead, she took 
those experiences, and by an act of refocusing her vision through a just and loving 
lens, she was able to transpose the narrative structure of her experiences with D. 
And it is on the subject of narrative structure that I want to concentrate for a 
moment. 
As I have indicated, the meaning we attach to our lives, we attach largely 
through narratives-that weaving together of episodes in our lives to make an 
intelligible story arc. One ofthe things I will be arguing in Chapter Five is that 
literary and fictional narratives are important resources for augmenting our moral 
and emotional imaginations. Through reading these literary narratives we have a 
range of opportunities available to us, which give us the chance to inhabit 
different moral postures and emotional experiences. Inhabiting different lives 
from different perspectives gives us a certain kind of "subjective knowledge"-
that is, knowledge about "what Xis like" (Lamarque and Olsen 371). In addition 
to that, though, literary narratives help provide us training in "writing" the 
narratives of our own lives. My ability to tell the story of my own life (to myself 
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and to others) is enhanced by my exposure to literary narratives, which usually 
take on the shape of a plot. Placing the structure of a plot over the top of the array 
of episodic material that makes up my life is an exercise in discerning the 
meaning and purpose not only of events, but ultimately of the meaning and 
purpose of my life. Through reading I receive training in helping to organize the 
seemingly chaotic nature of events into intelligible and illuminative stories that 
are not only descriptive of what life looks like, but are also prescriptive of what, 
given certain moral or philosophical or religious commitments, what life ought to 
look like. When I read The Stranger, by Albert Camus, for example, I am able to 
see not only what it might be like to live a life absent belief in God, and therefore 
(at least by Camus' account), absent any meaning external to the individual, but 
also what the trajectory of such an embodied life might look like as it plays out 
over time. Knowing what a life written in such a way might look like, I am given 
indications of how I might live toward that goal, or how I might live differently to 
avoid that goal. Nevertheless, the structure of narrative is epistemologically 
significant inasmuch as it provides, through its ability to focus and refocus 
attention, a new vision, a different understanding. 
I want to suggest that the knowledge of the world that comes about as a 
result of a new change in vision can neither be accounted for by scientific reason, 
nor by a self that is attending only to a reflection of itself. If I am right, to the 
extent that this kind of change of vision is hampered by the way our world is 
presently constituted (namely, as ruled by scientific reason and conditioned by 
radical reflexivity), we are in danger of losing a basic element of what it means to 
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be human. Because Western intellectual history has helped to cultivate in us 
habits of mind that tend toward objectification and abstraction, and because the 
radically reflexive self has become the primary authority for truth and value, our 
vision of one another is clouded. We tend to see each other either as disconnected 
from the context out of which we emerge (that is, as objects, or as types or 
symbols), or as projections of ourselves through the mirror of our "fat, relentless 
egos." To the extent that we are unable to see one another justly and lovingly, to 
the extent that we see each other through lenses adjusted to focus on the objective 
and the abstract (or fail to see each other because we are looking at mirror-images 
of ourselves), we risk cutting ourselves off from one another-since our 
knowledge of one another requires an understanding that goes beyond what can 
be observed objectively, beyond what we project onto one another from our own 
normative experience. We need to be present to one another in ways that leave 
open the possibility that the deepest, most vulnerable, most subjective part of 
ourselves will be encountered in each other; this is, as I have argued, in a very 
fundamental sense, at the heart of what it means to be human. Moreover, when 
this sort of emotional attending is achieved (it is an achievement, after all), we 
have one of the critical pieces in place for a community of human flourishing. 
To return to M and D: It might be objected here that an emotional change 
cannot be epistemologically significant inasmuch as the world that is changed by 
my example is not the real world. Nothing changes materially in the world when 
M realizes this new gestalt. Red is still red, cows are still mammals, and gravity 
still makes apples fall from trees-no matter what M thinks about it. To which I 
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would respond: that objection is exactly my point-that is, we think that only that 
which we can observe, analyze, quantify can rightfully be called "real"; 
everything else (emotion, value, beauty, irrationality, etc.) gets relegated to the 
irrational margins. That is just the argument I am making-namely, the world in 
which "red is red" is the world that we are taught to call real-the world of 
scientific taxonomies and physical laws; but, I am arguing, a world in which love 
and justice shape our vision of the intersubjective world we inhabit is arguably 
more real than the one that can be colonized by science. 
I need to pause for a moment to point out again that it is against the 
imperialistic designs of science that I am arguing. More specifically, I want to 
call into question the underlying assumption in the West that science is sufficient 
to account for that which we would term "real." In fact, not only is science 
insufficiently incapable of accounting for all that is real, but it does not, on my 
argument, account even for some of the most important parts-namely, our moral 
commitments and emotional lives, as well as the community made possible by 
them. Iris Murdoch points in this direction when she says that the sort of things 
that make up the realm of the non-scientific "do not move about within a hard 
world set up by science and logic. They set up, for different purposes, a different 
world" (Sovereignty of Good 27). One of the consequences of the ascendance of 
reason has less to do with distinguishing between the world of reason and the 
world of value and emotion (although, as I argued in Chapter Two, the line 
between those two worlds is much blurrier than we are accustomed to believe), 
than with the assumption that all that is reliably, demonstrably true-and 
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therefore, of significance-happens in the world of reason. Or as Terry Eagleton 
has so colorfully highlighted the distinction: "It is rather like saying that thanks to 
the electric toaster we can forget about Chekov" (Reason, Faith, and Revolution 
7). 
One of the practical effects of framing morality and emotional knowledge 
as a problem of vision is that the will becomes much less a faculty for the 
enactment of reasoned decisions, or even an independent faculty, which moves, 
chooses, and decides only through the sheer force of volition. The will, on 
Murdoch's reading, is substantially marginalized as a component of morality. 
The will came to be, as a result of the divide between reason and the emotions, the 
means by which rational human beings could be moral agents with the power to 
speak and act evaluatively. Accordingly, the task of the moral person when 
presented by an ethical decision was to weigh optional responses through reason, 
and then to choose (through the will) a response upon which to act. Both 
deontological and utilitarian accounts of ethics assume this kind of dilemma-
based moral decision-making-either through the application of rules or the 
calculation of the greatest good. In either case, the will acts as the force to put 
into action what the reason has decided. 
Murdoch, on the other hand, suggests through her use of the imagery of 
vision that continuous loving and just attention on another deemphasizes the need 
for heroic choices by the will. She asserts that "if I attend properly I will have no 
choices and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at" (38). In other words, my 
constant attention to another subject in a loving and just way (like M does with D, 
209 
for example) gives me knowledge about another person, another state of affairs 
that would otherwise be unavailable to me if my relationship with the subject 
consisted of choices reasonably made through the calculus of the application of 
rules or the calculation of the greatest good. And it is this emotional knowledge 
that I want to suggest is a morally and epistemologically more integrated way of 
knowing than systems of knowing and acting based on the privileging of reason 
and will. 
However, here I want to draw a distinction between Murdoch's position 
and my own over the implications of the use of vision as a moral and 
epistemological metaphor. While I agree that loving and just vision can reorient 
us to reality, I also want to argue that the mere knowing of another through 
constant attention, does not necessarily lead us to the kind of moral behavior 
Murdoch claims. The concern here is as old as Plato, who believed that one could 
not knowingly do something wrong: That is to say, Plato argued that immoral 
behavior comes about as a result of ignorance. However, Plato-and Murdoch, to 
the extent that she follows Plato here-begs the question, by suggesting that any 
wrong doing that is done with knowledge is done only with apparent knowledge 
(i.e., if you really knew what you were doing, you wouldn't do it). Possessing 
knowledge, however, is not necessarily a hedge against acting immorally. 
Murdoch seems to suggest that simply the possession of true knowledge, which 
comes as a result of loving and just behavior, is enough to ensure moral behavior. 
I would want to add that the constant focusing and refocusing of the lens through 
which we lovingly and justly attend, is a practice, the perfection of which comes 
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through habituation over time. We are not born knowing that others do not exist 
simply as objects or as extensions of ourselves. We learn over time, to the extent 
that we learn at all, that others have emotional lives (hopes, fears, joys, hatreds) 
that exist independently of us, and that part of what it means to grow as a human 
being is to learn how to attend to others on terms dictated by their lives and not by 
our own needs. There is, in other words, a commitment to a certain kind of action 
toward another implicit in the phrase, "the constant focusing and refocusing of the 
lens through which we lovingly and justly attend." I see you more clearly 
because I am committed to the practice of attending to you, viewing you more 
lovingly and justly. 
Moreover, as a result of our attending to others, we have better insight into 
how we ought to act toward them. That is to say, loving and just attention is not 
just an epistemological achievement; it is the result of a set of moral practices 
habituated over time that leads to action. On an Aristotelian reading it is 
impossible to become moral only through knowledge of another, because virtue is 
not a matter of knowing the good, but of actually being good (EN 11 03b 28). In 
other words, the knowledge of another I gain is not necessarily an end in itself, 
but is fundamental in helping me to know how I should act toward that person. In 
this sense, then, the work accomplished by emotional attending or by other sight 
is moral at its heart. I learn not only about you, but also about who I am called to 
be and how I ought to act in relationship to who you are. As I see you more 
lovingly and justly, I am better equipped to respond to you as a subject. What I 
first took to be indifference toward the world, for instance, I now see is my 
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friend's way of coping with the world's disappointments. The way I act toward 
her is colored by the knowledge that my actions may be understood by her to be a 
reaffirmation that the world is a place that never quite manages to do right by her. 
Consequently, when I make a promise to her, my keeping it is not just a matter of 
submitting to a universal maxim about promise-keeping, or about maximizing the 
utility of keeping this particular promise, but about considering her life, her 
expectations of what the world has to offer, and about my responsibilities to a 
person whom I call my friend. When I attend to her, I possess knowledge not 
only of what is right (which requires no personal relationship), but increasingly of 
what is right with respect to my relationship with her. 
To put the moral implications another way: if! were asked whether or not 
it is the right thing to do to give a child chocolate cake for breakfast, generally 
speaking I would say no. But that answer is largely unsatisfying inasmuch as my 
moral commitments are almost never enacted in a general way. Instead, I am 
much more likely to be faced with a situation in which a child asks to have 
chocolate cake for breakfast, and in which I am expected to have an answer. So, 
to the question about whether it is right to give a child chocolate cake for 
breakfast, my response is that it depends. Yes, but on what does it depend? It 
depends upon the child and upon the context in which the question is asked. If 
the child is sick with cancer, for instance, and has not eaten anything because the 
chemotherapy has taken away the appetite, my answer to the question about 
whether it is right to feed chocolate cake to the child might very well be an 
enthusiastic yes. The point, of course, is that ethics is practiced in particularities. 
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And if it is to be done well, ethics needs to take into consideration the context-
the people toward whom, or on behalf of whom I am acting. Emotional attending 
aids me in knowing how to answer particular ethical questions as they pertain to 
others, since not only are general ethical principles taken into account, but also 
the life narrative of others to whom I am attending. 
Someone might wonder, though, about the many situations in which I 
have no knowledge of the person toward whom I am called to act morally. First, I 
would suggest that the act of identifying a "person toward whom I am called to 
act morally" is already an act that establishes some amount of knowledge-
namely, that it is a person, and not a bus or a parakeet. Since I am dealing with a 
person, I already possess, as I have argued, some implicit threshold moral 
responsibilities to regard the other as a human subject. Second, that there are 
many people about whom I initially know very little is, to a certain extent, my 
point. I am arguing that emotional attending is an exercise in committing oneself 
to learning progressively more about another person over time by continuing to 
pay attention to that person. Since it is a perfectible practice-which is to say, in 
this case, a virtue-I am always seeking knowledge, not just to know how to act, 
but to know how to act better over time. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I introduced two concepts that I called emotional attending 
and other sight, which are different means of talking about the ways we engage 
other people as subjects. I argued that because of the ascendancy of reason as the 
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primary way of knowing, as well as because of the turn to the self, we have 
developed habits of mind that make us prone either to objectification and 
abstraction of others, or to viewing them as projections of our selves. For us to 
foster the kind of intersubjectivity necessary for community, and therefore, for 
human flourishing, we need to cultivate new ways of regarding one another 
within the context oflife narratives, which tell us not only about one another's 
lives, but about how we bring meaning to those lives. I argued that the kind of 
knowing made available through emotional attending or other sight is not just 
epistemologically significant, but also morally significant in that it provides with 
us with information about how better to be available for one another over time. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LITERATURE AND THE WORK OF THE IMAGINATION 
Introduction 
After the seas are all cross 'd, (as they seem already cross 'd,) 
After the great captains and engineers have accomplish 'd their work, 
After the noble inventors, after the scientists, the chemist, the 
geologist, ethnologist, 
Finally shall come the poet worthy that name, 
The true son of God shall come singing his songs. 
"Passage to India" (Whitman 346) 
Given the hegemonic nature of reason in Western culture, with its attendant 
privileging of scientific ways of knowing the world, as well as the radical reflexivity 
evinced by the tum to the self, it is no surprise that the emotions have been dismissed as 
somehow inferior parts of us with which we are stuck, but which nevertheless need to be 
subdued by reason. I have argued that the epistemological trajectory in the West 
subordinates emotions to reason. I have also argued that a tum to the self has managed to 
isolate us from one another because of our penchant for seeing in others not subjects but 
reflections of ourselves. I have also contended that the primacy of reason and the 
marginalization of emotion, as well as the perspective of radical reflexivity present us 
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with a question about how we can we extricate ourselves from this predicament and 
recover the virtue and intersubjectivity necessary for living a flourishing life in 
community. In Chapter Four, I suggested that the answer to this question is emotional 
attending-the ongoing commitment to refining our view of others as human subjects, 
who possess lives situated in complex social matrices that I have called life narratives. 
Emotional attending, however, requires not only a commitment to its practice, but a fund 
of emotional experience from which to draw. In this chapter I will argue that that fund of 
emotional experience is enriched by reading literature. I 
Reading literature does at least two important things upon which I want to focus. 
First, it helps to expand our moral imagination by creating an aesthetic space in which 
imaginatively we can experience life and the moral implications of action from a variety 
of different perspectives. By reading ourselves into literature (an almost unavoidable 
byproduct of reading) we begin to imagine what motivates behavior and, just as 
importantly, something of what it feels like to be so motivated, as well as what it might 
feel like to act in a particular way. We may inhabit, in a virtual sense, the process of 
moral reasoning that leads to both vicious and virtuous behavior, providing us with a 
nascent kind of experience from which to draw in our own lives. Second, reading 
literature helps to expand our emotional imagination with respect to the emotional lives 
of others. By reading about emotional experiences-by which I mean the experience of 
the unfolding of the emotional process I outlined in Chapter Two-and having some of 
those emotions elicited in us, we are able to have the beginnings of an understanding 
about emotional experiences we have never had occasion to enjoy in real life. Having 
these virtual emotional experiences from which to draw---even if only partial and 
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suggestive-provides us with expanded emotional resources, which resources are critical 
to understanding the lives of others through emotional attending. 
I. Literature and the Moral Imagination 
Aristotle suggests that feelings have to do "in general [with] whatever implies 
pleasure or pain." As I argued in Chapter Three, though, Aristotle does not view 
emotions as irresistible impulses that must be extirpated. Instead, they are educable to 
the extent that we must be trained to exhibit them at the right time and for the right 
reasons. If we cannot control our non-cognitive affective appraisals, which are the basis 
for emotional response, how can we educate the emotions? As I noted before, while our 
emotional responses are largely involuntary-in this respect, Plato was correct-we do 
have some control over the triggers that induce emotional response. I raised the issue of 
emotional triggers in Chapter Two, referring to them as those encoded mechanisms that 
respond to stimuli-both internal and external. As a consequence of these triggers, 
emotions are educable-not the emotions themselves, as perhaps Aristotle believed, but 
the triggers that elicit emotional response. It is these triggers that are subject to 
recalibration. In other words, we bear a certain responsibility for recalibrating those 
emotional triggers. In am aware that my friend's smile evokes disgust in me, for 
instance, because it looks like the smile of my ninth grade government teacher who I 
found disgusting, and if we are to remain friends, I have a responsibility (to the extent 
that I am aware of it), to do the cognitive work necessary to reframe my friend's smile as 
unique to her. I am not saying that this recalibration is easy; only that it is possible. 
Aristotle believes that this process ought to begin early, saying that "we need to have had 
the appropriate upbringing-right from early youth, as Plato says-to make us find 
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enjoyment or pain in the right things; for this is the correct education" (EN 1104bll). An 
Aristotelian account of the emotions views the recalibration of emotional triggers as vital 
if we are to "find enjoyment or pain in the right things," and abstain from vicious ones 
(1104bl0). 
Moreover, calibrating and recalibrating these emotional triggers goes to the very 
heart of virtue, inasmuch as virtues "are concerned with actions and feelings" (1104bI4). 
The cultivation of virtue, then, relies not only on the habituation of right action in the 
right ways and at the right times, while avoiding wrong action in the wrong ways, at the 
wrong times, but also on the recalibrating of emotional triggers so that the emotions are 
experienced rightly at the appropriate times and in the appropriate ways. Emotions, as I 
have said before, exist in critical relationship to our actions (1105a7). How, though, can 
we be intentional about the recalibration of those emotional triggers? An Aristotelian 
answer to that question, I will argue, is through reading literature. Literature allows for 
an aesthetic experience that asks the audience to enter a creative space and to participate 
in the construction of meaning through narrative, as I discussed in Chapter Four. Taking 
potential acts that seem random and episodic, literature provides a way of facing the 
chaos and imposing order on it through plot. 
Before examining how art may expand the moral imagination, I will address two 
possible objections, the first of which has to do with the nature of morality, and whether 
or not I am placing a moral theory on offer. The second possible objection centers on the 




The first objection deals with my contention that literature can expand the moral 
imagination, and whether that commits me to setting down a universally prescriptive 
moral theory. I want to be careful about the assertion of our ability to identify with 
characters in literature as a way of exercising our emotions or expanding our moral 
imagination for another reason. While this avenue of inquiry is fruitful, it raises a serious 
question about which morality is being formed. I must take a few moments to address 
this issue. 
Unfortunately, the question of expanding moral vision through literature is not the 
end of a discussion, but the beginning of a much longer one. The problem is that to use 
literature as a sort of moral laboratory in which one may creatively imagine oneself in the 
role of the characters in a book raises the larger question of making determinations about 
what are the moral actions to be inhabited by the reader. If! say that The Death of Ivan 
Ilyich is worth reading because it sets down what it feels like to be transformed through 
the process of dying-and that feeling that is worth imitating-I must first answer the 
question about what kind of moral framework I inhabit that makes this kind of 
transformation through dying a model for imitation. If another reader finds this sort of 
transformation objectionable because the moral framework she inhabits posits that an 
honorable death is one faced stoically and alone, then The Death of Ivan Ilyich could be 
viewed as distorting rather than expanding her moral imagination. In other words, the 
question of what can rightly be called morally good is what is at issue-antecedent to any 
literature that might be employed to expand the moral imagination. The problem, of 
course, is that there is no incontestable general morality that stands as foundational for an 
assertion about literature and the moral imagination. Whose morality is being served? is a 
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key question. Therefore, a broad generalization about literature's ability to expand the 
moral imagination exists as a metatheory, just to the extent that it is a theory about how 
moral theories can be enriched, and not which particular moral theory. However, in this 
case it would be difficult for me to say in a general metatheoretical way that literature 
allows the reader to expand moral imagination without also answering the question, 
"Which morality is in play?" 
At this point, the question might be raised about whether I have not already 
expressed a general moral theory in embracing virtue ethics. After all, does not Aristotle 
put forward a generalized objective moral account of virtue nested in the teleological 
function of the human being? The answer to the second question, I believe, is yes. 
Aristotle locates universal virtue in the framework of the human telos, while locating 
particular virtues in the telos of the polis. That is to say, Aristotle believes that some 
virtues are common to all people, while other virtues are specifically relevant to 
particular kinds of poleis. However, as to the first question, I would respond that while 
Aristotle may have held out for universal virtues, I do not feel myself bound to 
replicating his thought-similar to my understanding of Aristotle's aesthetics. Instead, 
part of what seems most Aristotelian (and therefore, most attractive) about using Aristotle 
as a place to start is the belief in the development and extension of a conversation or a 
line of inquiry to fit new circumstances. I would depart from Aristotle not on the 
existence of universal human virtues, but on universal human virtue available in a form 
unmediated by some community. 
Morality mediated through community, though, I submit, does not necessarily 
throw us back on ourselves to find out what morality means in individual conceptions. It 
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could be argued that whatever the truth of objective morality, my only way of 
apprehending the truth of that knowledge is through a narrative about morality passed on 
to me within the context of a particular community (or through the variety of 
communities of which I am a part). On this view, objective morality is beside the point, 
inasmuch as our access to reality as something "out there" is never immediate, nor 
uncontroversial. Whatever the truth of objective morality, our access to it is always 
perspectival. 
On this account, I know what to regard as moral, not necessarily because it 
occupies some privileged objective universal category, but because I occupy a 
community whose moral framework has a narrative that accounts for something as a 
virtue. Empirically, it is possible to claim that some virtues are counted as virtues by 
nearly all communities (e.g., promise keeping, truthfulness, etc.). That these are almost 
generally accorded the status of virtue does not begin to tell how they might be 
differently embodied in different cultures and communities. The objectivity of a virtue in 
some unmediated state, then, is not what is at stake, because our knowledge of it must 
always be mediated through narratives that locate it within particular contexts. The 
narratives that endeavor to account for virtues are produced within communities engaged 
in the process of attempting to describe what a virtuous life looks like. A virtuous life in 
Elizabethan England and a virtuous life in tribal Papua, New Guinea may have many 
similar features, but even something like truthfulness will be narrated in ways that make 
its abstraction from a particular context distorting. 
Competing narratives exist within different communal contexts, each of which 
purports to describe the world as truthfully as it can. In fact, a single person may exist 
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simultaneously in a variety of communal contexts that have fundamental disagreements 
between them about what can rightfully be called moral. These fundamental 
disagreements between competing moral narratives are not immediately resolvable by 
reference to a universal moral standard capable of adjudicating the discrepancy. Being a 
committed Muslim and a Tea Party advocate, for example, underscores this conflict 
between competing moral systems. Each community must advance its case, attempting 
to provide the most compelling account of morality in the face of the other. Whichever 
community is most convincing, though, still must proceed within a world in which its 
account may yet be shown to be lacking. Each account of morality, in other words, is 
always open to further interpretation in light of new circumstances. That is not to say 
that we must act as if we know nothing about morality; only that whatever we may be 
said to know is always open to question by other communities.2 
As a consequence of what I take to be the difficulty of putting forward an 
unmediated universal morality, my contribution here will center on the process by which 
morality can be shaped through the imaginative practice of reading literature. Even given 
the broad spectrum of moral commitments, it is still possible to find ways to expand 
one's moral imagination by entering into the creative aesthetic space provided by art-
especially literature. 
A second possible objection might be raised about my claims that literature can be 
useful in expanding the moral imagination. A particularly important aesthetic question 
centers on whether it is possible for literature to be morally formative without being 
merely instrumentally useful to that end. Can literature be morally formative (for my 
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purposes) of the emotional life without turning it into propaganda for moral positions 
already held-that is, without making it into an object lesson? 
R.W. Beardsmore has helped frame the aesthetic debate over the extent to which 
art can be useful and still be considered aesthetically. What he calls moralism, 3 and what 
Berys Gaut calls ethicism,4 are pitted against what Beardsmore labels, autonomism. 
Moralism at its most radical is the aesthetic position that finds art as merely a useful tool 
in dressing up "antecedently established moral principles" (Beardsmore 65).5 
Autonomism, on the other hand, is a more or less formalist account of aesthetics, which 
argues that art has no cognitive or ethical connection to anything outside itself. In this 
view, the claim is "not that individual works of art have no relation to artistic traditions, 
but rather that the traditions themselves stand in no relation to anything else" 
(Beardsmore 43). Beardsmore develops a picture of aesthetic "moralism" as a view of art 
that understands art as instrumentally useful in the pursuit oflarger projects, most notably 
ethics. Standard conceptions of mimesis fall under Beardsmore' s critique of aesthetic 
moralism. Immanuel Kant's aesthetic judgment, on the other hand, is autonomist or 
formalist, understanding art as an end-in-itself(namely, art is to be experienced as art, 
and not as "public relations" for a more important idea external to the artwork).6 
Immanuel Kant, in reacting to the traditional Western account of art as overly 
concerned with content (in this case, moral or ethical content) found mimetic theories of 
art too uncomfortably purposive, which is to say, too easily co-opted for purposes 
external to art itself. Art, for Kant (and here we should also include Schiller), occupies 
its own aesthetic sphere, subject only to judgment on an aesthetic, rather than on a 
cognitive or conceptual level. 7 Aesthetic judgment, for Kant, is differentiated from 
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cognitive judgment through its relationship to the subjective. Whereas cognitive 
judgment is concerned with the object (i.e., a thing external to the subject), aesthetic 
judgment is a sensation internal to the subject in virtue of its relationship to the object. 
Therefore, to determine whether something is beautiful, one must refrain from the 
impulse to inquire after (or even to care about) whether an object represents a thing 
whose "real existence" is establishable.8 
Moreover, an aesthetic judgment of art requires that the object be pleasing for its 
own sake (i.e., "good in itself') (§4). On a Kantian view, mimetic theories of art, on the 
other hand, are entirely concerned with a thing's real existence, seeing the object of art as 
"good/or something" (i.e., useful); hence, as theories capable of assisting us in 
cultivating aesthetic judgment, they fail. For Kant true aesthetic judgment conceives of 
art as an end-in-itself, rather than viewing it as a tool, useful for the pounding of some 
other antecedent and unrelated conceptual nails. The only basis upon which an object 
can be judged aesthetically, therefore, is its "bare form," which is the only basis that is 
"universally communicable" (§ 11). It is worth noting, then, that a Kantian version of 
aesthetic judgment offers an advantage over instrumentalist conceptions of art by viewing 
art as having intrinsic value. 
On the other hand, a purely formalistic understanding of art in which art has 
neither cognitive content, nor any relationship to the actual world we inhabit is also 
unsatisfying. Inasmuch as a formalist view seeks to isolate art from the world we inhabit 
(i.e., Schiller's "world of substance"), the pursuit of art threatens to devolve to the pursuit 
of art as the "plaything of empty pleasure.,,9 While Kant's initial claims regarding 
aesthetic judgment being unconcerned about the real existence of a thing, about art being 
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good in itself, and about fonn as the only thing being open to specifically aesthetic 
judgment was an important corrective to the moralist view of art-as-instrumental-to-
some-greater-good, aesthetic judgment was subsequently transfonned by the modem "art 
for art's sake" movement at the tum of the twentieth century. 10 This transfonnation 
consisted of turning art into art-as-autonomous-enterprise, the meaning of which comes 
not from some external source, but on its terms. It is only fitting, then, that this fonnalist 
evolution in art has been labeled, "autonomism." Autonomism rejects the notion of the 
ethical criticism of art, just to the extent that art is held not to possess ethical content 
(Gaut 67). The danger, of course, in the isolation of art from the world is that ordinary 
people will be tempted to say, "If art has nothing to do with the world in which I live, 
why should I even bother about it at all, then?" 
There are no easy answers to the dilemma of how art should be experienced-
through its form or its content. Wayne Booth, however, frames it well when he says, 
"Defenders of aesthetic purity have rightly deplored the temptation of moralists to judge 
narratives by standards they might use in teaching a Sunday school class or conducting a 
court for juvenile offenders; 'art' does offer us riches entirely its own, unrivaled by any 
other part of 'life'" (7). One might misread Camus' The Stranger, for example, and 
conclude that it is a morality tale, which sets out a warning about how trying to live life 
without some conception of the divine is morally tenuous and could possibly leave one as 
a candidate for the commission of the most violent sorts of crime. Or one might read the 
Oresteian Trilogy as a caveat about the intra-familial consequences of disharmony, rather 
than as a commentary on the movement from a primitive society ordered by lex talionis 
to a society based on a system of just laws. 
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I believe, contrary to strict autonomists, that the fine line between art-as-formative 
and art-as-instrumental can be negotiated. I I The key to this question, I am persuaded, 
lies in pointing out that one of the possible contexts in which the education of emotional 
triggers takes place is aesthetic. That is to say, since the worlds created by aesthetic 
experience are by nature imaginative, it makes sense to believe that these aesthetic worlds 
allow us imaginatively to experience emotions. One way that we recalibrate those 
triggers that elicit emotion is through real world experience. My disappointment at 
looking in my mail box, and finding a rejection letter, for instance, can be modified over 
time by becoming dulled to it (if! receive enough of them), or by having conversations 
with other authors who help me to see the benefit of good criticism over the long term. 
However, I might also have my disappointment in seeing a rejection letter modified by 
reading a novel in which a character seeking to become an author eventually comes to see 
a pile of rejection letters as inspirational-when she realizes that becoming a writer 
entails enduring setbacks. Either way, real or imagined, actual or aesthetic, one of the 
triggers for my disappointment (rejection letter) can be altered or recalibrated. 
Moreover, we can learn from reading fictionalized accounts of the lives of others 
about what it might mean to inhabit other (or even rival) moral positions through 
identification with literary characters. Identification with a character is a process that 
may lead to the triggering of emotional experience as one sees what the world might look 
like through another's eyes. Identification, on this reading, offers a context in which 
emotions may be triggered in the reader. What is gained through identification is a 
perspectival sense of the benefits and consequences involved in holding certain beliefs or 
engaging in certain activities. Scott Stroud writes: 
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What is identified with in cases of successful identification is the value that is an 
important part of the character and a value that the reader judges will be beneficial 
to her own life projects. Unsuccessful cases of identification, such as that with 
villains, involve some relevant dissimilarity that spurs us not to change to be more 
in line with that character's values or action strategies. Both aspects are important 
to an account of identification on the part of the reader, and both center on the 
change (or potential change) of one's beliefs, values, and/or action strategies (35). 
In other words, identification with literary characters can present moral positions to be 
imitated or cautionary tales to be avoided, by allowing the reader an opportunity to 
simulate experiences under imagined conditions. 
I would argue that it is possible, contrary to autonomist concerns about the 
potential for instrumentalist uses of art, that we may experience literature as having its 
own aesthetic value intrinsic to itself-while at the same time, literature does what cannot 
be done otherwise, through more prosaic, discursive means. On the account I am putting 
forward, then, moral education-in the training of the emotions through literary 
narrative-is intimately bound up with the creative aesthetic sphere we enter through 
fiction. We learn things from literature that we could not learn in any other way. 
Because of the nature of art, literature illuminates creative possibilities that would have 
remained otherwise hidden in darkness. Martha Nussbaum contends that much of the 
important work that needs to be done in expanding our moral imaginations is inaccessible 
to anything but the narrative nature of literature. She writes: 
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The moral work involved ... could hardly be shown us in a work of 
formal decision theory, it could not be shown in any abstract philosophical prose, 
since it is so much a matter oflearning the right sort of vision of the concrete. It 
could not be shown well even in a philosopher's example, inasmuch as an 
example would lack the full specificity, and also the indeterminacy, of the literary 
case, its rich metaphors and pictures, its ways of telling us how characters come to 
see one another as this or that and come to attend to new aspects of their situation 
("Finely Aware and Richly Responsible" 160-1). 
Literature, because it presents new information, attitudes, values, and so on indirectly-
that is, not through straight-line discourse-is often easier for people to absorb. In 
literature the reader is not necessarily confronted directly with explicit claims about the 
way the world is-which would require rejection or assent-but with possibilities to be 
explored, tried on, ruminated over. The knowledge that emerges from literature, then, is 
knowledge about what the world looks like from different perspectives. For the purposes 
of this work, then, I will assert rather than defend extensively the proposition that art can 
be experienced as both aesthetic and educative at the same time, with full awareness that 
among aestheticians this issue is far more nuanced than I am able to set down here. 12 But 
I will give a brief account as to how I think this balancing act might work. 
I would suggest that literature constructs a hypothetical, aesthetic space in which 
new worlds may be created.13 I want to advance a theory of mimetic art that is 
sympathetic to a qualified Schillerian view of art. By this I mean, a mimetic theory in 
which literature creates whole new worlds that are not merely imitations of our world-
or even necessarily composed of all the same constituent parts of the world we inhabit-
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while at the same time insisting that the new worlds these creations represent to us are 
intelligible only insofar as we can understand their novelty through reference to the world 
we inhabit. An act of love, or hatred, or pity, or fear portrayed in a work of literature 
need not have an actual referent in reality, but the portrayal of that act assumes of the 
spectator or the reader an accumulated fund of knowledge about each of those things so 
as to render their creative portrayal intelligible. R.W. Beardsmore argues that the artist 
does not necessarily offer any new information through art. Instead, the artist provides a 
hypothetical space in which to consider things anew, things that we already understand 
on some level, perhaps "to see them in a new light" (73). 
One might initially be tempted to say that something like science fiction acts as a 
counterargument to Beardsmore. However, he is not saying that imaginative details in 
these creative worlds (e.g., Vulcans or Wookies) are prescinded, merely that the great 
artist "does not impart new facts about hypocrisy or about love or about human 
degradation" (73). To press the point even further, it is not necessary for mimesis, for 
instance, that a novel include a law of gravity that corresponds to our own law of gravity; 
only that to the extent that it does not, the reader must understand the cause and effect 
relationship of non-gravity to the new world that has been created. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to describe this world of non-gravity without referring at some point to the fact 
that everything in it floats around, which is a way of drawing attention to the fact of a 
new world that is unlike the one we inhabit. We begin to understand this new world by 
the way that it differs from our own-but the world we inhabit always acts as a referent. 
By new worlds I mean imaginative worlds that mayor may not resemble the 
world in which we live, but that have their own norms, customs, and internally consistent 
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logic with which the reader might engage. 14 A world might be a small town in Middle 
America or serf village in feudal Europe or tribal enclave in Africa, or it might be Middle 
Earth or N arnia. Moreover, the characters that make up the world mayor may not be 
human, but will have encounters that humans will either recognize or that will be 
unrecognizable precisely because they contrast with human encounters. 15 It is the 
hypothetical aesthetic space created by literature that allows for the reader to discover 
and contemplate new worlds that provide experience beyond one's own world. 
These creative worlds, as I have suggested, may not necessarily bear much 
resemblance to the world we inhabit, but we make sense of these new worlds through 
reference to the world we inhabit. In this way literature is mimetic, in that it represents 
possible worlds intelligible to us by their points of contact with the world in which we 
live; but this mimesis is not particularly concerned with the "real existence" of that which 
is represented. The aesthetic space in literature-unbounded by the constraints of the 
world we inhabit but still recognizable to us as in some way related to that world-allows 
us to engage multiple situations and roles within a generally safe environment. 16 Because 
this aesthetic space offers potential situations and not actual ones, we are able to consider 
a range of possible stances and responses that would be otherwise unavailable to US. 17 
Moreover, the reading of literature is a rehearsal in bringing some kind of order to 
what otherwise might appear to be chaos. To the extent that human beings find 
themselves in a world that seems not to be guided by any underlying plot structure, 
people try to make sense of the world around them through the construction of 
narratives. IS Wayne Booth argues that "we all live a great proportion of our lives in a 
surrender to stories about our lives, and about other possible lives; we live more or less in 
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stories, depending on how strongly we resist surrendering to what is 'only' imagined" 
(14). It is through these narratives that one's life and the actions of others are 
understood. Without some narrative, life appears to be a disjointed series of random 
episodes, unrelated to any larger story. Humans gain a certain mastery of the world 
through a narration of life that offers meaning, where before the narration, there was 
none. Reading literature helps to shape our capacity for engaging our own stories by 
continually exposing us to the practice of imposing narrative order on what would 
otherwise be experienced as a seemingly endless series of episodes with no goal, and 
therefore with no purpose. 
Jonathan Lear, in discussing the literary genre of tragedy offers an example of this 
exercise in making meaning through narrative. He argues that the function of tragedy is 
to absolve the world of what appears to be meaninglessness, by placing the responsibility 
for the tragedy that befalls the tragic hero back on the hero. If tragedy happens randomly, 
we have no choice but to see the world as chaotic. According to Lear, Aristotle 
understands tragedy to reinforce, through the convention of an error (hamartia) made by 
the tragic hero, the picture of a rational world-a world resting on a stable structure of 
rational cause and effect. Tragedy underscores Aristotle's belief that the world is not 
irrational and chaotic. Oedipus, for example, is not merely the victim of bad luck, but of 
a series of choices he makes-even if unwittingly. The fault lies within human beings, 
and not within an irrational universe. Lear writes: "In Aristotle's conception oftragedy, 
the individual actor takes on the burden of badness, the world as a whole is absolved. 
And there is further consolation is [sic.] recognizing that even when they are responsible 
for their misfortunes, humans remain capable of conducting themselves with dignity and 
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nobility" (Lear 335). Put differently, Lear concludes that the pleasure we derive from 
tragedy is in being able to place ourselves imaginatively in situations where we have seen 
the worst life has to offer, and have then acted with dignity, so that "the fundamental 
goodness of man and world are reaffirmed" (Lear 335). By eliciting the emotions 
appropriate to tragedy, our moral imaginations are trained through literature to see the 
world in a new way that makes intelligible our moral responsibilities and the 
consequences of failure. 
However, expanding moral imagination by reading literature is not necessarily an 
inevitability. Iris Murdoch offers this caution about the limitations of art: "Art presents 
the most comprehensible examples of the almost irresistible human tendency to seek 
consolation in fantasy and also of the effort to resist this and the vision of reality which 
comes with success. Success in facts is rare. Almost all art is a form of fantasy-
consolation and few artists achieve the vision of the real" (Sovereignty alGood 62-3). 
She goes on to say that "the greatest art is 'impersonal' because it shows us the world, 
our world and not another one, with a clarity which startles and delights us simply 
because we are not used to looking at the real world at all" (Murdoch 63)19. The question 
arises about what it is she intends to suggest about the relationship of fantasy to the real, 
as well as what she means by referring to "our world and not another one." 
I read Murdoch not necessarily as insisting on mimesis, in the sense of requiring a 
one-to-one correspondence to reality. I take her to mean, for example, that something 
like fantasy as a genre can be revelatory, by disclosing that which is true about the world 
we inhabit--even though the world we inhabit is never specifically named in the work. 
Conversely, literature that might be categorized as realistic can obscure reality, by 
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presenting a picture of reality interested in only the facts, without sufficient reference to 
the intersubjective milieu in which characters act and are acted upon. Art, for Murdoch, 
captures us and disarms us because of its nature as fiction, while it simultaneously refers 
us back to the world we inhabit. Its force for good, however, comes when it discloses 
reality, when it reveals what is true, rather than allows us to maintain our fantasies. Her 
description of reality, I believe, is a thick one that includes more than just a report of the 
possible propositions relevant to the narrative; it includes things like a thoughtful 
depiction of motives, desires, purposes, fears-in short, context. It is the process of 
paying attention to this context within fictional narratives that helps the reader attend to 
the context of life narratives in actuality. Put another way, reading gives us the kind of 
preparation for attending to the subjects that make up a community by simulating 
experiences of attending to fictional subjects. Ultimately, that attending to fictional 
subjects has at its center attending to the emotional lives of others, to which I will turn 
now. 
II. Literature and the Emotional Imagination 
According to Murdoch, art teaches us how to look beyond our fat, relentless 
egos-which mediate reality in a distorted fashion-to attend to the world imaginatively 
and, ultimately, she thinks, truthfully (Sovereignty of Good 51). If science encourages us 
to see the world as objectifiable, and if We stem culture has bequeathed us an unfortunate 
set of mental habits that results in a vision of the world that looks more like a projection 
of the interior self, art allows us to refocus our sight, to employ, in my terms, other sight. 
Murdoch argues that this is possible because "great art teaches us how real things can be 
looked at and loved without being seized and used, without being appropriated into the 
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greedy organism of the self' (Sovereignty a/Good 64). Art, good art, draws us out of 
ourselves for the purposes of attending to a person or a thing external to us. Literature, in 
particular, because of its narrative nature can reveal the kinds of possibilities available to 
us in negotiating our interactions with others. In other words, it can expand our 
emotional imaginations, and thereby expand our awareness of the emotional experiences 
of others by allowing us to simulate an enormously wide range of emotional experiences. 
I should take a moment to comment on an obvious question-that is, what role 
does banal art play? Additionally, how we go about adjudging a piece of art to be banal? 
There are certainly more aesthetically sophisticated ways of discerning between great art 
and banal art but, for simplicity's sake, if we contrast Murdoch's line of thinking about 
great art (which draws us out of ourselves), banal art is art that draws us inward, diverting 
our attention from the world back onto ourselves, causing us to attend to our own 
interiority. I would suggest that banal art also takes certain shortcuts with respect to 
emotion, offering sentimentality and triteness in neat, pre-digested packages that require 
little intellectual or aesthetic investment of the reader or viewer. Additionally, I think 
banal literature is potentially objectifying, calling upon the reader to view human subjects 
as objects to be used or conquered. Romance novels, for instance, can establish or 
reinforce cultural tropes about what love ought to look like, and about what kinds of 
people are candidates for love (e.g., the good looking, the wealthy, the successful) that 
can warp emotional experience. Banal art, on my account, along with great art, also trains 
the emotions to the extent that it helps to recalibrate emotional triggers-but banal art 
often does so in potentially harmful ways. How, though, does this recalibration of 
emotional triggers through reading literature function? 
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Marcel Proust writes suggestively about how literature operates as a repository of 
imaginative possibilities in Swann's Way. He reminds us that "[The novelist] for the 
space of an hour ... sets free within us all the joys and sorrows in the world, a few of 
which only we should have to spend years of our actual life in getting to know, and the 
most intense of which would never be revealed to us because the slow course of their 
development prevents us from perceiving them" (117). In these words, Marcel Proust, 
has staked out a position over against the autonomist aesthetic concerns, then popular, of 
Oscar Wilde and the "art for art's sake" movement. "Art for art's sake" was an attempt 
to steer the aesthetic ship away from what was considered to be the shoals of the aesthetic 
moralism of those moralists (e.g., Tolstoy) who, as I have indicated, understood art 
(literature, in particular) as a mimetic tool to be wielded in the formation of moral 
individuals. 
Consequently, aesthetic autonomists increasingly clamored for art that 
concentrated on form, in order to avoid any confusion that content-which they took to 
be subjective-was important to the work. On this formalist reading, art should evoke 
only aesthetic experience, because to evoke an emotional or moral experience risked 
tripping people up by focusing on the content rather than the form. Modernist painting 
takes this concern to its ultimate conclusion in painters like Mondrian and Kandinsky, 
where there is no content--only form. Literature, on the other hand, found pure form 
much more difficult to execute. But innovations in literature (e.g., stream-of-
consciousness, shifting temporal perspectives) drew attention away from the content of 
representational or traditional plot and toward the form of the expression itself. 
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Proust, however, in Swann's Way is not convinced that novels have no work to 
do. He suggests that the novel has the capacity to expand the emotional imagination by 
placing the reader inside events that would, because of the lack of experience by the 
reader, be otherwise inaccessible. A human life, bounded as it is by the limitations of 
time and space can only contain a finite number of experiences. I cannot experience in 
reality even a fraction of the experiences possible to a human being. I may never fight in 
a war, experience a natural disaster, be stalked by a serial killer, and so on. Moreover, 
some experiences are closed off to me altogether. I will never, for example, be able to 
experience in my real life what it means to be a woman. I will never know firsthand what 
it means like to be born poor, or disabled, or Chinese. However, through literature I can 
begin to get some sense of what those experiences entail emotionally, and the kinds of 
beliefs and values that come from those perspectives. In "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" 
Thomas Nagle makes an argument about the inadequacies of objective, scientific 
description to circumscribe all that is knowable. He argues that experience is both 
perspectival and subjective, and that knowing what it is like to be X is not reducible to 
objective physical descriptions. Instead, he argues that we know what it is like to be X 
by being able to take up the point of view of X. And, to the extent that "one can take it 
up roughly, or partially, then one's conception will also be rough or partial" (Nagel 
"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" 442). That is to say, by reading literary accounts oflives 
and experiences different from our own, we are given some conception not open to us 
through scientific description, if only rough or partial, of what it is like to experience life 
from different points of view. 
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An important objection to my assertion that reading literature can provide 
knowledge of experiences I have not actually had is that it does not meet the test of 
propositionally determinate knowledge. That is to say, epistemologically, fictional 
literature does not offer us propositional knowledge about the world we inhabit, but only 
knowledge of fictional worlds. In other words, knowledge garnered in pretend worlds 
amounts to little more than pretend knowledge; and pretend knowledge fails to meet the 
conditions of real, objective, verifiable knowledge. But, as I have argued, the privileging 
of this kind of objectivist account of real knowledge is problematic, just to the extent that 
it fails to consider other ways of knowing the world that do not require propositional 
standards be met to establish knowledge (namely, in this case, knowledge of others). The 
kind of knowledge literature contains does not necessarily seek to describe the world in 
which we live with scientific rigor. Instead, the kind of knowledge literature offers is 
perspectival in nature-knowledge of the world from a particular perspective, and not 
knowledge of the world sub specie aeternitatis, or Nagel's "view from nowhere.,,2o 
Because of the almost limitless possibilities for perspectival knowledge, to the extent that 
it is subjective, those possibilities can never be exhausted through actual experience. The 
knowledge we derive from literature has to do with simulating the experiences of others 
from their particular perspectives. Consequently, the knowledge we gain is not "knowing 
how" or "knowing that"-standards for propositional knowledge-but "knowing what x 
is like" (Nagel "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" 442). Knowing what it feels like to swim, 
for example, is different from knowing the physical and mechanical laws that make 
swimming possible. The way the water feels as one moves through it, or the euphoric 
feeling that floating gives some people does not admit of propositional precision. Or, 
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more to the point with respect to literature, knowing what it feels like to find oneself 
subjected to sexual harassment, for instance, is different from knowing the legal 
definitions and possible psychological implications of being sexually harassed. Knowing 
the fear one might experience when one is alone with a particularly offensive supervisor, 
or knowing the kind of endless calculations one must continually make in such a 
circumstance (e.g., Can I or should I endure such offenses? Is speaking up worth it if it 
costs me this job? Can I afford to lose this job?) fall under the category of a certain kind 
of knowledge. According to Scott Stroud the experience of what it is like to be x in 
situationy is a type of knowledge-subjective knowledge (27). That subjective 
knowledge is not open to scientific verification does not, I would suggest, preclude it 
from being an important form of knowing about the world. 
Subjective knowledge of the world can be had experientially, as one would 
imagine. However, beyond actual experience, one of the most expansive resources for 
this kind of knowing comes through fictional accounts, in particular for my purposes, 
literature. This way of knowing, according to Stroud, "is a cognitive gain; it can be 
discussed and recounted in a linguistic fashion and is something that the reader would not 
cognitively possess unless she actually had that exact experience or read that exact 
fictional account (which involves imagination in its simulative function)" (32). Literature 
makes available to us ways of knowing the world that would otherwise be inaccessible-
ways that are important for the social life made possible by intersubjectivity. Ifwe are to 
attend to one another emotionally, then the ability to possess knowledge from 
perspectives other than our own is critical, since emotional attending requires an exercise 
of the imagination to understand another's emotional experience from her point of view. 
238 
- ---- -----------
Through reading, we accumulate a fund of experiences that allows us to make inferences 
about the world from perspectives other than our own. Admittedly, these inferences are 
not infallible. We may, for instance, draw the wrong conclusions about what it feels like 
to experience life from someone else's perspective. We may casually assume by reading 
Huckleberry Finn, for instance, that the life of adolescents who roam freely is romantic 
and adventurous, rather than perilous and lonely. But if, as I have suggested, our vision 
of others is infinitely perfectible, even these wrong conclusions (if we pay attention to 
them) become a part of the fund of subjective knowledge we will employ in the future as 
we emotionally attend others. Through reading we gain practice at looking at human 
subjects with other sight. That is to say, reading assists us in refocusing the lens oflove 
by regarding a fictional character not as an extension or a projection of my self, but as 
independent of me and my own needs. No matter what my needs happen to be, I regard 
Willy Loman, for instance, as a character over whom I have no objective power, no 
possibility for imposing my own program for personal or vocational improvement. I 
engage Jane Eyre as a character situated in a context not of my own design, placed there 
not simply for my private entertainment. They lead fictional lives that invite me in, but 
that do not cede control to me. I am welcome to identify with the characters, but I realize 
in some sense that the fictional lives they live are not dependent upon me for their 
intelligibility as human lives. These fictional human lives, though, are capable of 
eliciting some kind of emotional phenomenon. 
But here we run into the problem of the paradox of fictional emotions. How is it 
that fictional worlds seem to elicit emotional responses in real world readers? The 
paradox of fictional emotions can be summarized in this way: 
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Regarding certain fictional characters (and situations) F, it is 
simultaneously true that: 
1 We have genuine and rational emotional responses towards F; 
2 We believe that F is purely fictional; 
At the same time, it is also true that: 
3 In order for us to have genuine and rational emotional responses 
towards a character (or situation), we must not believe that the character 
(or situation) is purely fictional (Gendler 241). 
The paradox emerges when we realize that it is possible to hold any two of the 
conditions simultaneously as true. However, taken together, all three present a 
contradiction. Kendall Walton describes the paradox by giving the example of a movie-
goer named, Charles. Charles watches a scary movie about green slime.21 He exhibits 
the signs of someone who is frightened, even claiming to be "terrified" (5). Walton 
argues, however, that Charles cannot truly experience fear, since, ifhe is rational, he does 
not believe that there is any green slime about to overtake him. That is to say, according 
to Walton, it is irrational to be afraid of something you know does not exist. But what 
then do we make of Charles's apparent fear response? Walton believes that what Charles 
experiences is "quasi-fear" (6). This quasi-fear is a function of the "make believe" world 
Charles has chosen to inhabit through fiction (13). In this way, Walton believes he can 
offer a description that makes sense of the paradox of emotional engagement with fiction. 
Since Charles cannot rationally believe that the slime is any threat to him, and 
since, according to Walton, real emotions are the product of beliefs about the real world, 
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Charles must therefore not be experiencing real emotion. However, it is Walton's 
commitment to a cognitive account of emotions-in this case, belief-dependent 
emotions-that causes him to undergo great theoretical contortions in an attempt to solve 
the paradox of fiction. For one thing, on a commonsense level, if what I feel as I read 
Oedipus Rex feels the same as the experience of what I would feel if I were watching the 
same circumstances on the nightly news, it is not immediately apparent what is achieved 
by drawing a hard line to distinguish between "quasi-emotion" and "real emotion?" If 
"quasi-emotion" and "real emotion" feel the same, it is not apparent for the purposes of 
the philosophy of literature or for my argument about the emotions we experience when 
reading literature what practical advantage is to be gained by differentiating between the 
two.22 
Furthermore, a "quasi-emotion" theory, as I have just mentioned, fails to account 
for the ways that emotions are believed to function according to modern neuroscience. 
As I suggested in Chapter Two, cognitive accounts of emotions depend upon beliefs, 
evaluations, or desires as the key to understanding emotional response (e.g., I believe my 
dog is dead, which makes me sad.). Moreover, as I argued earlier, cognitive accounts of 
emotions are problematic on a number of different fronts; but most devastating to the 
cognitive theories is the insufficient physiological response time necessary for cognition 
to track with emotional response. Put simply, we have emotions (in most cases) before 
we think about them. If, however, we view emotions not as the product of beliefs, but as 
a process initiated by affective appraisals, the paradox of fiction dissolves. For the 
purposes of my argument, then, the question is not the objective question of categorical 
description: "quasi-emotion" versus "real emotion"-but the subjective question of 
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experience: Does the emotional experience I have when I read literature track the 
emotional experience I might have under the same circumstances in real life? 
-------~~~ 
In Chapter Two I discussed the encoding of somatic markers or embodied 
appraisals; in this chapter I am going to expand on that discussion. Emotions are 
triggered, by and large, affectively, meaning that they happen involuntarily. My urge to 
duck when I see something flying at me is not initially bordered by a set of cognitive 
beliefs, which must be weighed and then acted upon. Instead, my response to the flying 
object is filed with all of the other experiences of flying objects in the Ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex as a somatic marker or embodied appraisal. The experiences that make 
up that somatic marker or embodied appraisal become this quick and dirty response 
system, activated automatically. These somatic markers or embodied appraisals act as 
involuntary trip wires, or triggers, for emotional response. That is not to say that 
emotional response via somatic markers or embodied appraisals is a static thing-that 
these triggers are set in stone. On the contrary, these triggers are constantly undergoing 
recalibration to account for new input. Therefore, what triggers an emotional response 
today may very well be recalibrated, and therefore, not trigger an emotional response in 
the future. That the scent of lilac perfume, for instance, causes me to experience sadness 
because it reminds me of my grandmother does not mean that I am doomed to feel sad for 
the rest of my life when I smell lilac perfume. It may be that after some time lilac 
perfume triggers an entirely different response-nostalgia say, or wistfulness. 
Alternatively, I may come to associate lilac perfume with another person who brings me 
happiness, which could recalibrate the scent of lilac perfume to trigger a joyous 
emotional response in me. The point is that though I experience sadness at the loss of 
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someone I love in much the same way, the kinds of triggers associated with that emotion 
are constantly undergoing recalibration as new experiences are filed. I will come back to 
these triggers momentarily. 
Proust describes just this sort of affective appraisal in the famous episode 
describing the unfolding of emotional response, triggered by eating the madeleine in 
Swann's Way: 
The sight of the little madeleine had recalled nothing to my mind before I tasted it 
... [but] ... as soon as I had recognized the taste of the piece of madeleine soaked 
in her decoction of lime-blossom which my aunt used to give me ... immediately 
the old grey house upon the street, where her room was, rose up like a stage set to 
attach itself to the little pavilion opening on to the garden which had been built 
out behind it for my parents (63). 
Marcel experiences nostalgia not because of any particular beliefs he has initially about 
the madeleine he is tasting. Instead, the taste itself initiates a process, first physical, then 
cognitive, in which a memory trace is activated. The activation of this memory trace, the 
calling forth of this somatic marker or embodied appraisal elicits not only an intellectual 
recollection; it recalls also the feelings associated with the memory. In some very real 
way, then, Marcel not only remembers his grandmother's room in the old grey house by 
its sights, sounds, and smells, he also feels the traces of the feelings he felt as a child 
while in that room. The feelings associated with this memory, however are not the 
product of some intellectual achievement, having analytically weighed his beliefs about 
the goodness of his grandmother's room (as cognitive theories of emotion might suggest); 
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the memory trace triggers an involuntary emotional response-where emotional response 
is a complex and unfolding process that includes the affective, the physiological, the 
dispositional, and the cognitive. 
The argument I am making about emotions and literature follows the same kind of 
path. When I read literature, I respond emotionally not because I have beliefs about the 
reality of a fictional work, but because my emotions have been triggered in the creative 
aesthetic space I am inhabiting. As I am imagining the world about which I am 
reading-itself, I think, a largely involuntary action-the sorts of situations I encounter in 
the fictional world are candidates for triggering my real world emotions. Imagining Anna 
Karenina in anguish after her clash with Vronsky, waiting for him at the train station, 
finally throwing herself under the train in despair, my own emotions are triggered-
empathetically at the despair she feels, as well as sadness at her death. My beliefs about 
whether there was ever a suicide with a real person named Anna are largely beside the 
point. I feel something for the fictional Anna that approximates my feelings for a real 
person in a similar situation. Whether my emotional reaction to Anna's death is triggered 
by a past experience I have had with suicide, or because I am able to think prospectively 
about the practical and emotional impact of suicide, or because I make associations with 
her suicide and other tragedies with which I have had experience, the point is that my 
emotional response to the fictional world is real, having implications for my emotional 
life in the real world. That is to say, through experiencing Anna's suicide imaginatively, 
I can feel grief and sadness, to a greater or lesser degree. In other words, my embodied 
emotional response can be triggered by experiencing Anna's fictional suicide through 
reading. My throat clenches up and tears form in response to a fictional loss because my 
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emotional response is triggered by an embodied appraisal, rather than by cognitive beliefs 
about the truth or falsity of the account-not necessarily of the same intensity or duration 
as if the suicide happened to someone I know in real life, as I will comment on shortly, 
but at least tracking along the same emotional trajectory. 
Those fictional human lives offer me a host of images of people's emotional lives 
from which to draw as I navigate my interactions with others. The narrator of Swann's 
Way, Marcel, recalls that in reading novels "afternoons were crammed with more 
dramatic events than occur, often, in a whole lifetime" (116). In experiencing the 
emotions attendant to these fictional events, the narrator says that the novelist taps into 
something important with respect to emotions. He says that for a person to experience an 
emotion in real life, one must get "a mental picture" of the "joys or misfortunes" 
experienced by a real person (116). In other words, for me to be sad about the death of 
my grandmother, I must picture not only my grandmother, but the experiences I had with 
her (to which a variety of emotions are invariably attached), as well as the experiences I 
will be prevented now from having with her in the future. Presumably, this is why, 
though I may experience an intellectual loss upon reading of the death of someone else in 
the newspaper, I may have little emotional investment because I have no pictures of that 
person upon which to call. On the other hand, if I read that the person was a grandmother 
who engaged in activities like the ones engaged in by my grandmother with me, then I 
may begin to form pictures of this unknown person's life. According to the narrator in 
Swann's Way, a "real" person is limited emotionally by the fact that he or she cannot 
possibly have a wide enough experience of the different variations of events that would 
produce the sophisticated emotional imagination of a committed reader of novels. The 
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genius ofthe novelist is to write in such a ways as to evoke images within the reader, 
images that provide access to emotions, allowing the reader to expand his or her 
emotional imagination, without actually having to experience in reality the broad range of 
"dramatic events" necessary to the cultivation ofthose emotions (116). 
Leaving aside the cognitive resonances of Marcel's "mental picture," what he 
refers to can be accounted for by somatic markers or embodied appraisals as a memory 
trace. These memory traces are not stored as cognitive holdings (though I have cognitive 
memories triggered by theses calibration files or somatic markers), but as quick and dirty 
affective triggers that recall particular emotional experiences. In other words, my 
experience of sadness over the loss of my grandmother calls upon more than just my 
memory of her as a human being related to me. My memory of her includes my 
emotional experiences of her. I am able, if only to a certain extent, to identify with 
people (even strangers) as subjects because my emotional imagination builds on 
experiential points of contact with others. I must, therefore, have a fund of emotional 
experiences from which to draw to be able to make the analogical leaps necessitated by 
these experiential points of contact. That is to say, I need have a broad range of 
emotional understanding to be able to have some idea about what it is like to experience 
the world from some other point of view. Reading literature, as I have argued, is one way 
for expanding the base of emotional experience. How, though, are these emotions 
induced within us by reading literature? 
At one point in Swann's Way, the narrator takes a sip of tea, which immediately 
elicits within him an experience of "all-powerful joy." He begins to question where this 
emotion comes from. How can such a small thing trigger such an intense emotion? He 
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finally concludes that "the truth I am seeking lies not in the cup but in myself' (61). In 
other words, the narrator determines that the emotion evoked within him comes not 
because of the tea he has just drunk, but because of the emotionally creative connections 
surrounding the drinking of that kind of tea. Something independent of the narrator 
causes him to make connections located within his memory, bringing about a new 
awareness of himself. This connection between memory and emotion makes sense when 
one recalls that emotion is an embodied process, triggering memory traces, which are 
both somatic and cognitive in nature. According to Proust, reading fiction may provide 
us as readers with the emotional resources necessary to undertake, what Husserl would 
call, a phenomenological investigation of the emotions. 23 If Proust is right, the content 
of art (in this case the novel), in spite of formalist objections, is significant in illuminating 
ways of knowing that do not rely for their illuminative powers on propositionally 
determinate knowledge. Instead, reading literature provides us with subjective 
knowledge-that is, knowledge from another point of view about what it is like to be X. 
The subjective knowledge we acquire through literature is invaluable to emotional 
attending inasmuch as it expands the repository of emotional experiences, and thereby 
expands our emotional imaginations. 
It might justifiably be argued that the emotions one experiences by reading 
literature are not necessarily of the same intensity as emotions in real life. Although they 
might occasionally approach that intensity, they almost certainly do not approach the 
duration of the most intense emotional experiences. I do not, for example, grieve the 
loss of Anna Karenina for the same length of time I would grieve the loss of my 
grandmother. My point, however, is not to say that emotions elicited while reading 
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literature track in exactly the same way as emotions elicited in real life; only that some 
affective parts of the emotional process "feel" identical between fiction and real life. 
Again, the question to be put to the emotions induced by reading literature is not an 
objective categorical one about whether real emotions and simulated emotions can be 
objectively described as identical in every respect. The question, instead, is a subjective 
experiential one about whether real emotions and simulated emotions "feel" the same. 
It might also be asked whether the emotions elicited by literature that I am 
describing are not merely simulations of emotions. That the emotions educed by 
literature within this aesthetic space are simulations of emotions, and not the actual 
emotions one would need to exhibit appropriately in real life is not a damaging 
admission. Any simulation, by its very nature, is suggestive of the range of responses 
(emotional, physical, etc.) available to one when facing the actual situation being 
simulated. The objective of military training, for instance, is not to put one's life in 
danger, but to give one a glimpse into what that danger looks and feels like, so that when 
faced with a similar situation in actuality, one will have a certain familiarity with danger 
through having lived with it in an imaginative space, and thus be more liable to respond 
appropriately. Just so with literature, the simulation of emotion can enrich the resources I 
possess for confronting life-although not always, as is the case with banalliterature.24 
Though they may not be entirely identical, emotions elicited by reading fiction 
offer insight into the emotional lives of others (both fictive and real) by giving us-
however attenuated it may be-the ability to feel what it might feel like to have a certain 
kind of experience. In this creative aesthetic space, we can begin to imagine how others 
experience life as subjects-not as objects, or as extensions or projections ofthe self. It 
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is this exercise of the imagination that will be crucial for developing the resources 
necessary for emotional attending. In The Lovely Bones, for instance, Alice Sebold 
introduces us to a fourteen year-old girl, Susie Salmon, who is raped and murdered in the 
first chapter, and narrates the rest of the book from heaven. The rest of the story deals 
with the aftermath of her death, and how her family attempts to come to terms with it. 
Through Susie's eyes the reader begins to see what it might look like to love a victim of a 
violent crime-the initial panic of a missing child, the wrenching grief at the loss, the 
enduring pain and emptiness. The book is intensely affecting. And while, admittedly, 
there can be no equivalent between the emotions experienced by those who lose a loved 
one to violent crime and the emotions experienced when reading about the loss of a loved 
one to violent crime, the emotional understanding one receives by reading about this kind 
of experience gives one a sense of what it might feel like to lose someone to violence. 
The kind of subjective knowledge of what it is like to be X, if only in a partial way, 
allows one better to be able to attend to that person. 
It is imagination that allows for the transfer of knowledge gained from reading 
fiction to real life social interactions. And when it comes to emotional attending, 
imagination is a key component. In Chapter Four, I spent a great deal of time speaking 
about imagination-both moral and emotional. I will expand on that discussion here. 
Social interaction requires imagination-even on the most basic levels. Antonio 
Damasio writes: 
The somatic-marker account is thus compatible with the notion that 
effective personal and social behavior requires individuals to form adequate 
theories of their own minds and of the minds of others. On the basis of those 
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theories we can predict what theories others are forming about our own mind. The 
detail and accuracy of such prediction is, of course, essential as we approach a 
critical decision in a social situation. Again, the number of scenarios under 
scrutiny is immense, and my idea is that somatic markers (or something like 
them) assist the process of sifting through such a wealth of detail-in effect, 
reduce the need for sifting because they provide an automated detection of the 
scenario components which are more likely to be relevant. The partnership 
between so-called cognitive processes and processes usually called "emotional" 
should be apparent (Descartes' Error 174-5). 
The part of the brain responsible for imagining and predicting during social interactions 
has been dubbed by Leslie Brothers, the "social brain" (Brothers). Chris Frith explains 
that "it is the social brain that allows us to interact with other people. As with all our 
interactions with the world, we can do much better if we can predict what is going to 
happen next. The better we can predict what someone is going to do next, the more 
successful our interactions with that person will be" (671). This is so because all of life 
requires a degree of predictability. I have to be able to take a number of things for 
granted to get through the day. I need to be able to take for granted the prediction, for 
example, that when I drive down the road that people going the opposite way know that 
they are supposed to stay on the other side of the yellow line. I need to be able to predict 
with some certainty that the pills my pharmacist places in my medicine bottle are the 
correct ones. The same is true of my interactions with others on an emotional level. The 
better I am at predicting how my wife will respond to a given situation, the more likely I 
am to respond to her successfully. If I know that the anniversary of her father's death is 
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approaching, and that that anniversary causes an intensification of her grief, I will be 
better prepared to be with and for her. To accomplish this skill at predicting, we have 
developed highly skilled capacities for imagination. 
These capacities for imagination are linked to capacities for memory recall. 
Addis, Wong, and Schacter confirmed, through a tMRI study, the connection between the 
regions in the brain that mediate construction and elaboration of both past and future 
events (1363). In the study, participants, while undergoing tMRI scanning, were given 
cues about whether they were to recall a past event or imagine a future event. They were 
given a timeframe (e.g., last week/next week, last year/next year). Then, they were given 
a concrete episode (e.g., the birth of one's child). When they had the event in mind, they 
were to push a button, ending the construction phase, and beginning the elaboration 
phase-where the participants were asked "to expand the event representation by 
retrieving or generating as much detail as possible" within the twenty second time limit 
for each event (1366). What they found was that there was overlap in the neural system 
between past and future events-that is, between retrieval and prospective thinking-in 
both event construction and elaboration. Event elaboration, however, "was characterized 
by extensive overlap between past and future events" (1375). Addis et al. suggest that 
"this striking neural overlap is consistent with findings that amnesic patients exhibit 
deficits in both past and future thinking, and confirms that the episodic system 
contributes importantly to imagining the future" (1363). 
In other words, our imagination of future events, our ability to think prospectively 
about things that have not yet happened is closely linked to our ability to recall 
experiences from the past. We take past experiences and imaginatively reshape them to 
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fit new sets of circumstances. Having started new jobs in the past, for example, I am able 
to imagine what my first day on a new job will feel like. Having experienced the 
disappointment of losing a competition, I am able to begin to imagine what it might feel 
like for you to lose. Reading literature, therefore, enlarges the fund of emotional 
experience I need to expand the imaginative capacities I employ in emotional attending. 
To the extent that I am unable to draw on past experience, I am unable to imagine 
the future. 25 Imagination acts like a reassembly agent, building as yet unexperienced 
situations from the building blocks of past experience. David Hume believes something 
like this about the connection between memory and imagination. He argues that the mind 
receives sense impressions, which are then transformed into ideas. These ideas are then 
combined to form memories. Moreover, the ideas formed out of impressions can also be 
recombined in new and novel ways, which he calls the imagination. I see the tree, for 
example. My impression of the tree becomes an idea (e.g., a picture of the tree, the smell 
of the leaves, the feel of the bark, etc.), which I can recall as a representation of the tree 
in a memory. I can also use that idea of the tree, combine it with other ideas in my 
imagination to form other trees, or forests, or Ents from Middle Earth. This process of 
the recombination of ideas in imagination, according to Hume, is how we get "winged 
horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants" (11). I am arguing that this is how our 
minds work in calling upon the kinds of emotional experiences we have when we read 
literature to be used by our imaginations as we attend to the emotional lives of others. 
The emotions I experience when I read about the grief and anxiety of Susie Salmon's 
parents becomes something I can draw from to imagine the grief and anxiety of a parent 
to whom I attend in real life. 
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Someone might object that I am contradicting myself here by describing a way of 
knowing others that comes from my interiority-which I have previously said obscures 
my vision. That I have an interior life is something that I neither wish to dispute nor 
denigrate. Indeed, interiority, as I have said already, is the very place from which springs 
the kind of literature that takes seriously the emotional life of people. As I argued in 
Chapter Four, the problems presented by radical reflexivity have less to do with having 
an interior life-which is a good thing-than with believing that true knowledge of the 
world, of others, and of how we are to live morally are generated by the isolated self. It 
is, finally, a matter of humility. I see in the emotional lives of others not a mirror image, 
not merely an affirmation of my own emotional life, but a life in which the subtleties and 
complexities of a life narrative chart a course, often similar to my own, but always unique 
in their particularity. The inferences I draw from other people's life experience are 
always tempered by the humility that I may have gotten it wrong. Knowledge of others 
humbly drawn from my emotional experience and imagination and focused on another's 
complex life narrative seems a different kind of practice to me than the kind of colonizing 
certainty that everyone's emotional experiences and life are like my own. In the first 
instance, I try to take my cues about your emotions from attending to you in your 
particularity, while in the second instance I start from the premise that I already 
understand you, because I possess enough information about emotions and life in general, 
drawn from my own interior life. The question is finally: Is our knowledge of others 
generated from within and then applied (imposed?) on the emotional lives of others, or is 
our knowledge of others first a product of attending to them in their particularity? As I 
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have argued, I think the most helpful way to view our knowledge of others begins with 
our focus upon them, before it is ever directed back upon ourselves. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that reading literature offers an important means by which 
we increase our imaginative capacities. First, I suggested that reading literature helps us 
expand our moral imaginations by allowing us to adopt the process of moral reasoning of 
fictional characters, allowing us to understand the implications and consequences of a 
variety of moral perspectives. Second, I argued that reading literature expands our 
emotional imaginations through the simulation of the emotional experiences of fictional 
human lives-and that these emotional experiences in the reader track the emotional 
experiences of real life. In short, reading literature aids us in both the pursuit of virtue, as 
well as in our ability to engage in emotional attending. In the final chapter I will try to 
give a practical example of what I have been talking about by offering an analysis of the 





Richard Russo, in an interview about his book, Empire Falls, talks about his 
understanding of what literature can do. He says, "The thing that I would say about 
literature in general, the thing that I love most about it, is that when I'm in the world of a 
gifted writer I'm able to see that world through that writer's eyes, not my own" 
(http://www.identitytheory.comlpeople/birnbaum20.html). In Empire Falls Russo creates 
his own world in small town Maine, exploring the relationships of its inhabitants, in 
particular diner owner, Miles Roby, and his daughter, Tick. Of specific interest to Russo 
is the characters' lifelong effort to understand people within their world more fully. 
Miles, on a quest to understand others, begins to understand himself more fully as he sees 
himself not as the lead actor in a self-produced psychodrama, but as a human being 
embedded in a complex web of relationships. Miles recalls one of the things his mother 
always said about small towns "was that they accommodated just about everyone; the 
lame and the disfigured were all your neighbors, and seeing them every day meant that 
after a while you stopped noticing what made them different" (Russo 21, emphasis mine). 
In other words, seeing people as human beings embedded in a communal matrix, rather 
than as individuals abstracted from the communities that make their lives intelligible, 
255 
allows for a kind of sight, what I have called other sight, that focuses not on the 
peculiarities that are always open to abstraction. Abstraction, as I am using it, means 
being considered apart from the intricately woven fabric that makes up a life lived within 
community-while other sight means focusing on the whole person within the context of 
a community, an integrated human subject complete with all the particularities and 
idiosyncrasies that implies. 
Russo uses the metaphor of sight throughout the work, which, I will suggest, 
offers an opportunity to think epistemologically about knowing another-not in the 
scientific sense, as an object to be observed as if through a microscope, but as a subject to 
be regarded through the lens of love. By love I mean less a feeling than a commitment to 
taking the other person seriously on her or his terms-which is to say, in relationship to 
the other's life narrative-instead of as an object of study or as an extension of my own 
emotional needs. In the account of emotional attending I am developing, sight operates 
as a metaphorical synonym of attending. I watch you, I see you, and I am able to 
understand you better as a part of a whole, from whence derives your projects and goals, 
likes and dislikes, that which you care about, as well as that which you despise. 
I want to be clear at the outset of my discussion of Empire Falls, which is a novel 
about a small town in Maine, that I do not intend to sentimentalize small town life as an 
idyll, or as somehow superior to other communal living arrangements. Though small 
town life can share all the positive aspects of community, including intimacy, support, 
accountability, and so on, it can also achieve great heights of alienation, discouragement, 
and censure. In fact, neither should community per se be glorified as an unassailable 
good, since there can be communities, as I mentioned in Chapter Three, that have laid 
256 
down bad ends (telos), and are therefore malformative and destructive. Small towns, 
communities, families-all can accomplish wonderfully nurturing and sustaining 
environments in which people can flourish; they can also accomplish great evil. 
So far, I have tried to put forth an argument in which humans, through the 
ascendancy of reason and science, as well as through a turning to the self, have developed 
habits whereby we view others as atomic individuals, abstracted from the contexts that 
helped to produce them, and seen through the filter of Murdoch's "fat, relentless, ego." 
The metaphor of sight in this traditional epistemological sense, however, which has been 
the hallmark of Western ways of knowing the world, is inadequate as a manifestation of 
all life to the extent that it is a sight calibrated for seeing objects, for things, for analysis, 
for calculation-instead of a sight calibrated for seeing subjects, for motives, for 
intentions, for human beings. Hence, sight as a metaphor for reliable knowledge has 
done double duty-the sight of the eye (reason), and the sight of the heart (emotion). 
Unfortunately, though the metaphor of sight may be apt in both cases, we have often 
acted as though the knowing that relies on reason and the knowing that relies on emotion 
were the same process, the goal of which is the same. And while I have made a case for 
understanding knowing as a dynamic process involving both reason and emotion, that 
which is to be known-that is, object or subject--ought to determine the kind of process 
one uses to achieve reliable knowledge. Although most people would recoil from the 
thought that it is possible to know a proton through the same process by which it is 
possible to know a lover, nevertheless, we bring some of the same habits of mind to bear 
on the latter (abstraction, objectification, etc.) that we bring to the former.! 
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In this chapter I will trace, on the one hand, the development of the image of 
vision in Empire Falls, specifically how the nature of the knowledge of another changes 
between characters with the sharpening or blurring of the vision the characters have of 
one another. I will try to show how the modification of one's vision of another as a 
subject allows for the discovery or recognition of new knowledge about the world the 
subject inhabits (c.f., Murdoch's Sovereignty of Good 51ff.).2 This knowledge of others 
as subjects within community also constitutes a framework in which our actions take on 
moral significance, becoming morally intelligible as expressions of communal life, rather 
than as universal maxims to be satisfied or utilitarian calculations-both of which, as I 
argued in Chapter One, encourage the kind of abstraction that is counterproductive to 
intersubjectivity. On the other hand, I will also examine how one's self-understanding 
undergoes modification. Put differently, when seeing with other sight, one is freed up to 
view oneself through the eyes of others, helping to reshape one's understanding of 
oneself. Next, I will explore the way a flourishing community is created by emotional 
attending and threatened by bad attending. That is to say, I will focus on the way that 
viewing others as subjects with their own projects and desires fosters an atmosphere in 
which the intersubjectivity necessary for human flourishing can occur, and in the absence 
of which, that intersubjectivity is threatened-intersubjectivity being a state of affairs in 
which I am freed up to be with and for another. I will also make the claim that 
community is bound together by more than the positive feelings each member is able to 
generate. Finally, I will seek to use Empire Falls to illustrate how the simulation of 
emotional states during reading, which I set down in Chapter Five, provides the reader 
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with an opportunity to begin to expand her understanding of emotions through the use of 
imagination, and therefore, her capacity for emotional attending. 
I. Other Sight: The Lens of Love 
Miles Roby, who dropped out of college after his junior year to look after his 
dying mother, took over the management of the Empire Grill as a way to support himself. 
What began as a temporary job to help Miles make ends meet turned into his life's work. 
Of course, it is the dawning realization that his life-which everyone believed held such 
promise in the beginning-has consisted mainly of his attempts to keep a failing 
restaurant in the declining town of Empire Falls above water that provides the narrative 
tension in the book. The town of Empire Falls, once a prosperous lumber and textile 
producer under the oversight of generations of the Whiting family, has fallen on difficult 
economic times. It is the widow of the last scion of the Whiting empire, Francine 
Whiting, who owns the Empire Grill, and who uses her power to manipulate the town in 
general, and Miles in particular. 
The story involves the interactions that take place in a small town between people 
trying to negotiate often complicated relationships. Miles, for example, tries to figure out 
how to parent his precocious teenage daughter, Tick. At the same time, Miles must deal 
with his ex-wife, Janine, and her fiance, Walt Comeau-both of whom are selfish and 
venal-and their impending wedding, his insightful but troubled brother, David, an 
obnoxious police officer (Miles's childhood neighbor), Jimmy Minty, the intrepid Mrs. 
Whiting, Miles' cadging father, Max, as well as a host of other townspeople, many of 
whom work at or frequent the Empire Grill. 
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While Russo employs the perspective of multiple characters in the novel, the plot 
largely revolves around Miles' attempt to keep the Empire Grill open amid the economic 
pressures of a declining population and shrinking job market-at least until Mrs. Whiting 
dies, at which time he has been promised that he will become the owner of the Empire 
Grill. In the process of trying to hold a shaky business together, Miles also finds himself 
trying to hold together relationships with family and friends, which are threatened by all 
manner of domestic troubles, not to mention the problems associated with living in a 
dying town. Miles' relationship to his daughter, Tick, acts as a moral center for the novel 
by concentrating on how two people can continue to try to keep one another in focus 
during the inevitable change each undergoes. Over the course of the novel, Miles faces a 
number of questions about whether he should stay at the Empire Grill or strike out on his 
own, about how he should deal with the demands on his time and his loyalties, about his 
responsibilities toward his family, his friends, and his town. 
The climactic scene in the novel, however, centers on a school shooting. John 
Voss, a high school student in Tick's art class, launches a fatal attack witnessed by Tick. 
A great deal of attention is paid to how the town receives John Voss, and what sorts of 
things compel someone to such violent acts. Of significance to the plot and the trajectory 
of the growth of the characters is the fallout from the shooting on Miles and Tick and 
their relationship. Russo explores the kind of complicated context out of which can 
emerge both great acts of love and great acts of violence. 
The book implicitly poses the question about whether the measure of a life is best 
understood as the sum total of one's achievements or as the quality of the relationships to 
which one devotes oneself. Judged by the former, Miles sees his life as a failure, defined 
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by an expanding list of missed opportunities. We become increasingly aware that the 
value of Miles' life in the dying town of Empire Falls changes dramatically when the 
measure of its success is recalibrated to standards that take into account love and loyalty, 
compassion and commitment. Despite the fact that the town of Empire Falls can produce 
such goods, though, it cannot escape the fact that it is equally capable of producing 
treachery, selfishness, and hatred. Such an insight into the human condition, of course, is 
not novel. What makes Richard Russo's narration of this insight noteworthy, though, lies 
in his attention to attention-which is to say, his concentration on the ways that attending 
(and failing to attend) to others is revelatory, both of the person who is attended to and of 
the one who seeks truth through emotional attending. Russo uses vision effectively to 
draw the reader's attention to the way that characters see, or fail to see, one another. That 
is to say, the metaphor of sight offers cues to the reader about whether a character is 
successfully attending to another, by concentrating on whether the subject being attended 
to is seen clearly or is out of focus. The quality of the relationships produced through 
emotional attending bespeak a strength through which community may be sustained, even 
though economic distress seems to be unraveling the social fabric. However, when 
emotional attending is not achieved, when relationships fail, as they sometimes do in 
Empire Falls, those failures threaten the community. 
Emotional attending in Empire Falls, as 1 have mentioned, is highlighted through 
Richard Russo's use of the metaphor of sight. The role of sight in everyday life is always 
multivalent, operating on an empirical, sensory level, which leads to its traditional 
Western usage as an epistemological metaphor. That is to say, "I see that the bird is on 
the wire" operates as a propositional statement about the location of the bird, a verifiable 
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report of the way things really are. Additionally, though, sight operates on a level seen as 
much less certain. If! say, "I see that she is confused," I seem to be making the same 
kind of propositional statement about the way things really are. But because my 
statement does not admit of rational or empirical verification, its status as knowledge is 
judged to be inferior. But sight under this second description, as a way of understanding 
and reporting human emotions and motives, though not open to the same sorts of 
verification as other ways of knowing, is as important to negotiating a fully flourishing 
human life as the empirical sense of sight. This second kind of sight I have called other 
sight, which I will use more or less as roughly synonymous with emotional attending. I 
must take just a moment to call to mind my discussion of other sight in Chapter Four. 
Other sight, on my account, is the understanding of another that comes through emotional 
attending. Both kinds of sight-physical sight and other sight-give us knowledge of the 
world, but in fundamentally different ways. Other sight is similar to Murdoch's idea in 
The Sovereignty olGood_of seeing another "justly or lovingly" (22). When she 
distinguishes seeing another "accurately" from seeing another "justly or lovingly," she 
calls attention to the different ways of seeing--one way of seeing that is concerned with 
objective precision in observation, and the other way with seeing another as a human 
subject caught up in a complex and vastly connected life narrative. She describes what I 
mean by other sight quite nicely when she speaks of "the progressive attempt to see a 
particular object clearly," a progressive process that is "infinitely perfectible" (23). The 
progressive and perfectible nature of the kind of sight she refers to as just and loving is 
what I will call the image of the lens oflove. To think of a loving or just lens through 
which another is seen, reinforces the infinitely perfectible nature of emotionally attending 
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to another. The subject to which I am attending, the person I am watching, is dynamic, 
moving, changing. As a consequence, my focus will have to be constantly adjusted so 
that I can keep the subject in focus. Emotional attending is, as I have said in Chapter 
Four, less like science than virtue, since one can never achieve a definitive vision of 
another. 
Knowledge of another in the traditional Western epistemological sense, while 
useful as a descriptor of those parts of a person open to propositional verifiability, can be 
in the case of other sight a failure truly to see another as a human subject, just to the 
extent that by reciting propositions about another, one may be tempted to believe one 
knows her. I may be able to describe my wife accurately-the color of her hair, the date 
of her birth, the kind of clothes she wears, and so on-but not truly know her. In fact, I 
may in practice substitute the verifiable knowledge I have about her for true knowledge 
of her as a subject, thereby failing to see her with other sight. So, the habits of objective 
observation we hold up as the standard of true knowledge for the purposes of describing 
everything from gravity to the mating habits of ground squirrels we are tempted 
(conditioned?) to bring to the observation of human subjects-which, if taken by itself as 
the only knowledge we may reliably possess of another, can but prove deceptive. 
Furthermore, because of the tum to the self, which I argue in Chapter One has 
become a reality in Western thought, my habits of mind might produce nothing more than 
a distorted picture of another that looks curiously more like me and my prejudices and 
assumptions than the person about whom I believe myself to possess knowledge. I know 
myself to be unprincipled and self-serving, for instance, when it comes to _____ _ 
(fill in the blank). Therefore, I assume that given the same set of circumstances your 
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motives and desires will mirror my own. It is in the phrase "mirror my own" that the 
nature of the potential distortion becomes apparent. Because, while your motives and 
desires may reflect my own, I cannot know whether this is true entirely through either 
objective observation or introspective reflection. The process of knowing whether your 
motives and desires "mirror my own" can only be known over the course of time, through 
a commitment to attending to you and to why you do what you do and why you care 
about what you care about. Perceiving motives and desires is a significant part of what it 
means to attend to the emotional life of another. 
In Empire Falls, Miles Robey's daughter, Tick, is apprised of the penchant for 
projection of oneself onto others in a conversation with John Voss, who will bear close 
watching as the book reaches its climax. John Voss, a socially awkward and shy teenager 
in Tick's art class, is someone for whom Tick feels a great deal of sympathy. The fact 
that John Voss is a social outcast does not deter Tick from trying to engage him in 
conversation. Since she is the only character in the book who makes any real effort to get 
to know him, we see Tick's sensitivity to others as a sign that, though she is a teenager, 
she possesses an emotional depth not demonstrated even by most of the adults in the 
novel. In Tick, therefore, we find a character through whom the reader may begin the 
difficult task of trying to see the world through John Voss' eyes; and it is a difficult task, 
given his social and emotional isolation. Tick, in one scene faces the problem of 
projection faced even by those who show some proficiency in emotional attending. She 
asks at one point why John Voss hasn't depicted one of his dreams in a painting-an 
assignment for art class. He tells her the reason is because he never dreams. Tick says, 
"Everybody dreams." 
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He meets her eye for the first time now, reminding her of something, she 
can't quite think what. "You're one person," he says, as if to suggest that's just as 
well, that he wouldn't have wished her to replicate. 
"True," she allows. "So?" 
"So, how does that qualify you to know what everybody in the world does 
or doesn't do?" 
Tick, having already had this conversation with her father, feels pretty 
confident of the intellectual terrain. "It's called an inference," she says. If she 
were certain she could speak with such authority in class, she wouldn't be so 
quiet. "I infer that no two snow-flakes are alike. I don't have to examine 
everyone." 
The boy doesn't miss a beat. "That's not a very good example," he says, 
as if he, too, may have had a similar conversation before. "When you say that I 
must dream because you do, you're inferring that nobody can be different from 
you, not that everybody must be similar" (182-3). 
In this exchange John Voss strikes at the heart of the issue by pointing out the kind of 
hubris it requires to believe that one's inner life provides a normative example that other 
lives necessarily follow. Again, the problem is not the having of an inner life or seeing 
one's inner life as analogous, but the assumption that one's inner life is normative. 
To understand others I must attend to them in an entirely different way from the 
way I customarily go about pursuing knowledge. What I take to be a lens through which 
I view others may tum out to be either a microscope that offers up pieces of a person 
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abstracted from the whole or a mirror in which I view only an image of myself that I 
mistakenly take to be the image of another. This tendency to abstract or objectify 
another, as well as the tendency to project from a normative inner life onto another, I will 
call bad attending. Bad attending not only fails to give us a good understanding of 
another, but because the practice itself is transparent to us, it can be doubly harmful, 
providing illusions we believe to have been arrived at through objective observation, 
through introspective reflection, or, more likely, through a combination of the two. 
In contrast to bad attending, good emotional attending takes place when there is a 
commitment to viewing another as a particular individual located within a shared social 
matrix, both a contributor to and a product of community, a subject complete with 
projects and desires. In Empire Falls Miles Roby works to understand his teenage 
daughter, Tick, by emotionally attending to her as she evolves from, what he believes to 
be, a simple child into a complicated adolescent. Miles assumes that the difficulty he has 
in understanding his daughter has something to do with his divorce from Tick's mother, 
Janine, although he is not entirely sure. He suspects that the change in his relationship 
with Tick has just as much to do with him as with her. Nevertheless, he focuses his 
attention on Tick, trying to understand how their relationship has changed: 
Since spring he couldn't seem to get Tick to stand still long enough to get a good 
fix on her. She was maturing, of course, becoming a young woman instead of a 
kid, and he grasped that there were certain things going on with her that he didn't 
understand because he wasn't supposed to. Still, it troubled him to feel so out of 
sync. Too often he found himself needing to see her, as if only her physical 
presence could reassure him of her well-being; yet when she did appear, she 
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seemed different from the girl he'd been needing and worrying about. The week 
they'd spent together on the Vineyard had been wonderful, and by the end of it 
he'd felt much more in tune with Tick than at any time since he and Janine had 
separated. But since they'd come home, the disconnected feeling had returned 
with a vengeance, as if losing sight of her might lead to tragic consequences (29-
30). 
This excerpt bears comment for a few reasons, apart from the fact that it sets 
down vision as an important metaphor for understanding the emotional lives of others. 
First, through Miles the reader is invited into the difficult experience at the heart of other 
sight-that of attempting to focus on "a moving target." The reader gets a sense of the 
frustration involved in continually trying to understand the emotional life of another. 
Miles cannot bring Tick into focus for very long at anyone time, because she is 
continually moving, changing, growing. Second, Miles demonstrates the extent to which 
we are always in danger of conflating physical sight with other sight-as if the two 
constitute essentially the same practice. He feels a need to see Tick's observable physical 
presence as a way of reassuring himself that she is all right. Of course, what Miles is 
really worried about-that is, her wholeness as a human being-is only betokened by her 
physical presence. What he really wants to "get a good fix on" is her emotional presence, 
her health (physical, emotional, social, and so on) as a developing human subject. In 
attending to his daughter, Miles seeks to understand the extent to which she is 
flourishing. Third, Miles's intuition that "losing sight of her might lead to tragic 
consequences" both signifies his belief that he must be vigilant in keeping Tick in focus 
ifhe is to understand her, as well as foreshadows his belief that his failure to see Tick 
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clearly will ultimately contribute to her proximity to the tragedy that comes at the end of 
the book. 
Miles, though he seeks to attend to his daughter, sometimes misses important 
cues. As the father of a teenage daughter, Miles is prone to idealizing her-which is to 
say, to seeing her still as an innocent little girl, in need of protection. Miles, like many 
other fathers, appears reluctant to see his daughter grow up. The reader senses the 
struggle in Miles between genuinely wanting to see his daughter clearly and needing to 
see her as the little girl he can still shield from the dangers of the world. Through the 
struggle in Miles the reader is invited to experience the conflicting impulses that make 
other sight such a difficult exercise. In one scene Tick, who, at her prior year's physical, 
was deemed underweight, is watched vigilantly by one of the waitresses at the diner for 
signs of under eating. However, Miles fails to notice her artful penchant for pushing food 
around the plate in an attempt to fool him into thinking she has eaten. Janine, Tick's 
mother and Miles's soon to be ex-wife, realizes Miles has a "blind spot" when it comes to 
seeing Tick clearly, and complains that Tick is taking advantage of her father, that Miles 
is too easy on her. Miles objects to the implicit assertion that he is not paying sufficient 
attention to Tick as a burgeoning young adult by saying that "she's just a kid." Tick, at 
sixteen, of course, is no longer "just a kid." And the fact that Miles believes this still to 
be the case points up the extent to which he must refocus to get a true picture of Tick. In 
pointing this fact out, Janine pantomimes thrusting a spoon into her temple "as if to drive 
it home," saying, "Miles. You're wrong. First, she's not a kid. You don't believe me, 
just look at her. Try using the eyes you look at other people with" (110). Miles, prone to 
idealizing Tick, is shown his failure to attend to his daughter, to see her with other sight; 
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instead he sees an image of Tick that is more a product of his own needs than a true 
vision of who she is. 
Though Miles is just as prone to distorting the image of others through projecting 
his own needs onto them, the book continually shows him making an honest attempt to 
see others clearly. Sitting in Francine Whiting's office-a wealthy dowager and the 
owner of the Empire Grill, which Miles manages-Miles looks at the portraits of the 
Whiting men-owners of the big textile mill in Empire Falls. The mill, now closed, 
stands as not only a symbol of the fortunes of the town; but, as its largest employer, it 
bears (at least in part) a causal connection to the general decline of the town and the 
accompanying malaise. The Whiting men, including Mrs. Whiting's dead husband, 
Charlie, as founders and managers of the mill are associated with a more robust economy 
in Empire Falls, and are therefore widely viewed in town with nostalgia. That the 
Whiting men have left a mixed legacy to Empire Falls is not widely (or publicly) 
acknowledged. Miles, however, does not succumb to easy sentimentality, understanding 
the part that the mill and the Whiting men have played in fouling the local environment, 
and leaving many people jobless after closing the mill. An interesting dynamic develops 
over the years between Miles and Mrs. Whiting that Miles is hard-pressed to understand. 
What Mrs. Whiting knows-and what Miles does not yet know at this point, but will find 
out later-is that Miles' mother, Grace, at one time had an affair with Mrs. Whiting's 
husband, Charlie. And though Grace tries to atone for her transgression by taking over 
the care of the Whiting's disabled daughter, Mrs. Whiting's relationship with Miles 
carries with it an undertone of hostility, manifested in her attempts to manipulate him. 
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Mrs. Whiting, whose failed marriage-only one in a long line of failed Whiting 
marriages---causes her also to regard the Whiting men with a certain bitterness, turns to 
look at one of the portraits of Elijah Whiting, remarking that "they were all mad as 
hatters, you know. In one way or another. You can see it lurking behind their eyes if you 
look" (60). And though Miles isn't burdened by his own needs to see them through the 
false lens of bathos the way that much of the rest of the town seems to need to see them, 
neither does he need to see them through the lens of Mrs. Whiting's animosity. Miles, 
released from his own ego needs, "did look, though he didn't see what he was supposed 
to. There was a quality of zealousness perhaps, of bigotry maybe, but not insanity" (60). 
Miles demonstrates an admirable commitment to other sight, to trying to see beyond 
himself to see others justly or lovingly. Miles is able, because of his commitment to 
seeing people in context, instead of as abstractions (or, in this case, as symbols) or as 
extensions of his own ego needs, to see the Whiting men for what they were: flawed 
human beings, capable of offering economic and civic goods to the community, while 
also tearing at the fabric of the community through the ultimate recklessness of their 
personal and business decisions. 
Miles' commitment to other sight extends beyond seeing relative strangers clearly 
to attempting to see those closest to him justly and lovingly. In a scene involving Miles 
and two of his greatest antagonists, Miles's father, Max, and Miles's childhood neighbor, 
Jimmy Minty, we find that other sight cuts both ways. In the scene, Miles and his father, 
Max, are seated at a window booth at the donut shop. Miles regards Max, whom he 
considers shiftless, lazy, and the possessor of atrocious grooming habits, and wonders 
why his beautiful mother had ever been attracted to him, suspecting that to love Max, she 
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had had to "overlook" him. The word overlook is deceptive, inasmuch as what is meant 
is not that in order to love Max, Miles's mother had to quit looking at him, but that 
because Max generally cuts such an unsavory figure, she must look at him with other 
sight through the lens of love-seeing in him not what others see, but what she believes 
is truly there unseen by everyone else. 
Miles's reflections on his mother's love for his father cause him to study Max, 
offering the observation to Max that he has crumbs in his beard. The crumbs in Max's 
beard act as a kind of visual shorthand for the kind of person Max is in Miles' 
estimation-that is, sloppy, lazy, and unconcerned with what others think of him. Miles 
refers to his father as "a walking appetite suppressant" (89). What ensues is a long 
conversation that eventually leads to Max asking for money, a common but unwelcome 
practice that brings great aggravation to Miles. 
In due course, Max excuses himself to use the restroom. While he is gone, Jimmy 
Minty, uninvited, joins Miles in the booth, and proceeds to aggravate him even further. 
Jimmy starts needling Miles about the fact that Miles' car is rusting, causing Miles to 
reflect on the annoying habit Jimmy has always displayed by using Miles as a kind of 
yardstick against which to judge his own success-especially financially. Miles reflects 
that Jimmy has a "way of taking inventory behind his eyes" (91). Before Max returns 
from the restroom, Jimmy asks if that was Max he saw sitting at the table with Miles 
before he came in. Miles, says that it was, in fact, Max, and that Jimmy knows it was 
Max, since Jimmy sat outside in his car staring into the window where Miles and Max 
sat. Jimmy, in what will become an important insight later for Miles, protests that he 
couldn't see in the window because of the glare. The glare operates as a metaphor for the 
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way that Jimmy, because of his self-absorption, is unable to see others clearly. And in 
this case, even when he does see clearly, he lies about it. The reader is invited to 
experience Jimmy as someone prone (inveterately, it would seem) to the dishonesty that 
encourages bad attending. 
When Max finally returns from the restroom, he sees Jimmy sitting in the booth 
and slides in next to him. The first thing Max says is, "Jimmy Minty. My God what a 
stupid kid you were growing up." Max, with a smile on his face, continues to reminisce 
about what a "stupid kid" Jimmy Minty was, making Jimmy visibly uncomfortable. 
Miles, who does not like Jimmy, smiles to himself knowing that "few social situations 
were improved by Max Roby's participation, but this was one of them" (94). However, 
Max soon turns his sights, offering a variety of insults about Miles, who refuses to give 
him any money (which Max wants so he can go down to the Florida Keys for the winter) 
or to hire him to help Miles paint the church that Miles has volunteered to paint. 
Eventually, Miles excuses himself and leaves Max and Jimmy in the booth. 
Sitting outside in his car, Miles looks through the window to see Max and Jimmy 
still seated on the same bench in the booth. His father starts to knock on the window, 
trying to get Miles's attention. Miles, reluctant to look up, finally does, and "is 
immediately glad that he did, for the scene framed in the window was priceless. In order 
to rap on the glass, Max had to lean across the booth in such a way that his moist, 
fragrant armpit was practically covering the policeman's face. Miles couldn't help but 
smile. He was grateful for his father's existence, just as Minty told him he should be" 
(96). Seeing his father "framed in the window" gives him an opportunity to view him 
through a different lens from the one he normally uses. In a brief moment of clarity, 
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Miles is offered a picture of his father through other sight that takes all of his annoying 
characteristics into account, and finds a way to view them as-rather than sources of 
aggravation-the lineaments of a person for whom he is abidingly grateful. This small 
epiphany does not mean that Miles will no longer be impatient with his father; but it does 
mean that rather than settle for an understanding of his father that suits his own picture of 
the way things are, Miles's willingness to employ love as a lens gives him a broader, and 
I would argue, truer, picture of Max. This framing of Max is a way to offer the reader 
perspective on what it feels like to have strongly negative feelings for another person, 
which are, from time to time, recalibrated so that a completely different picture emerges. 
Like M's view ofD in Murdoch's example from Chapter Four, we get a glimpse of the 
kind of gestalt that occurs in Miles. We see Max from Miles' newly acquired point of 
view, not as ignorantly socially crude, but as someone self-aware enough to know how he 
"comes off" to others without being overly concerned by it. The reader is given access to 
what this kind of change in perspective, no matter how brief, might feel like. 
At the same time, Miles also sees Jimmy Minty more clearly. In this case, 
however, his vision crystallizes his assessment of Jimmy as meretricious and deceitful. 
Russo writes of Miles: 
As he watched the two men slide out of the booth, he realized that Jimmy 
Minty hadn't been telling the truth about light reflecting off the donut shop 
window. Everything on the other side of the glass possessed the stark clarity of 
an Edward Hopper painting, which meant that Jimmy had pretended to be unable 
to see what had been plainly visible. A silly lie. A lie so small and to so little 
purpose that it suggested to Miles a way of life, a strategy for confronting the 
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world, and this was further reason-if any was needed-to doubt the truth of 
everything the man had said inside (97). 
Miles, since childhood, has been constructing an image of Jimmy as "sneaky and mean 
and envious and dangerous" (99). Whether it is because Jimmy wants Miles' approval or 
because he wants to prove himself superior to Miles, Miles resents being used as the yard 
stick against which Jimmy measures his own self-worth. Jimmy is the kid Miles is glad 
to have changed high schools to escape. In seeing Jimmy framed in the window-having 
caught him out in a meaningless lie-Miles experiences a clarifying of his thoughts about 
Jimmy's character that allows the reader to encounter this shift in vision once again from 
Miles' viewpoint. 3 
This reframing of Jimmy in the window points up an important reality about other 
sight and the lens of love, which has to do with both the nature of love as well as the 
practice oflooking at another justly or lovingly. Love in common usage means 
something like feeling favorably disposed toward another, or feeling strong affection 
toward another. Lest my use of the lens oflove be misunderstood to be merely a gilding 
of our images of one another, it is important to point out what I mean when I speak about 
love. As I have indicated, the love that stands as the lens through which we see others 
has less to do with feelings of affection, or even favorable disposition toward another, 
than with an attitude with which we view others as subjects worthy of our just attention, 
as worth taking seriously, and ultimately as worthy of giving uptake.4 When love is 
spoken of in our culture, its use is often associated with romance or fond sentiment, as 
with one's lover or one's friends or family. Its use commonly connotes feelings with 
strongly positive valence. Love, however, if only in common sense ways has as much to 
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do with a commitment to another than with feelings toward another. That is not to say 
that the feelings of love are somehow unimportant; only that were love to exist merely as 
a positive feeling, one's relationship to the object of one's love would always be an open 
question, depending on one's feelings at any given moment. But love cannot operate 
solely as a feeling, since one does not feel continuously affectionate or positively 
disposed toward the beloved. If, for example, my love for my children depended on 
feelings of affection, I could regularly be accused of not loving my children when they 
disappoint me, or annoy me, or anger me. To say, "I love my children" is a different kind 
of statement from, "I am disappointed with my children." The first implies a state; the 
second can be either a state (as in, "I am perpetually disappointed in my children, since 
they have repeatedly failed to keep in touch with me.") or a simple episode (as in, "I am 
disappointed with my children, since I told them to load the dishwasher when I left, and 
they did not."). 
Love as a state or commitment suggests a boundary inside which all sorts of 
emotions (often conflicting) can roam about without necessarily threatening the 
commitment. If I were to wait for these feelings of affection to emerge before acting 
lovingly toward my children, I could not parent them. Were I to need a swell of fondness 
to lodge itself in my heart before being prompted to act lovingly toward them, diapers 
would often go unchanged, meals would go uncooked, and tuition would go unpaid. I 
make these loving gestures even when I don't feel particularly solicitous or favorably 
disposed toward my children, because my love for them transcends my feelings for them 
at anyone time. Love as a state of commitment helps to explain how it is that one can 
simultaneously love and despise the same person. 
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Again, I am aware that I risk being misunderstood when I say that Miles looks 
lovingly at Jimmy Minty, since Miles's general feelings toward Jimmy involve antipathy, 
verging often on hatred. In fact, at one point, Miles breaks Jimmy's nose in an 
unprovoked act of hostility. However, I want to suggest that the commitment to 
community that runs throughout the novel, Empire Falls, requires more than positive 
feelings toward everyone. True community, where intersubjectivity is a possibility, 
requires a commitment to taking everyone seriously, to seeing them justly, to seeking to 
understand them in all their complexity, and not as we need for them to be. Miles, in 
continually working to see both Max and Jimmy clearly, foregoes the easier route of a 
static vision of them as set pieces in his own psychodrama, upon whom he can 
uncritically superimpose his own self-serving picture of who they are. Instead, Miles 
continually revises his understanding of those within the community-which is to say, 
even those he does not seem to like-in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of those 
who populate the world he inhabits. 
Not all attending that goes on in community is emotional attending in a good 
sense. There exists, as I have suggested, bad attending-viewing others either as objects, 
abstracted from their life narrative or falsely through the filter of the "fat, relentless ego." 
Jimmy Minty, in another scene, sits again in his car waiting to be seen by Miles. Jimmy 
begins to think about his own father, a wife beater and small time thief, remembering his 
father's theories about how power is allocated in the world, such that a nameless "they" 
have everything figured out, even down to "who they'll let you marry" (281). Jimmy 
remembers thinking that he wants to choose his eventual wife-somebody like Miles's 
mother, Grace Roby. 
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From where Jimmy sat in the living room he was able to see the Roby 
house across the driveway. Many evenings Miles's mother would pass behind 
their living room window, sometimes stopping to pull the curtains shut. At nine 
years old, Jimmy had thought Mrs. Roby the prettiest woman he'd ever seen, 
including girls, and he wondered what it would be like to live in the same house 
as her. He guessed maybe it'd be different if she was your own mother, but he 
couldn't imagine not having the hots for Mrs. Roby, no matter whose mother she 
was. He'd caught his father looking across the way a couple times, too. Jimmy 
had even made the mistake of telling Miles how lucky he was having her for a 
mother, all to himself, most of the time, Mr. Roby being gone as much as he was 
home. He'd also asked Miles ifhe'd ever seen his mother naked, hoping for a 
description, and Miles hadn't spoken a word to him for a week, until he 
apologized which Jimmy was quick to do, because he was afraid Miles would tell 
his mother that he was a dirty boy" (281-2). 
Jimmy attends to Grace, but in a bad way. His gaze is framed in such a way that she 
becomes an object to be leered at, not a human being to be appreciated.5 It might be 
objected that this is a memory about a nine year-old boy, doing what nine year-old boys 
often do. I would agree that there is nothing exceptional about a young boy staring at a 
pretty woman. However, this is a story in which this particular anecdote is intended to be 
illuminative of Jimmy Minty's character. That the grown Jimmy Minty has this memory 
in the context of the story is intended to reveal something about the continuity of 
Jimmy's character-that is, as one who is the kind of person prone from very early on 
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(and influenced by his father) to objectifying others. In fact, even Jimmy's son, Zack, 
who has had a previous relationship with Tick, is shown as a teenager to have an 
untrustworthy character. Miles hopes that a boy whom Tick has met on a vacation to 
Martha's Vineyard will "free his daughter from any lingering attraction she might feel for 
a boy [i.e., Zack] who, like his father and grandfather before him, bore more or less 
constant watching" (40). Jimmy is framed for the reader as someone who comes from, 
and contributes, to a long line of men of vicious character; and Zack is framed in the 
same way. 
In two scenes involving Jimmy Minty, the view of others is both literally and 
metaphorically framed through a window. What is different is not the physical act of 
seeing, but the relationship of the spectator to the one being seen-good emotional 
attending versus bad attending. In the first case, the frame through which Miles sees Max 
and Jimmy reveals Max in a positive way, while Jimmy is viewed negatively-but in 
both cases the view offers clarification about the ones being viewed, since Miles sees 
with other sight. In the second case, Jimmy sees Grace Roby framed in a way that 
reduces her to a body to be possessed, a vision that obscures rather than reveals who she 
really is. It seems to me that Russo is aware of the metaphorical power of framing to 
objectify women-a commonplace of modern Western culture. However, by using a 
device that frames people in windows, under diverse circumstances, Russo helps to show 
that the vision of another is never straightforward. One can gain clarity of vision by 
gazing intently on another as a subject, or one can gaze at another in a distorting way that 
conceals as it abstracts and objectifies. Both are possibilities. 
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Jimmy Minty and Francine Whiting offer a moral and emotional counterpoint in 
the novel to Miles and Tick. While Miles and Tick commit themselves to seeing others 
justly and lovingly, Jimmy Minty and Francine Whiting allow the reader to get a glimpse 
of the kind of character given over to bad attending. Selfish and conniving, Jimmy and 
Mrs. Whiting help the reader to understand that though the community can survive those 
whose emotional selfishness is evidenced by bad attending, their presence is ultimately 
corrosive. Additionally, not everyone in a community needs to get along, since the 
community is bound together by something stronger than any individual's personal 
preferences-that is, by some good or set of goods held in common by the community. 
Another particularly telling scene of bad attending occurs when Miles is at the 
rectory of the Catholic Church, speaking with the young priest, Father Mark. The retired 
priest, Father Tom, who is suffering from the beginning stages of dementia, happens 
upon the conversation. In an act of bad attending, he fixes "Miles with a particularly 
menacing glare," and proceeds to call him "an evil bastard" (49). 
"This is no evil bastard, Tom," Father Mark said calmly. "This is Miles, 
our most faithful parishioner. You baptized him and you married his parents." 
"I know who he is," Father Tom said. "He's a peckerhead and his mother 
was a whore. I told her so too." 
Miles sat back down. This wasn't the first time the old man inspired by 
only God knew what, had taken one look at Miles and offered a poor opinion of 
his moral character, though he'd never before insulted the memory of Miles's 
mother. This was clearly the man's dementia talking, but for the second time that 
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afternoon Miles fleetingly considered how satisfying it would be to send another 
human being into the next world. This time, a priest. 
"Look at him. Look at that face. He knows it's true," the old man said, 
taking in Miles's paint-splattered overalls. "He's a filthy degenerate is what he is. 
He's tracking his filth into my house" (49-50). 
Father Mark tries to reason with the demented Father Tom to no avail. Father Tom 
continues to insist that Miles is "a peckerhead." 
Father Mark, his patience exhausted, slid out of the booth and took him by 
the shoulders, rotating him gently but firmly. "Tom," he said, "look at me." 
When he continued to glare at Miles, Father Mark placed the tips of his fingers on 
the old man's stubbled chin, turning his head. "Look at me, Tom." 
Finally he did, and his expression instantly morphed from disgust to 
shame (50). 
A couple of important things happen in this scene that are noteworthy for my 
purposes. First, the whole idea of vision as the epistemological gateway to knowledge is 
reinforced. The knowledge that Father Tom arrives at about Miles comes from the way 
he looks at Miles. However, the way Father Tom attends to Miles is bad; his "menacing 
glare," is historically the one that he has used to view Miles. This glare, however, once 
again fails to reveal anything about Miles, but very much about Father Tom-which 
leads to the second notable point, having to do with the coupling of bad attending and 
dementia. Russo cleverly juxtaposes Father Tom's dementia with his inability to see 
Miles. What Father Tom continues to see when he glares at Miles is a picture that has 
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nothing to do with who Miles really is (i.e., the parish's "most faithful parishioner), and 
everything to do with the barrier to Father Tom's sight-dementia. In effect, the reader 
is invited to make the connection between the loss of mental capacities that attends 
dementia and the inability accurately to attend to another person. I would not want to 
press the connection between dementia and bad attending too far, but its presence in the 
story summons the reader to assess the extent to which there is a relationship between 
Father Tom's bad attending and his gradual loss of himself. What is worth noting, 
however, is the impression we are left with that, though dementia is the obstacle to a clear 
vision of another in this instance, bad attending is characterized less by pathology than by 
a consistent failure to see another person in ways that reflect who he really is. 
The view of others we receive from emotional attending does not tell the whole 
story, though. As I argued in Chapter Four, the way we understand the world does not 
come first from an interrogation of interiority, but through the way we are formed in 
community. I understand the world primarily not by radical reflexivity, but through the 
reflections of others. Emotional attending is an exchange, one in which one hopes to get 
a clearer image of another person, but additionally, one in which a view of oneself 
reflected in the eyes of another assists in providing a clearer vision of oneself. It is to this 
second part of emotional attending in Empire Falls we must now tum. 
II. The Mirror of Love 
In the previous section I mentioned that often what poses as knowledge of another 
is merely a projection of the self. Returning to the metaphor of sight, I suggested that 
rather than focusing upon another through a lens of love, it often turns out to be the case 
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that vision is focused on a mirror instead of a lens. Hence, what one sees is not another 
subject, but the distorted reflection of oneself. What I want to argue in this section is 
that, counter-intuitive as it sounds, when I employ other sight to view another, the clarity 
with which I see the other also allows the mirror of another to reflect to me images of 
who I am in another's eyes. If, when I view others what I see is a distorted image of 
myself, then I gain neither real knowledge of others, nor real knowledge of myself. 
There are mirrors when attending to another that can clarify rather than distort, but clarity 
requires that the image viewed also first be viewed through the lens of love. It is 
possible, in other words, to see myself through the eyes of others when I emotionally 
attend them, when I use other sight. 
In Empire Falls there are two particularly important examples of how seeing 
oneself through the eyes of another are formative. In the first instance, Miles's 
understanding of himself is shaped by the view his mother had of him, the expectations 
she set down for who he was to become. Miles remembers that 
from the time he was a boy, he would look up from a book he was reading to find 
[Grace] quietly studying him. "My little scholar," she'd say, smiling. Later, in 
college, he'd been greatly attracted to the exciting life his professors seemed to 
lead, richly furnished with books and ideas worth arguing over, and he'd thought 
that maybe his mother was right, that the life of the mind was his own truest 
destiny. One thing was for sure. He'd never aspired to feeding other professors 
twice-cooked noodles for a living (202). 
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Grace's vision of Miles gives shape to his own vision of himself, and what he is 
ultimately destined for. Miles realizes that she wants nothing more than to be able to 
know that he is able to move away from Empire Falls-which is to say, to escape the life 
she has led. So that when he fails to live up to Grace's image of who he is supposed to 
be, he sees his failure reflected in his mother's eyes. In one flashback scene, Miles has 
quit college to return home in the final semester of his final year, because his mother is 
dying. However, he cannot bear to be around her, because he sees her disappointment in 
him, as a result of his quitting college and returning to Empire Falls. An important 
question from Grace haunts his time with her: "Didn't he realize, she kept asking, that the 
mere sight of him only increased her suffering?" As the flashback continues to unfold, a 
scene on one particular night shapes Miles's vision of himself, seen through his mother's 
eyes. Miles finally goes to see his dying mother, who "was awake when he appeared, 
and upon seeing him in the doorway she'd simply turned her head and looked away, a 
gesture so eloquent in its futility that it had backed him out into the hall" (451). The 
problem for Miles is that because he loves his mother, when he sees himself in the way 
she sees him, his failure to live up to the expectations she has had for him (and therefore, 
that he has had for himself) is overwhelming. He cannot bear the image of himself that 
he sees, and must retreat from it. 
The reader, however, is invited to assess Miles' choice to return to Empire Falls 
and tend to his mother sympathetically. Though by his choice Miles is prevented from 
living out the dreams his mother had for him, it is this choice that allows him the 
opportunity to become one who is with and for others in Empire Falls. Miles grows into 
the kind of person whose life is centered not on himself, but on others. Over the course 
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of the novel, the reader can see that the act of coming back to Empire Falls ties Miles to a 
community that helps to shape him as one who is capable of attending to the emotional 
lives of others. 
That Miles finds Empire Falls a community capable of fostering intersubjectivity 
does not mean that everyone finds it so. One young man, John Voss, a student in Tick's 
art class, cannot bear the vision ofhimselfthat he sees in everyone else's eyes. John 
Voss is a victim of bad attending in the novel. In one scene Tick Roby and John Voss are 
eating lunch by themselves in the cafeteria, having been put there together by the 
principal in an effort to find someone with whom John Voss can connect. Tick sees that 
John Voss-whom we eventually learn has been living by himself in his grandmother's 
trailer, months after she has died-is hungry. She offers to share her sandwich with him, 
but he declines, telling her that he is full. Though because of his blank affect and 
reluctance to communicate, John Voss is not immediately a sympathetic character, the 
horrible nature of the details of his life inspires a certain kind of sympathy in the reader. 
We see him as a largely forgotten young man, consigned to the margins of the 
community. Expecting little from anyone, his pessimism about the community's ability 
to meet his needs is regularly confirmed, either through being ignored or through outright 
hostility. 
Tick and John Voss are supposed to be alone in the cafeteria because of the 
special arrangement made by the principal, "when the boy's eyes flicker at something 
over her shoulder" (184). Just then "Tick glances at the cafeteria, where Zack Minty is 
framed, motionless, in one of the small rectangular windows" (184). Zack's appearance 
startles Tick, so that "she nearly flinches, since something the stillness of the face in the 
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tiny window suggests that it's been there for a long time, observing them" (184). Tick's 
reaction to the framing of Zack in the lunchroom window offers a cue to the reader about 
the ominous nature of Zack's sudden appearance. However, we notice that not only is 
Zack framed in the window, but that from his perspective, Zack is busy framing Tick and 
John Voss, having apparently "been there for a long time, observing them" (184). In 
Zack's case, though, it soon becomes apparent to the reader that Zack's attending has 
little to do with trying to see Tick and John Voss as subjects; if we see Tick and John 
Voss through Zack's eyes, we see only characters on display in Zack's own drama. They 
are, in Zack' s mind, there with and for him-and not he for them. 
Zack Minty, still reeling from Tick's breakup with him, enters and comes over to 
where Tick and John Voss are seated. Like virtually everyone else in John Voss's life, 
Zack torments him. Zack, a bully like his father, Jimmy Minty, focuses on John Voss. 
But Zack can only see John Voss as something less than human. The reader senses John 
Voss' vulnerability as Zack fixes him in his gaze. Russo writes: "Zack hasn't looked at 
[Tick] yet, but is staring at John Voss as if searching in vain for a reason for this kid's 
existence" (185). Zack, with no reason apparently other than to torment, picks up a 
quarter lying on the table and throws it at John Voss, hitting him in the forehead. John 
Voss does not flinch. This detail provides the reader with an insight into the kind of 
barriers to social interaction John Voss erects to protect himself-especially given that 
the reader has just learned that Tick "nearly flinches" when she glimpses Zack framed in 
the window. The lack of a reflexive flinch, which might be seen in someone else as 
courage or stoicism, appears in John Voss to be either an inability to feel anything, or 
perhaps just a simple resignation to the pain and indignity of life on the periphery. 
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Zack finally shifts his attention from John Voss to Tick, wanting to know why she 
refuses to give him a second chance. He turns to John Voss and asks, "Why don't you go 
away?" adding that "myoid girlfriend is going to explain why she doesn't like me 
anymore" (186). John Voss retreats to the other side of the cafeteria, sitting down at 
another table, and turning his back to them. Tick watches him go, surprised that he is so 
easily cowed, but observes that "he's apparently come to accept humiliation as his lot in 
life, perhaps even made it his friend" (186). Tick's perception of John Voss' humiliation 
tells the reader something about Tick's ability in the midst of a tense situation to use 
other sight to see the resignation in a figure almost everyone else seems content to ignore. 
Once again the reader is invited to understand John Voss' life as one in which 
humiliation seems to be an inevitability. 
Zack continues to torment John Voss, calling him "dickhead," until Tick finally 
agrees to leave with Zack. She is furious that Zack treats another human being this way, 
and tries to distract Zack from his abuse of John Voss. Finally, outside the doors of the 
cafeteria, Tick asks Zack why he acts this way. Zack, laughing, says he has no idea. 
Tick "knows better than to glance over her shoulder at the small rectangular windows of 
the cafeteria doors, but she does so anyway and regrets it immediately, wishing she 
hadn't glimpsed John Voss taking a hungry bite out of her leftover sandwich" (190). It is 
this "glimpse" that reveals John Voss as a young man who is not only hungry, but who is 
ashamed of his need-both his physical need of food, as well as his emotional need to be 
engaged as a subject by another human being. Moreover, Tick is also revealed by this 
glimpse to be a person whose attending to others, because she has so successfully 
cultivated this virtue, is almost reflexive.6 Once again Russo uses a window as a way of 
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framing vision, as a way of suggesting a new understanding of another person through 
the presentation of visual cues. 
After it is discovered that his grandmother is dead, her body having been tossed 
on a garbage heap, John Voss runs away. He stays gone for over a week, until showing 
up one day back at school. Tick watches him approach the building through a window in 
the art room. She tries to fix him in her vision, but he keeps shifting in and out of focus, 
head bobbing between visual obstructions. That John Voss shifts in and out of focus 
draws the reader's attention both to the particular difficulty in trying to attend to someone 
who-because of the walls of protection with which he has surrounded himself-is so 
elusive. Moreover, the reader's attention is drawn to the broader truth about the ongoing 
and perfectible nature of emotional attending, which assumes, as I have said, constant 
revision. That is to say, people continually move in and out of focus. 
At length, John Voss enters the room, carrying a folded grocery bag. And even 
Tick, the person who has tried most valiantly to attend emotionally to him, can't help but 
wish he had not returned: "One look at him now-head down, shoulders hunched 
forward, resolutely silent, as ifhe thinks he can walk into art class and take up where he 
left off-brings back to her the thoughts she'd tried so hard to ignore last week, which 
she was too embarrassed to admit even to her father: that everyone was better off with 
this boy gone" (445). Tick continues thinking as she watches him, concluding that 
No, his disappearance has been a blessing, allowing the whole horrible story [of 
finding his grandmother's body in a garbage dump] to recede from public 
consciousness. True, for the last five days everyone in Dexter County was 
looking for him, but the truth is, nobody hoped to find him. Is there a term for 
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that? Tick wonders. The thing everyone is searching for and hoping not to find? 
The thing you're secretly glad has made a clean getaway, lest you yourself be 
blamed should it ever be located (446). 
In a very short period of time John Voss has gone from a tormented loner-not an 
optimal state, to be sure, but at least a human being-to a non-person, one nobody wants 
to find, one who is considered refuse, worthy of being tossed on another kind of garbage 
dump. In short, people have failed finally to attend to him as a subject at all, but merely 
as an object, worthy of abstraction from the life narrative that helped to shape who he is, 
or perhaps only as a projection of people's darkest fears about themselves. This failure 
to attend to John Voss is a community failure. As I indicated earlier, communities-
when they set down bad ends (felai), or when they fail to live up to good ends-can stand 
in the way of human flourishing. In any case, this sort of bad attending on a 
comprehensive scale prevents John Voss from seeing himself or others any longer as 
human beings. His appearance, that is, the way he looks to others, is described as animal-
like, complete with a "rancid smell," his clothes "wet and caked with dirt," and "his hair 
knotted with bits of leaves and twigs" (446). 
As Tick watches in terror, John Voss pulls a gun from the grocery bag, and after 
firing four fatal shots, "John Voss slowly turns to look at her" (447). The question arises 
for the reader about what John Voss sees as he observes the one person who has 
attempted to look at him through the lens of love. The reader, who has followed John 
Voss' alienation from the community, is able to see the end result of the dehumanizing 
effects of bad attending, as the attempt of one human to attend to his emotional life is 
finally not enough. Tick, as frightened as she is, 
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faces John Voss as bravely as she can, knowing it will all be over soon. Her 
vision has now narrowed to the point where she can barely make him out, his face 
bloody, his eyes almost sad. When he speaks, his voice comes from a long way 
off. "This is what I dream," he tells her, in answer to the question she asked him 
so long ago. Then he squeezes the trigger, and she hears what she is certain will 
be the last sound she will ever hear, and feels herself thrust backward into 
blackness" (447). 
There is, of course, no literal causal relationship between Tick's losing sight of John Voss 
and his violence. However, I would argue that metaphorically it is precisely John Voss's 
fading from sight, that is, his slipping from the attention of others within the community 
that calls into question his humanity-causing him to feel as worthless and abandoned as 
others view him. He finally becomes Aristotle's man without a polis-a beast, and 
clearly not a god. Even Tick ultimately loses sight of him, feeling "herself thrust 
backward into blackness." That Tick finally loses sight of John Voss is significant, 
inasmuch as Tick has occupied a primary moral focus of the novel, the one person willing 
to try to see him as a human being, a subject with dignity and desires and projects. Tick's 
inability in the end to focus on John Voss because he has been rendered nearly 
invisible-since Tick alone has proven herself willing to attempt emotional attending 
with someone on the extreme margins of the community-lodges itself as a significant 
critique of the community of Empire Falls. 
Finally, John Voss turns the gun on himself, while Tick blacks out. Miles Roby is 
escorted through the police cordon, where he kneels at his daughter's side, saying her 
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name repeatedly. She has withdrawn into herself, presumably as a defense mechanism 
against the chaos and fear. Miles loses track of how often he calls out Tick's name 
"before her eyes flickered, or how many more before they came into something like 
focus" (455). When her eyes finally do focus on her father, "she saw him for who he 
was. In that instant she was suddenly back, and her expression first relaxed, then came 
apart, and she was sobbing, "Daddy, Daddy, Daddy'" (455). It is this sight of Miles that 
orients Tick, reminding her of who she is, and where she is located, not only her own life 
narrative, but in the life narrative of the community. That is to say, she comes to find out 
who she is through the intersubjective connections that anchor her to the reality of her 
life, through the lens that focuses loving attention onto the mirror of love, all of which is 
described metaphorically as a function of the faculty of sight. Though the community 
fails utterly sometimes, as is the case with John Voss, the town of Empire Falls 
nevertheless provides a context in which people like Miles and Tick can learn to attend to 
the emotional lives of others. The intersubjective connections that make community 
possible, and that which threatens it, however, need a bit more attention. 
III. The Ties that Bind . .. and Loose 
What Empire Falls offers is a way of viewing the texture of community and the 
nexus of relationships that sustain (define?) it. Those relationships, and therefore, the 
community capable of fostering human flourishing, depend upon intersubjectivity, upon 
the ability of those within the community to attend to one another emotionally, to view 
one another with other sight. People come to know who they are through these 
communal connections. When the community fails a member, though, not only is the life 
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of the individual affected but the very fabric of community can be threatened. In the 
aftermath of the school shooting, Miles takes off with Tick to Martha's Vineyard in an 
attempt to protect her from the shockwaves he believes the tragedy will give off; Jimmy 
Minty starts drinking and is arrested for possession of stolen goods when the police find a 
number of stolen appliances in his home; Francine Whiting sells everything, but drowns 
before she is able to move out of Empire Falls. 
Communities, though, because they are complex organisms, educate and form 
people in different ways. Jimmy Minty, for instance, offers one view to Miles of the 
difference between the ways people are formed in the community of Empire Falls. It is 
worth quoting at length: 
Thing is, Miles, people in this town like you. A lot of people. You got 
friends, even some important friends. I admit it. But here's something that might 
surprise you. People like me too. Something else? I got friends. Might surprise 
you to hear we even got some of the same friends. You're not the only one 
people like, okay? And I'll tell you something else. What people around here 
like best about me? They like it that they're more like me than they are like you. 
They look at me and see the town they grew up in. They see their first girlfriend. 
They see the first high school football game they ever went to. You know what 
they see when they look at you. That they ain't good enough. They look at you 
and see everything they ever done wrong in their lives. They hear you talk and 
maybe they're thinking the same thing you are, except they can't say it like you 
do and they know they won't ever get any credit. They see you and your buddy 
the principal with your heads together, deciding how things are gonna be, talking 
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the way you talk and making your little jokes, and they know they'll never get no 
place with either one of you, not ever. But me? Maybe they might just get 
someplace with me, and that's why they like me (295-6). 
Leaving aside the issue of Jimmy's arguably skewed vision of his and Miles's roles-an 
interesting case of projection, it would seem-this passage points up the ways we are 
bound together, that teach us to see ourselves and others not as atomic individuals, 
roaming about as totally unencumbered private selves and moral free agents, but as 
interconnected in ways that help us to learn who others are, as well as who we are as a 
result of those connections. The clarity of both our knowledge of others and of ourselves 
depends, as I have argued, on our abilities to attend emotionally to one another, to see 
one another justly or lovingly. 
The character of the relationships in Empire Falls relies on the kind of 
commitment to seeing one another with other sight. It is when other sight is lost entirely, 
as in the case of John Voss, that not only is an individual lost, but the very web of social 
relationships is threatened. This community is symbolized by the Empire Grill, where 
people come repeatedly to be in one another's company-again, even those who do not 
particularly like one another. Miles's ex-wife, Janine, and her obnoxious soon-to-be 
husband, Walt Comeau, are regularly in attendance-a fact that vexes Miles, in 
particular. Max, Miles's father, is often there, exasperating Miles with his requests for 
money, his surreptitious dipping into the till. Miles's brother, David, the former 
alcoholic works at the grill, as does Charlene, a waitress Miles has had a crush on since 
he was a young teenager. Tick is there, struggling to makes sense of adolescence in the 
presence of a father who is also struggling to make sense of her adolescence. Even John 
292 
Voss, the one who imperils the continued existence of community, is at the Empire Grill, 
having been given ajob after Tick entreated her father to take him on as a dishwasher. A 
host of characters, bound together, and congregated in the Empire Grill, which acts as a 
metaphor for the wider community-which is to say, a group of people who live in 
relationship to each other not because they agree, but in spite of the fact that they almost 
never do. 
The Empire Grill, I would suggest, operates in the novel as a kind of synecdoche 
of the larger community of the town of Empire Falls; it is a microcosm, at the very least, 
of the kind of people, fears, joys, conflicts, and so on that also arise in the town. And 
while Empire Falls will most likely never mirror Aristotle's vision of a true polis, 
inasmuch as it makes no claim to be able to identify the highest human good in a way 
common to all its inhabitants, it can nevertheless aspire to being a community, in which 
the lesser goods of concord, a just economic system, and friendship can be held in 
common, prompting the cultivation of the virtues necessary to realize those goods. And, 
as my argument suggests, good emotional attending is at the cohesive center of this kind 
of community, since it allows people to be valued as human subjects, and helps to avoid 
the alienation and enmeshment that threatens community. In this way, emotional 
attending is basic to intersubjectivity, which in turn is a necessary condition for 
flourishing. Consequently, when Miles and Tick attend to the emotional lives of those 
around them, they strengthen the context in which flourishing can occur. That is to say, 
in the kind of circular logic of virtue ethics, as Miles and Tick practice the virtue of 
emotional attending in Empire Falls, they make it more likely that the virtue of emotional 
attending will be learned and performed by others-since they are helping to sustain a 
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community characterized by intersubjectivity, which can, in tum, produce people capable 
of the virtue of emotional attending. 
What the Empire Grill and the town of Empire Falls share is a common locus, a 
space not bounded by geography, but by their commitment to showing up, when often 
showing up seems the least rational thing to do. The Empire Grill is at the heart of the 
metaphor of community in Empire Falls, where identities are shaped and influenced by 
the nature of the relationships that bind people together, ultimately freeing those people 
to live as human beings, to pursue their dreams and desires, knowing that they have a 
stable platform from which to venture out into the world. So that when Mrs. Whiting 
seems to regret the decline of the restaurant and wonders "out loud why she [needs] the 
aggravation of a business that [produces] so little revenue" (37), we may read that not 
only literally, but also as a commentary on a community that seems to produce so little in 
the way of relational "revenue." In other words, the Empire Grill operates as a place 
where people continue to come together; but it often seems as though things change so 
imperceptibly between people that the Empire Grill suffers from inertia. And yet, in the 
same manner that the absence of actual revenue generated does not tell the whole story of 
the value provided by the Empire Grill to the community, the quality and sustaining 
power of the relationships formed at the Empire Grill cannot be quantified in terms of the 
relational "revenue" of immediately perceptible change. Nevertheless, there are also 
occasions "when Miles himself had become discouraged and offered the same argument" 
to Mrs. Whiting (37). It is upon these occasions that Mrs. Whiting sees the necessity of 
the Empire Grill, the necessity of community, urging "him not to give up, reminding him 
that the Empire Grill was a landmark, that it was the only non-fast-food establishment in 
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town, and that Empire Falls, if its residents were to remain at all hopeful about the future, 
needed the grill to survive, even ifit didn't thrive" (37). 
That which finally endangers community in Empire Falls is a failure of attending, 
when the community loses sight John Voss, noticing him-if at all-as something less 
than human. Not only is community threatened in a literal, physical way by the killing of 
some of it members, but also in terms of instersubjectivity. To the extent that emotional 
attending is like a virtue, it requires the cultivation of habits, which lead to flourishing. 
When bad attending occurs, like a vice, it also is the product of habits--only the habits of 
bad attending are insidious, leading not to flourishing but to isolation, to the dissolution 
of the ties that bind the community together, or in other cases, to a further enmeshing that 
encourages the view of others as extensions of oneself. Imperfections in emotional 
attending, lapses of loving attention, are to be expected inasmuch as attending is 
"infinitely perfectible." However, bad attending that leads to the utter alienation of one 
of the community is corrosive to the community, potentially even deadly. This bad 
attending can come either as vicious and intentional bad attending (e.g., Zack Minty's 
bullying of John Voss) or as neglect (e.g., the community'S negligence of John Voss). 
And it is precisely this threat to community in the person of John Voss that literature lets 
us Imagme. 
IV. Literature and Imagination 
failbetter: Empire Falls is a timely work that has some clear connections with the 
problems of modem day society. I am referring to the implications of the troubled 
boy John Voss. Did you find yourself writing about the tortured school teen from 
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the angle of an inquisitive author, or more from the view of a real life parent 
seeking a plausible explanation for such tragedies? 
Russo: I'd been thinking about school violence since the incident in Paducah, 
however long ago that was, and I was right in the middle of writing Empire Falls 
when the events at Columbine took place. I'm not sure I can separate the 
inquisitive author and terrified father functions, at least not now, after the fact. 
But after the Columbine shootings, when everyone was asking why, I remember 
thinking (in inquisitive-author-mode) that answering this kind of question is what 
fiction is best at. The sociological explanations for school violence-the easy 
availability of guns, too much violence in the media, too little parental supervision 
of to day's youth-are not terribly satisfying. We suspect that if solutions to these 
very difficult problems could be engineered, the question of why would still 
remain. What we really want to know is more like, What did it feel like to aim the 
gun and pull the trigger? What sequence of events led to this moment? The only 
knowledge that will be even remotely satisfying is the kind that comes from living 
that horrible moment imaginatively and understanding what led up to it. That's 
what literature offers us-the visceral experience of the living moment. So, yes, I 
was interested in investigating that. But it was out of my role as a terrified parent 
that the book really grew, I suspect. Like Miles Roby, I've often thought that as 
parents we have to be vigilant, and the first chapter of the novel opens with Miles 
anxiously awaiting his daughter's return from school, hoping to catch sight of her, 
to make sure she's okay. What Miles also knows (and I fear) is that no matter how 
vigilant you are, the moment you're needed most, you'll likely be elsewhere, 
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dealing with some other distraction. Such knowledge is the basis for parental 
night sweats, and I've come to think of this book in exactly those terms--one long, 
vivid, parental night sweat ("Interview with Richard Russo,jailbetter.com 
http://www.failbetter.com/04/Russo.html). 
One of the things literature does, as I have argued in Chapter Five, is to offer us 
creative worlds in which to have emotional experiences that we might not otherwise have 
occasion to have. Having these experiences gives us more extensive emotional resources 
with which to attend emotionally to others. Since good emotional attending requires that 
we have some understanding of another's emotions, we are in the position of admitting 
that many of the emotional experiences of others will be unfamiliar to us as actual 
experiences. However, it is possible to experience emotions, at least in some partial or 
simulated way, through reading literature. Because emotions are not cognitive, as I 
suggested in Chapter Two, but are affective appraisals-which is to say, something like 
trip wires that trigger physiological, and then cognitive, responses to stimuli-emotions 
may be elicited by imaginatively inhabiting the emotional experiences of characters in 
literature. In other words, literary characters need not be "real" to prompt emotional 
experiences within the reader. And having these emotional experiences through literature 
allows us better to recognize the same sorts of emotional experiences in those to whom 
we attend. 
In Empire Falls Richard Russo explores the emotional abandonment of John 
Voss, wondering what it took to drive him to commit wanton murder, what it might have 
felt like committing the act itself. Russo believes that imaginatively exploring the 
emotional lives of his characters, in this case, John Voss, he can begin to arrive at some 
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answers about what motivates people to do what they do. He suggests that "sociological 
explanations"-that is, those answers calibrated to render a scientific analysis-fail to 
satisfy, since scientific analysis cannot speak intimately to the issue of individual 
motivation. Individual emotion requires context, a locatedness within a story that takes 
into account life narrative. Science cannot satisfactorily provide an adequate causal 
account that makes motive intelligible-since individuals respond differently, even to the 
same situations. To provide such an account, we need practice in the virtue of emotional 
attending, of seeing human subjects with other sight, of understanding people as complex 
human subjects, of recognizing individuals as members of nexuses of communal 
relationships. In Empire Falls the reader finds two people, Miles and Tick Roby, who are 
involved in trying faithfully to attend to the emotional lives of others. Through the 
attempts of Miles and Tick to attend, the reader is offered an opportunity to see an 
embodied manifestation of what it looks like to attend to others. Moreover, the reader is 
invited to simulate a wide variety of emotional experiences-from the anxiety of a father 
for his teenage daughter's well-being to the wistfulness of a man who has come to 
question the choices he has made in life, from the struggle of an adolescent in finding out 
who she is, and in light of that knowledge, how she ought to treat other people (even 
those very different from her) to the feelings of alienation that result from the object of 
bad attending. 
Russo contends that what literature offers us is "the visceral experience of the 
living moment." Through literature it is possible to imagine what it might feel like, for 
example, to be abandoned by the community, to be lost from the sight of those who help 
shape one's identity, and to feel like one no longer has a home. To be able in some way 
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to begin to understand the emotional life of another in the imagination makes the 
possibility of recognizing it in another who is actually having similar experiences that 
much more likely. And that understanding is necessary to preserve the community, 
necessary to the context in which flourishing is made possible. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER ONE: THE LENS AND THE MIRROR 
1 An exact date for the development of clear glass is elusive. However, credit for the perfecting of 
clear glass probably goes to the island of Murano, adjacent to Venice. Cristallo glass, thin, 
flawless, and colorless, is first mentioned in 1409. See Alan Macfarlane and Gerry Martin, Glass: 
A World History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) 21. 
2 The development of the microscope is generally attributed to a father and son, Hans and 
Zacharias Janssen in the mid 1590s. See, for example, Robert E. Krebs, Scientific Development 
and Misconceptions through the Ages: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1999) 44. Zacharias Janssen also found himself in a dispute with Hans Lippershey over the 
development of the telescope in 1608, the news and the implications of which were not lost on 
Galileo who subsequently popularized the technology. See Brian S. Baigrie, History of Modern 
Science and Mathematics, 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002) 47. 
3 The Venetian brothers, Andrea and Domenico d' Anzolo del Gallo applied for a patent on a new 
kind of shiny backing for glass in 1507 that created the first truly detailed mirror. See, for 
instance, Mark Pendergrast, Mirror Mirror: A History of the Human Love Affair with Reflection 
(New York: Basic Books, 2003) 119. See also Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New 
York,: Harcourt, 1963) 129-30. 
4 For more on the correspondence theory of epistemology, see Bradley P. Armour-Garb and J. C. 
Beall, Deflationary Truth, Open Court Readings in Philosophy 1 (Chicago: Open Court, 2005). 
Richard A. Fumerton, Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth, Studies in Epistemology 
and Cognitive Theory (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002). Michael P. Lynch, 
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The Nature of Truth " Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2001). 
5 For a detailed discussion of what is at stake in the argument over Cartesian representations see 
Alison Simmons, "Are Cartesian Sensations Representational?," Nous 33.3 (1999). I am aware of 
the difficulties associated with a philosophical use of the word "representation" with respect to the 
relationship between the intellect and the extramental world. Simmons lists some of the questions 
raised by the use of representation: Does the mental representation have to present the thing to the 
mind just exactly as it is in extramental reality? Does the thing have to be part of the causal chain 
that produces the representation? Can there be mental representations of potentially but not 
actually existing things?" Engaging those important questions, though, is beyond the scope of the 
modest story I am trying to tell about the rise of reason in the West as the dominant way of 
knowing about the world. 
6 However, Locke is quick to say that an innate idea of God is unnecessary since "the visible 
marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation, that a 
rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity," in 
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser, [New 
ed. (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2004) 39. 
7 A view of imagination similar to this will be explored in Chapter Five. 
S It is important to point out that Kant's Copernican Revolution was not a suggestion that there 
exists no mind-independent reality, but that there is no way finally to have access to that reality 
prior to the structuring of the mind that allows us to experience that world. Kant, in other words, 
is not arguing that the reality of the world is a subjective projection outward; instead, the world 
that exists independent of the mind can only be intelligible through the conceptual framework 
made available by the mind. Johann Fichte, a short time after Kant, argues for just such a 
subjective projection: "You realize then that all knowledge is only knowledge of yourself, that 
your consciousness never goes beyond yourself, and that what you take to be a consciousness of 
the object is nothing but a consciousness of your positing of an object which, in accordance with 
an inner law of your thought, you necessarily engage in together with sensation" in Johann 
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Gottlieb Fichte, The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1987) 
45. 
9 Aristotle disagrees with Plato over some matters related to morality, though, for example, the 
precision with which political science can be studied. 
10 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. 
Co., 1999). Cited hereafter as EN. 
11 In fact, Iris Murdoch argues that, even for Plato, uninspired replication does not adequately 
describe the work of mimesis. She writes, "Surely art transforms, is creation rather than imitation, 
as Plato's own praise of the 'divine frenzy' must imply," in The Fire & the Sun: Why Plato 
Banished the Artists (Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press, 1977) 7. 
12 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. M.E. Hubbard, Aesthetics: The Classic Readings, ed. David Cooper 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). Hereinafter cited as Poet. 
13 A.D. Nuttall, Why Does Tragedy Give Pleasure? (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996),37. 
14 Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics (Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina Pr., 1986), 58. 
15 Lorraine Gaston and Peter Galison make the same case for the objectivity/subjectivity binary, 
by saying that they "define each other, like left and right or up and down. One cannot be 
understood, even conceived, without the other" in Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity 
(New York: Zone Books distributed by MIT Press, 2007) 36-7. 
16 While it might appear that Plato's view of women should be read through the lens of Book VII 
of The Republic as egalitarian or proto-feminist, Morag Buchan has argued that this view of Plato 
does not take into account Plato's strong view of the inequality between men and women as a 
general matter. Although Plato admits that in theory women and men have equally innately 
distributed qualities, he hastens to add that women "are the weaker sex in all respects" (455e). 
Nevertheless, as Buchan points out, "That some talented women may show Guardian potential and 
must cease to be private wives and mothers does not alter the fact that it is men, not women, 
whom Plato releases from the stricture of family since it is men, not women, who have the highest 
capacity for virtue and who will become Philosopher Kings. They must consequently be placed in 
an environment which is protected from the worst aspects of family and female nature, so that 
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their full potential may be realized" in Morag Buchan, Women in Plato's Political Theory 
(London: Routledge, 1999) 154. To the extent that Plato understands women having any equality 
with men, it is an equality tempered by "the inherent inequalities in human beings and the inherent 
differences between men and women" (154). 
17 In using political to describe the relationship between the male/female binary and the 
reason/emotion binary I am following Terry Eagleton: "I mean by the political no more than the 
way we organize our social life together, and the power-relations this involves" in Terry Eagleton, 
Literary Theory: An Introduction: Anniversary Edition, Anniversary ed. (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Pub., 2008) 169. 
18 c.f. Iris Murdoch, who states: "Moral language which relates to a reality infinitely more 
complex and various than that of science is often unavoidably idiosyncratic and inaccessible," in 
Iris Murdoch, Sovereignty of Good , Routledge Classics (London: Routledge, 2001) 33. 
19 Interestingly, Genevieve Lloyd points out that "In western thought, maleness has been seen as 
itself an achievement, attained by breaking away from the more 'natural' condition of women," in 
Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: "Male" And "Female" In Western Philosophy 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) 38. 
20See, for example Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, N.H.: Published for Brown 
University Press by University Press of New England, 1987)., and Lorraine Code, What Can She 
Know?: Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991). Alison M. Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," Women, 
Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, eds. Ann Garry and Marilyn 
Pearsall (New York: Routledge, 1992). Lloyd, The Man of Reason : "Male" And "Female" In 
Western Philosophy. 
21 I should point out that I am by no means unaware of the irony that attaches to my use of post-
Enlightenment literature as a way of talking about the turn to the self. There can be no doubt that 
the literature I use in this endeavor is made possible, in large part, by the emphasis on interiority 
that begins with st. Augustine, and is eventually picked up in earnest by Descartes. The 
psychological depth evident in Western literature after the Enlightenment is an important 
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manifestation of the story I am trying to tell. Consequently, I want to be clear that I understand 
my indebtedness to the very trend I am critiquing. What is problematic, and therefore, what I am 
addressing has primarily to do not with the familiarity one has of one's interior self; I believe that 
to be largely a good thing. Instead, I am seeking to call into question an orientation that points 
people first toward the self as the primary referent for meaning, value, and purposes, rather than to 
some exterior authority. 
22 Code, What Can She Know?: Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge 52. 
23 By "influence" I am speaking specifically of Kant's understanding of heteronomy (i.e., external 
inclination to action), as opposed to autonomy (i.e., action that emerges as the product ofthe 
individual's free will-which is, to Kant, a necessary precondition for establishing moral agency). 
24 I understand that the idea of identifying social contractarianism as encouraging the privileging 
of the individual as the center of political life seems counter-intuitive. However, when it is 
realized that the social contract (as it has come down to us in modem liberal democracy) acts as a 
tool for the securing of political goods for the individual, who agrees to act in concert with others 
for the purpose of advancing individual self-interest, the truth that it is the individual who is the 
focal point of the social contract begins to emerge. 
25 It is important to point out, however, that Taylor makes a distinction between Augustine and the 
Cartesian tradition of interiority. Augustine, though radically reflexive, escapes the charge of 
radical SUbjectivity inasmuch as for Augustine it was not the self, but God who occupied a 
position above the individual's reason. For Augustine, the self was merely the beginning of the 
journey toward reason-not its final destination. Truth, for Augustine was not something one 
manufactures according to one's own specifications (Taylor 133). 
26 Gareth Matthews, "Consciousness and Life," Philosophy 52 (1977),25 in Richard Rorty, 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979) 51. 
27 I use culture here not in the anthropologically and sociologically specific sense of identifiable 
people groups, delimited by geography, nationality, ethnicity, and so forth. Instead, I use it here in 
a much more expansive global sense that includes local cultures, but that also transcends those 
local cultures, including them in a broader sweep of time-almost epochal in its scope. 
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28 Aristotle, Politics, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub., 1998). Cited 
hereinafter as Pol. 
29C.D.C. Reeve says that Aristotle uses prior in three different ways: 1) X is prior in nature to Y 
if X can exist without Y, but Y cannot exist without X, 2) X is prior in substance to Y if an only if 
X is more nearly perfect or more complete than Y, or 3) X is prior in definition (or formula) to Y 
if and only if X is mentioned in the definition ofY but not Y in the definition of X in Aristotle, 
Politics 258. 
30 See especially the chapter, "Trade in the Northern Half of Central-Eastern Europe: Great 
Poland, Pomerania, Prussia and Mazowia" in M. M. Postan and H. J. Habakkuk, The Cambridge 
Economic History of Europe, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,: Cambridge U.P., 1966). 
31 That Luther was an Augustinian monk I take not to be entirely coincidental in setting a 
precedent for Luther's own radical reflexivity. 
32 Perhaps not coincidentally, it is important to note that if Luther's presumption of interiority as 
the ground from which springs true devotion appears anti-Aristotelian, it is because, as Diarmaid 
MacCulloch points out, Luther disapproved of Aristotle, a philosopher for whom "he developed a 
lifelong hatred." Diarmflid MacCulloch, The Reformation, 1st American ed. (New York: Viking, 
2004) 117. 
33 George Bush and Dick Cheney's ignoring of the anti-war resolution put forward by 96 United 
Methodist Bishops (the denomination to which they both belong) on November 9, 2005 calling for 
an end to the war in Iraq is but an instantiation of Luther's two kingdom theory, coupled with the 
anti-authoritarian, anti-ecclesiological realities of American Christianity. 
34 It must be emphasized, however, that Kant would not recognize the modern use of "private"; I 
am merely pointing out here how it is that Kant's ideas have come to be used--that is, as 
undergirding the turn to the self. Private, for Kant, does not anticipate the interior space occupied 
by the individual and her "personal" convictions and projects--the notion of which is itself 
intelligible only as a post-Enlightenment product of modernity. Rather, private, for Kant, signifies 
an identifiable role one takes on publicly, but with commitments to a particular community, guild, 
or set of practices, which is why Kant uses as examples clergy, academics, and military officers. 
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In that sense, then, one is not free to assume a public role, without submitting oneself to the rules 
of the community or guild to which one has gained access. A military officer qua military officer, 
for instance, is not free to disobey an order from a superior (for Kant, duty is duty, after all). 
However, as a public function of being recognized as a credentialed master ofa particular 
community or guild (i.e., as a scholar of that discipline), one is freed up to-for Kant, perhaps, 
responsible to-offer up reasoned argument and critique when the order is in error See his 
discussion of private and public in Immanuel Kant, "What Is Enlightenment?," On History, ed. 
Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis,: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). 
35 See Kant's discussion of agency in which he writes: "The autonomy of the will is the sole 
principle of all moral laws, and of all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, 
heteronomy of the elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is on the 
contrary, opposed to the principle thereof, and to the morality of the will" in Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbott (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2004) 19. 
CHAPTER TWO: TOWARD A THEORY OF EMOTION 
1 Interestingly, Septimus Warren Smith's lack of emotion resembles real life figure, Phineas Gage, 
about whom I will have more to say shortly. For a brief recounting of Gage's story see Jesse J. 
Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion, Philosophy of Mind Series (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 59. See also Paul Thagard and Fred Kroon, Hot Thought: 
Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006) 89. 
For a fuller account of Phineas Gage and the scientific aftermath of his injury, see especially 
Chapters One and Two in Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the 
Human Brain (London: Penguin, 2005). 
2 Since a survey of theories of reason is beyond the scope of this paper, I will use reason (unless 
otherwise indicated, e.g., practical reason or theoretical reason) in the sense of propositional 
knowledge. For an excellent bibliography on epistemology and the various way reason can be 
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described, see Keith DeRose, The Epistemology Page, July 13,2009, Yale University, Available: 
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/e-page.htm, March 19,2010. 
3 I do not have enough room in the span of a chapter to do an exhaustive survey of available 
theories of emotion. However, to see excellent discussions of the possible theoretical options 
open to the philosopher of emotion see, for example, Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: 
The Problem of Psychological Categories, Science and Its Conceptual Foundations (Chicago, III.: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997) 21-43. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion 
3-51. lenefer Robinson, Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 5-56. Craig DeLancey, Passionate Engines: What 
Emotions Reveal About Mind and Artificial Intelligence (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 31-48. 
4 For more on this see William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 2 (New York: Dover, 
1950). James originally proposed the theory of emotion as feeling. 
5Because of the possibility for mistaking cognitive emotion theories with cognitive psychology, 
Paul Griffiths prefers the term "propositional attitude theory." That is to say, emotions are that 
attitude one takes toward a proposition. If I say, for example, that the plane on which my wife is a 
passenger is landing, I am stating a proposition. That value I attach to the proposition or the 
attitude I take as a result of it is emotion. I may say, "Great! The plane with my wife whom I 
miss is finally here." Or I may say, "Oh no! My shrewish wife has finally returned." The 
proposition remains constant, but my attitude toward it constitutes my emotional response. Part of 
Griffiths' critique of cognitive emotion theories is that methodologically they are at heart 
philosophical, consisting entirely of conceptual analysis; which is to say, they lack the 
methodological rigor of the experimental methodology present in cognitive psychology. 
Therefore, to call them cognitive is to risk confusing with them cognitive psychology, thereby 
giving them more credit than he believes they deserve. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The 
Problem of Psychological Categories 2. For the purposes of this chapter, though, the use of 
cognitive in relationship to emotion theory will suffice, inasmuch as I am clear that I am not 
speaking of cognitive psychology. 
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6 Here I am indebted to the discussion of an Aristotelian conception of emotions as grounded in 
beliefs in Martha Craven Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness : Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 383-4 .. 
7 I realize that nailing down just what that shared moral framework consists of, and where one 
might go to find it is problematic, in the same way that nailing down any general or 
universalizable moral code is. I am not arguing that there is such a thing, only that people often act 
as though there were. What I am speaking of here as a shared moral framework is what I mean to 
be thought of as nothing more than an assumed baseline civility; it often operates under the cover 
of words like "commonsense," "conscientiousness," and "fairness." We can see it in common 
sentiments: "People aren't supposed to take things from other people's gardens." "You shouldn't 
cheat on your taxes." "He ought to be kinder to his wife." "Aren't," "shouldn't," "ought to" all 
bespeak a basic shared moral code that raises general expectations about attitudes and behaviors. 
8 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: 
Putnam, 1994). 
9 Thagard and Kroon, Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition. See 
especially his chapter, "Spiking Phineas Gage." 
\0 DeLancey reserves the manifestation of affect programs, however, to "basic emotions" (3). 
11 Whether there are basic and complex emotions or affect programs that act as specialized 
modules that are triggered for specific purposes, but which cannot be reliably grouped under the 
heading of emotion, I will not argue here. I will suggest, though, that however one describes 
them, the fact that this kind of mapping is thought necessary suggests that there is enough 
differentiation between kinds of emotions and the ways in which they are elicited that attempting 
some kind of taxonomy in which fast-acting and slow-acting emotions are qualitatively 
differentiated seems eminently reasonable. How those emotions get carved up, though, will be a 
matter of long-lasting debate. 




13 For an excellent summary of the various kinds of arguments for basic emotions and their 
proponents, see Table 1 in Andrew Ortony and Terrence 1. Turner, "What's Basic About Basic 
Emotions?," Psychological Review 97.3 (1990): 316. 
14 I must acknowledge a distinction between social construction and socialization. By 
socialization I mean only the learning and habituation of the language and roles within a particular 
culture, which are necessary for successfully negotiating life within that culture. What one learns, 
though, need not be socially constructed. One could be socialized, for example, into the proper 
use and meaning of an essential characteristic. In other words, one could hold that emotions are 
part of the essential make-up of human beings, and that one needs to be socialized correctly in 
order properly to manage them-not as social constructionism would have it that the emotions 
themselves are what need to be learned. 
15 Furthermore, he says that "even those which, like paternity, seem to be part and parcel of the 
human make-up are in reality institutions" (220). 
16 I realize that there is no general conception about which emotions, if any, occupy a category 
called basic emotions. Although, a short list that includes anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
and surprise seem be a good start (see Damasio, Descartes' Errorl49; Prinz, 150). 
17 See also Elizabeth A. Phelps, "The Interaction of Emotion and Cognition: Insights from Studies 
of the Human Amygdala," Emotion and Consciousness, eds. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. 
Niedenthal and Piotr Winkielman (New York: Guilford Press, 2005). 
18 For this account I am indebted to Antonio Damasio's detailed retelling of the story in Descartes' 
Error, especially 3-17. 
19 See especially his chapter, "The Theory of Pre oedipal Origin," in which he gives a brief historic 
survey of the argument in Charles W. Socarides, Homosexuality: Psychoanalytic Therapy 
(Northvale, N.J.: 1. Aronson, 1989) 63-88. For a fine discussion of the history of homosexuality 
and psychiatry, see Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of 
Diagnosis, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
CHAPTER THREE: HUMANS ARE POLITICAL ANIMALS 
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1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b 12. Aristotle, Politics, 1253a3, 79a19. 
2 See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the 
Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989). Hauerwas and Willimon make the case for 
viewing the church as a polis. 
3 Aristotle alludes to the self-reinforcing nature of the virtues when he says that "abstaining from 
pleasures makes us become temperate, and once we have become temperate we are most capable 
of abstaining from pleasures. It is similar to bravery; habituation in disdain for frightening 
situations and in standing firm against them makes us become brave, and once we have become 
brave we shall be most capable of standing firm" (1104a35-1104b4). 
4 I will use the genre of tragedy as an example of literature's affect on emotion. I will expand my 
study of the relationship between literature and emotion in Chapter Five. By using tragedy I am 
merely citing a traditional touchpoint for the discussion of the relationship between literature and 
the emotions. Admittedly, the tragedy about which Aristotle and Plato spoke was experienced 
primarily as theater, rather than in written form-which we would ordinarily associate with 
literature. However, nothing in my argument turns on reading versus spectating-both are capable 
of eliciting similar emotional responses. But because literary criticism begins in earnest with 
Aristotle's commentary on the nature of plot in tragedy, literature is never too far removed from 
the implications of Aristotle's critique. 
S Richard Rorty writes: "Between Plato's Phaedo and the seventeenth century, the standard 
philosophical argument for immortality had always revolved around our ability to do what beasts 
cannot-know unchanging truths rather than just particular facts," in Richard Rorty, Philosophy 
and the Mirror o/Nature 53. 
6 In this respect, Rawls mirrors Mill's convictions about the necessity of the individual as 
antecedent to the polis, and the individual's choices being sacrosanct, bounded only by the limits 
of another's right to pursue the good. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings, 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge [England] ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989) especially 56-7. 
310 
7 It should be pointed out here that the solipsism to which I refer is a voluntary one. A person cast 
unwillingly out of society may be nourished as a human being through the memory of past 
emotional engagement and/or through the hope of future emotional engagement when one may 
one day be restored (e.g., a prisoner in solitary confinement). Admittedly, there are those isolated 
incidents of children involuntarily cast out into the wilderness, who survive as "wild children," 
perhaps without recourse to the memory of emotional contact (though that is difficult to know 
with any certainty), and therefore without hope of it. However, their status upon being returned to 
human society more closely resembles the very "beast" that Aristotle identifies as those capable of 
surviving outside human society. Presumably, though, a person who leaves society as a matter of 
choice on a permanent basis does so because that person wants to minimize, ifnot altogether 
eliminate, exposure to emotional contact. 
8 But, in the case of Christianity, even hermits are sustained by their desire for emotional 
engagement-only now with God instead of other humans. In Hinduism, on the other hand, the 
time of the hermit is a temporary one in which the one who chooses it does so with the knowledge 
that he (most likely a male) will return to the family. 
9 By objects I mean the stimuli that elicit emotions, which may truly be objects (for example, a 
speeding car headed toward me), or may be my own thoughts, or may be the emotions of another 
(for example, when I see your anger, I may become angry or afraid or amused.) The object of my 
affective state, then, is that which stimulates the emotions, calling the complex emotional process 
into action. 
10 See also Morten L. Kringelbach, The Pleasure Center: Trust Your Animal Instincts (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) 47. 
II In Philosophy of Mind, of course, what I am describing has resonances of Bertrand Russell's 
distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Without 
rehearsing the argument over the failings of knowledge by acquaintance (a sort of first-hand, 
eyewitness knowledge) to give us truth about objects (e.g., I may only be dreaming that the car is 
yellow), it is important to point out that knowledge by acquaintance may offer some insight with 
respect to acquiring truth about subjects. One criticism of acquaintance theory is that it is 
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imprecise in defining the relationship between the knower and what is known. However, when the 
relationship between the knower and its object is a subject, as is the case with an individual, such 
knowledge is not necessarily inferential or open to empirical verification, and will, therefore, 
appear dubious as a form of knowledge classically construed. However, one of the critiques of 
knowledge by description is that it assumes a foundation of inference that determines what can 
even be called knowledge, dismissing what cannot be accounted for propositionally, and is, 
therefore, arguably the sort of political move I will ultimately want to address. 
12 C.D.C. Reeve believes this "salvation" signifies the preservation ofa stable community. Politics 
Ixiii-Ixiv. 
13 It is important to draw attention to what will be an enduring tension throughout this work, and 
that is over whether there are such things as universals-be they essential human teloi or universal 
virtues that are spatio-temporally transcendent-identifiable as such, or whether all evaluative 
discourse is necessarily local, contingent, and particular; or whether emotions are essential and, 
therefore, universal or the products of local, contingent, and particular social construction. I will 
address these at greater length as they come up in subsequent chapters, in particular in Chapter 
Five. However, I will suggest for now that ifthere are universals, they remain contested to such 
an extent that not only is there not a universally accepted account of universals, but there does not 
even exist a consensus on what would be received as acceptable evidence and standards by which 
to judge whether universality has been achieved. To what bar of appeal would one have recourse 
in adjudicating disputes over claims of universality? I raise this issue here because I will argue 
that normative teleology can be taken seriously without resorting to an essentialized version of 
Aristotelian metaphysics or anthropology, by offering up an argument concerning the possibility 
of discourse between seemingly incommensurable systems of meaning. 
14 Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) 152. 
15 There are times when the demands of virtue require opposing actions in different situations. 
The whole idea of the mean suggests that what might be considered generous in one context (e.g., 
I give a person who has no money some money to buy food.) would be considered profligate and 
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harmful in another context (i.e., if I gave that same amount of money to another person who had 
no money, but whom I suspected would use it to buy narcotics). 
16 Aristotelian virtue ethics has been criticized just to the extent that-because of an insistence 
upon the contextual nature of practicing virtue-it seems to invite relativism into the moral sphere. 
The lack of regulative guidelines for determining how one should act is seen as a deficiency of 
virtue ethics by deontologists and utilitarians. The charge lodged against virtue ethics centers on 
the belief that virtue ethics provides no clear guidelines for acting in particular instances, giving 
rise to the oft-repeated commonplace: "Virtue ethics does not tell one what to do; it is concerned 
with telling one what kind of person to be." Unfortunately, it is thought, this leaves the virtue 
ethicist without anything to say when confronted by an ethical dilemma. A deontologist can say 
of lying, "You must never lie, because there is a universal maxim prohibiting it." A utilitarian 
faced with the same question has recourse to a formula in which the answer to the question about 
lying is to be found in determining which course of action promises to maximize utility. A virtue 
ethicist, on the other hand, is thought incapable of providing specific direction in this case because 
virtue ethics does not rely on rules like, "Do not lie"-only on exhortations to be honest. So while 
virtue ethics might supply good general principles about strengthening character, as an ethical 
system it fails to offer the kind of precise direction necessary for life situations. In short, virtue 
ethics, it is argued, is not normative. This general argument over the superiority of ethical 
systems, while important, is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, Rosalind Hursthouse has 
put forward a persuasive argument that virtue ethics can offer normative guidelines for action by 
making reference to the virtuous person as a guide. See her excellent essay in Rosalind 
Hursthouse, "Normative Virtue Ethics," How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, ed. Roger 
Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
17 By agent-centered I refer to a conception of morality that begins with what kind of person one 
ought to be in order to know how one ought to act, as opposed to act-centered conceptions of 
morality that begin with a deliberation over the principles and requirements for moral action, 
which is a necessary prerequisite for a discussion of the moral agent. 
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18 In fact, epistemology itself went from being oriented to divine revelation to being oriented to the 
human pursuit of knowledge through science and philosophy. 
19 It is worth pointing out that freedom for Kant is a purely theoretical but necessary concept, 
"even though experience shows the opposite of those requirements represented as necessary under 
the presupposition offreedom," (Immanuel Kant, Groundingfor the Metaphysics of Morals_trans. 
James W. Ellington, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1993) 56. 
20 It should be noted, however, that I am not making the claim that the presence of motivations to 
act beyond a sense of duty render the act immoral in some way; only that to the extent that 
emotion operates as primary motivation, it is, for Kant, something beyond the scope of a moral 
act. For an excellent survey of interpretations of Kant on motivation see Michael Weber, "More 
on the Motive of Duty," Journal of Ethics 11 (2007). 
21 Kant suggests that in those cases where love is commanded-for example in John 13:34, where 
Jesus says, "1 give you a new commandment, that you love one another. Just as I have loved you, 
you also should love one another" (NRSV)-that that sort oflove must be a conscious act of the 
will. To the extent that emotions cannot be commanded, they must not be under the control of the 
will. To speak oflove-at least some forms of it-as a function of the will-that is, as a moral 
issue-will strike many readers as odd. And while the scope of this chapter will not allow for an 
extended discussion about the ways love may differ as an act of the will or as an emotion, Kant 
recognizes, at minimum, the ways in which language about emotions are imprecise. Additionally, 
though, he may also have identified one of the instances in which cognition is implicated in 
secondary emotions in ways that basic emotions will not allow-as I suggested in Chapter Two. 
22While it is important to differentiate between feelings and emotions-inasmuch as feelings 
suggest the essentialist, pre-rational responses against which I am arguing-that distinction is not 
central to Aristotle's argument. And because 1 am merely using Aristotle here as suggestive ofa 
starting point for a more fully developed argument about emotion, it will be sufficient for our 
present purposes to treat them at this point as unproblematic synonyms. As I argued in Chapter 
Two, however, they should not be thought of as the same things. 
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23 I find myself in agreement with the assertion Richard Janko advances in presupposing that 
correct emotional response must be present before true virtue can be said to exist. He writes: "Just 
as we become good by habitually doing good, until good action becomes a 'second nature' to us, 
so too by feeling emotion appropriately we become habituated to having the correct emotional 
responses" Richard Janko, "From Catharsis to the Aristotelian Mean," Essays on Aristotle's 
Poetics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 343, Janko, "From 
Catharsis to the Aristotelian Mean." 
24 As I have indicated, Kant seems to suggest that the less inclined one is to an action required by 
duty, the greater the moral achievement. He writes, for example, that "if adversity and hopeless 
sorrow have completely taken away the taste for life, if an unfortunate man, strong in soul and 
more indignant at his fate than despondent or dejected, wishes for death and yet preserves his life 
without loving it-not from inclination or fear, but from duty-then his maxim indeed has moral 
content" Kant, Groundingfor the Metaphysics of Morals, 10. 
25 On the other hand, learning to have the emotions appropriate to the virtuous person, without 
ever acting in the way a virtuous person would act is even less desirable, because "some sort of 
actions and activities are the end [telos]" (1098bI9). Feeling, for example, like an auto mechanic 
is not sufficient to the techne of automotive repair. To be an auto mechanic, one would actually 
have to fix cars. 
26 I will speak more about this shortly. 
27 I am using potentialities in Aristotle's primary sense in which a thing is "said [to be] either of 
acting or being acted upon" in Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Montgomery Furth (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1985) 1046a16. This is to distinguish my usage of it from his other 
sense of potentiality as related to actuality. In this sense of potentiality, potentiality has to do with 
the realization of a thing's telos. Hence, actuality is to potentiality "as what is awake to what is 
asleep, and as what is seeing is to what has its eyes shut but has sight, and as what has been shaped 
out of the matter is to the matter, and as the wrought is to the unwrought" (l048bl). 
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28 Although I am not prepared to offer this as a statement of universal truth, I am unaware of a 
narrative artistic tradition, regardless of culture, which does not rely on conflict as essential to the 
development of the plot. 
29Someone might object that intellectual forms of conflict are also interesting-an assertion with 
which I would agree. Intellectual conflict, however, seems not to be nearly so well represented as 
emotional conflict as the focus of art. Moreover, one might wonder to what extent intellectual 
conflict has an emotional component, like, for example, the thrill or fear elicited by the clash of 
ideas. See my argument on the intertwining of reason and emotion in knowing in Chapter Two. 
30 See my argument concerning feminist epistemology having made a persuasive case that the 
privileging of the rational operates as a political move on the level of ideology in Chapter One. 
31 The extent to which our own language continues to reflect the ideal of an emotionless rationality 
serves to demonstrate the persistence of Plato's influence in epistemology. Again, as I have 
already indicated, feminist epistemology has something to say about the possibility of objectivity 
and how maintaining objectivity as the standard of rationality underwrites power arrangements in 
which males are identified as objective and dispassionate observers, while women are viewed as 
emotional, and therefore, incapable of the objectivity. 
32 For an excellent discussion of Plato's ideal of self-sufficiency, see Martha Craven Nussbaum, 
"Tragedy and Self-Sufficiency: Plato and Aristotle on Fear and Pity," Essays on Aristotle's 
Poetics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) especially 268-70. 
33 Alexander Nehamas, "Pity and Fear in the Rhetoric and the Poetics," Essays on Aristotle's 
Poetics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 293. 
34 See also Martha Craven Nussbaum, The Fragility o/Goodness : Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy. Nussbaum says that "there is no loving action without someone to 
receive and return it; there is no being a good citizen without a city that accepts your claims to 
membership. In these cases hexis and praxis, character and activity, are so intimately connected 
that it would not even be possible to represent the appropriate character-states without 
representing action and communication" (381). 
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35 Pity and fear are commonly referred to, therefore, as the tragic emotions. 
36 The now famous aesthetic position identified by R.W. Beardsmore as autonomism suggests a 
view of art in which each artistic work exists independent of any external influence or meaning. 
Art in this conception cannot be engaged as art if any considerations other than aesthetic ones are 
used. Therefore, form is emphasized over content. 
37It seems plausible to suggest that for Aristotle the pleasure of tragedy results from tragedy 
fulfilling the function associated with its genre. For a more contemporary discussion of the 
"paradox of tragedy," see Susan L. Feagin, "The Pleasures of Tragedy," American Philosophical 
Quarterly 20 (1983): 95-104. For an interesting counterargument to Feagin see, Stacie Friend, 
"The Pleasures of Documentary Tragedy," British Journal of Aesthetics 47.2 (2007): 184-98. 
38 Imagination, as I am using it, is one's ability to take past experiences, images, representations, 
and so on, and creatively blend them together to produce new and as yet unrealized scenarios. 
With respect to emotions, the creative scenarios produced by imagination allow for the 
anticipation of one's emotional response to fictitious circumstances. 
39 Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, Ingram Bywater and Friedrich Solmsen, 1st 
Modem Library ed. (New York,: Modem Library, 1954) 1382a21. 
40 Here Aristotle explains that rectificatory justice deals with two types of transactions: 1) 
voluntary (e.g., business transactions), and involuntary-because they are secret (e.g., theft) or 
coerced (e.g., murder). Rectificatory justice concerns restoring "the unjust situation to equality" 
(1132a6). 
CHAPTER FOUR: INTERSUBJECTIVITY: THE NEED FOR EMOTIONAL 
ATTENDING 
I See Immanuel Kant, "What Is Enlightenment?" 
2 In fact, Onora O'neill has argued against a traditional critique of Kant as purely oriented to the 
interior self, since Kant is so dubious about "the reliability of introspection." See Onora O'neill, 
"Kant's Virtues," How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 88. 
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3 See, for instance, Rosalind Hursthouse who argues for a normative view of virtue ethics in the 
face of utilitarian and deontological criticisms. She writes that "the acquisition of moral 
knowledge involves the training of the emotions in a way that the acquisition of scientific 
knowledge does not." "Normative Virtue Ethics" in How Should One Live? 32. 
4 A nice summary of narrative in the sense I am using it is provided in Alasdair C. MacIntyre, 
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. MacIntyre writes: "To be the subject ofa narrative that 
runs from one's birth to one's death is ... to be accountable for the actions and experiences which 
compose a narratable life. It is, that is, to be open to being asked to give a certain kind of account 
of what one did or what happened to one or what one witnessed at any earlier point in one's life 
than the time at which the question is posed. Of course someone may have forgotten or suffered 
brain damage or simply not attended sufficiently at the relevant time to be able to give the relevant 
account. But to say of someone under some one description (,The prisoner of the Chateau d'If) 
that he is the same person as someone characterized quite differently ('The Count of Monte 
Cristo') is precisely to say that it makes sense to ask him to give an intelligible narrative account 
enabling us to understand how he could at different times and different places be one and the same 
person and yet be so differently characterized. Thus personal identity is just that identity 
presupposed by the unity of the character which the unity ofa narrative requires. Without such 
unity there would not be subjects of whom stories could be told" (218). 
5 Zaki, Bolger, and Ochsner make a qualitative distinction between affective empathy and 
cognitive empathy, where "affective empathy refers to perceivers' experience of sharing the 
emotions they observe in social targets"; this roughly corresponds to my use of the word empathy. 
They define cognitive empathy, on the other hand, as "the ability of a perceiver to understand the 
internal states of targets and is often measured as the accuracy with which a perceiver can assess 
the thoughts and feelings a target is experiencing"; this is what I am choosing to call emotional 
attending. I believe that a clear distinction between the terms empathy and emotional attending, is 
more descriptive and less confusing for my purposes than affective and cognitive empathy. Jamil 
Zaki, Niall Bolger and Kevin Ochsner, "It Takes Two: The Interpersonal Nature of Empathic 
Accuracy," Psychological Science 19.4 (2008): 399. 
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6 To say I feel it "because" she feels it is to differentiate between empathy and simultaneous 
feeling, where simultaneous feeling is a phenomenon like two people observing the same spectacle 
and having the same feeling synchronously. In the case of simultaneous feeling, the emotion is, 
what I would call, a first order feeling occurrence. Empathy, on the other hand, would be a second 
order feeling occurrence that depends for its existence on the first order feeling occurrence of 
another. 
7 So as not to confuse terms, I must point out that Potter's use of the word "empathetic" need not 
entail what Zaki, Bolger, and Ocshner term "affective empathy," but could be satisfied by what 
they call "cognitive empathy," and what I have called "emotional attending." 
8 What Aristotle calls "friendships of utility" (or even friendships of pleasure) are not, in their 
strictest sense, friendships in the way we commonly understand them when we say something like: 
"Bill is my friend"; they are much closer to what we would refer to as business associates, or 
casual acquaintances, or co-workers. What binds us to these people has very little to do with any 
emotional investment in the relationship. Rather, it revolves around our usefulness to one another. 
On this point, Aristotle is clear: "Those who are friends of utility dissolve the friendship as soon as 
the advantage is removed; for they were never friends of each other, but of what was expedient for 
them" (EN 1157aI7). 
9 C.f. Michael Stocker who suggests that emotional engagement is primarily reserved to those with 
whom we have (or hope to have) a relationship, those with whom we play. He writes: "One 
wants, and quite properly so, engagement-emotional engagement-with those one plays with. 
Indeed, one of the important reasons for playing is to be emotionally engaged with the play, with 
oneself, and with others" in Michael Stocker, "How Emotions Reveal Value and Help Cure the 
Schizophrenia of Modem Ethical Theories," How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, ed. 
Roger Crisp (London: Oxford University Press, 2003) 180. 
CHAPTER FIVE: LITERATURE AND THE WORK OF THE IMAGINATION 
1 I am aware of the argument that the term literature encompasses more than just fiction-say, 
perhaps, literary biographies and so forth. I am also aware of the especially knotty debate over 
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just what constitutes "literature," and how it may be distinguished from other literary forms like 
instructional manuals or cookbooks. I do not need to put forward a comprehensive definition of 
literature, since my argument does not tum on questions of historicity, but on thick narrative 
descriptions of human life. Consequently, I will use "reading literature" and "fictional human 
life" more to suggest narrative description than to distinguish between actual and virtual worlds. 
2 See, for instance, the prologue to Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 
In it MacIntyre speaks about the kinds of things necessary for a confrontation between competing 
systems of enquiry, like the ability to think within the system of one's rival. Then, one would 
need to identify "the unresolved issues and unsolved problems-unresolved and unsolved by the 
standards of that tradition-which now confront those adherents and to enquire how progress 
might be made in moving towards their resolution and solution" (xiii). Ifno resolution or solution 
can be found, one must then ask whether the system of enquiry is ill-suited because of standards 
internal to the system to offer resolution or solution? If so, it may be the case that resolution or 
solution can only be offered by a rival tradition. 
3R. W. Beardsmore, Art and Morality (London,: Macmillan, 1971). 
4 Berys Nigel Gaut, Art, Emotion, and Ethics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007). Gaut defends monotonic or full-blooded ethicism, which is the position that "a work is 
always aesthetically flawed in so far as it possess an ethical demerit that is aesthetically relevant; 
and a work is always aesthetically meritorious in so far as it possesses an ethical merit that is 
ethically relevant" (52). 
5 See also Gaut who suggests that this type of radical moralism is characterized by a contention 
that the "ethical merits or demerits [in art] are always relevant"; and he points out that this kind of 
radical moralism is not seriously held by anyone in the debate at present Gaut, Art, Emotion, and 
Ethics 51. 
6 See Beardsmore 65. 
7 Iris Murdoch wryly observes that "Kant's examples of pure conceptless beauty, in art or nature, 
have a Platonic simplicity: birds, flowers, (tulips for instance, of which Kant appears to have been 
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fond), Greek-style designs, patterns of foliage on wallpaper. (Plato would not have objected to 
unpretentious wallpaper.)" in The Fire & the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists (Oxford [Eng.]: 
Clarendon Press, 1977) 19. 
81mmanuel Kant, "The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," trans. J.C. Meredith, Aesthetics: The 
Classic Reading'§., ed. David Cooper (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) §2. 
9 Richard Thomas Eldridge, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art (Cambridge, UK New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 62. 
10 Gaut notes a third aesthetic trajectory beyond ethicism and autonomism-immoralism-the 
extreme version of which is the mirror opposite of radical moralism. That is to say, according to 
Gaut, radical immoral ism "holds that a work is always aesthetically flawed in so far as it possesses 
an ethical merit that is aesthetically relevant; and that it is always aesthetically meritorious in so 
far as it possesses an ethical demerit that is aesthetically relevant"-which no one defends (53). 
Gaut goes on to argue that a less than radical immoral ism should better be thought of as a strain of 
contextualism, which advances the idea that the value-relation between an artwork and its aesthetic 
appreciation are "sometimes positive, sometimes negative," depending on the context (54). 
11 See Derek Penwell, "Education in the Virtues: Tragic Emotions and the Artistic Imagination," 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 43.4 (2009). In this article I make the argument for the ways in 
which tragedy may be thought to be morally educative of the emotions through just this kind of 
imaginative encounter. 
12 For an excellent account of the problems associated with a view of literature has having 
cognitive content see Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A 
Philosophical Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). To see other accounts that find 
literature to have cognitive value, see Noel Carrol, A Philosophy of Mass Art (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998). Also, see Scott R. Stroud, "Simulation, Subjective Knowledge, and the Cognitive 
Value of Literary Narrative," Journal of Aesthetic Education 42.3 (2008). For an interesting 
argument that literature ought to stay away entirely from cognitivist aspirations, which are too 
objective, and seek purely subjective knowledge, see Alex Burri, "Art and the View from 
Nowhere," A Sense of the Word: Essays on Fiction, Narrative, and Knowledge, eds. John Gibson, 
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Wolfgang Heumer and Luca Pocci, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy (New York: 
Routledge, 2007). 
13 By qualified I mean here a view of art that recognizes the value of Schiller's "world of 
semblance," an aesthetically imagined world, characterized by the free play of ideas ("Nothing 
need here be sacred to [the artist] except his own law, ifhe but observes the demarcation 
separating his territory from the actual existence of things, that is to say from the realm of nature," 
Letter 26, § 8, 127), but that does not assume, with Schiller, that the aesthetic world created must 
be hermetically sealed off from reality ("Only inasmuch as it is honest [expressly renounces all 
claims to reality], and only inasmuch as it is autonomous [dispenses with all support from reality], 
is semblance aesthetic," Letter 26, § 11, 128) Friedrich Schiller, "On the Aesthetic Education of 
Man," trans. E. Wilkinson and L. Willoughby. Cooper, in Aesthetics: The Classic Readings, .ed. 
David Cooper (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) especially 123-36. 
Moreover, in referring to aesthetic or hypothetical space I am not attempting to make any 
complex metaphysical claims about "possible worlds." Rather, I am employing what I take to be 
an uncontroversial claim about the capacity of the imagination to conceive ofthings "as if." 
Literature depends upon just this ability to imagine what is not explicitly there-in particular, that 
part of the narrative that falls between the gaps of what is explicitly named as essential to the 
story. 
14 See Maria Lugones, who has an interesting discussion of the ways that those on the margins 
always find themselves inhabiting different worlds, as well as the kind of imagination necessary to 
travel between those worlds in Maria Lugones, "Playfulness, 'World'-Traveling, and Loving 
Perception," Hypatia 2.2 (1987). 
15 A world might exist, for example, of beings from the planet Zorfam, who relate to one another 
always as strangers. The way that human readers might be engaged by that world would be 
imaginative, a constant cross-referencing of human experience, in which there are a variety of 
people to whom one relates as familiar; or one might be engaged by that world by imagining the 
similarities with a human being bearing some kind of cognitive or memory deficit. Though the 
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world of Zorfam is hypothetical, as with other possible worlds, the creative aesthetic space is 
habitable through an act of the imagination. 
16 I say "generally safe" inasmuch as a literary villain presents no real, physical threat. However, I 
understand that some experiences are so traumatic in real life that to recall them even in an 
imaginary literary world could render that world unsafe emotionally or psychologically for some 
people. 
17 Nuttall, for example, argues for a view that sees one form of literature, tragedy, "as an exercise 
in understanding in advance the real horrors we may meet and the psychic violence they may 
cause," in Nuttall, 104. 
18 See David Carr's fine survey of recent thought on the construction of narrative in David Car, 
Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), especially his 
chapter, "The Self and the Coherence of Life," 73-99. 
19 Unfortunately, however, it is possible to read Murdoch as placing too much emphasis on a 
theory of mimesis that assumes reference to the world we inhabit as a necessary condition of 
"great art." It must be admitted that the way she describes the characteristics of great art and bad 
art risk confusion. Nevertheless, what I think she says about art is important, if perhaps 
potentially misleading. 
20 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
Knowledge, on Nagel's account, starts as subjective and perspectival and moves toward 
knowledge that is increasingly objective and non-perspectival-the apex of which is opposite of 
the view from some particular place-that is, a view from no particular place. 
21 Though Walton uses a movie, rather than literature, as an example for his theory of quasi-
emotional responses to fiction, what he has in mind applies equally as well to fiction. 
22 One argument about why differentiating between "real emotion" and "quasi-emotion" could be 
important under non-literary circumstances is taken up by Arlie Hochschild in her book, The 
Managed Heart. She contends that acting as though one has feelings one does not really possess 
is a way to manage emotions to secure one's employment. She uses the example of flight 
attendants who are trained to reframe anger at passengers by drawing different cognitive 
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conclusions about the object of their anger (e.g., a needy passenger could be conceived of as 
suffering from a fear of flying, or a drunken passenger could be viewed as "just like a child") Arlie 
Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983) 25. Another strategy offered by a trainer to deal with anger involves 
"preventative tactics," like "deep breathing, talking to yourself, reminding yourself that 'you don't 
have to go home with him '" (25). 
There are two problems, however, with seeing emotions themselves as manageable. 
First, the force of Hochschild's argument in this instance-that is, of the example of managing 
emotions as a strategy for flight attendants--is that this act of "managing emotions" alienates 
oneselffrom one's true feelings by acting, because of the demands of one's job, as though one 
feels a particular emotion when one does not. She extends Karl Marx's argument about the 
alienation of oneself from one's labor to include the alienation of one's true emotional self from 
one's "emotionallabor"--which she defines as labor that "requires one to induce or suppress 
feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in 
others" (7). Acting as though one feels something one does not, or "managing emotions," on 
Hochschild's account is potentially alienating. The second problem with seeing emotions proper 
as manageable, as Hochschild does, is that to do so is to view emotions once again as cognitive 
constructions of belief, judgment, or evaluation. Under her description of how emotions may be 
managed, one has to change one's cognitive appraisal to change emotions. A drunken passenger, 
for instance, is no longer infuriating if one believes the offending passenger to be "just a child." 
Making such a cognitive shift can transform how one feels about the passenger. What such a 
cognitive reconception does, however, is not necessarily to change emotion itself but to change 
one's relationship to that which triggers the emotion. For, to make such a cognitive shift is to 
make a category adjustment. It is to say of drunk people in general that drunkenness should no 
longer trigger my anger, but that it should trigger in me pity, or disappointment, or wry 
amusement, and so on. What changes initially is not my emotion, but that which triggers my 
emotion. 
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As to the issue of whether the kind of management of emotion suggested by Hochschild 
offers an argument about why it might be helpful to distinguish between "quasi-emotions" and 
"real emotion," I take her caveat about the potential for the alienation of one's emotions from 
one's emotional labor through a form of acting to be an important insight. If there were to be any 
advantage conferred by differentiating between "quasi-emotion" and "real emotion," it would be 
in some account like Hochschild's, which assumes that pretending to have an emotion for the sake 
of one's livelihood can, over the long term, be alienating. I am not arguing, however, about 
pretending to have emotions to secure one's employment, but about simulating emotional 
experiences through reading literature for the purpose of better understanding the emotional lives 
of others-and by extension, as I have argued, better understanding myself. Hochschild's 
purposes for differentiating between true emotional experiences and emotions appropriated for 
public consumption as a vocational necessity and my purposes in calling attention to simulated 
emotional experience are altogether different. 
23 It strikes me that Proust, in holding out for the important educational component of fiction, 
through its expansion of the imaginative possibilities for the emotional life, describes, in part, 
Husserl's phenomenological project. That is to say, to do a phenomenological investigation of 
emotion requires that the investigator be able to imagine certain states of affairs. However, 
because of the limitations inherent within the experience of temporal beings, most likely we will 
not have had the broad range of experiences necessary to form all emotions adequately. However, 
in phenomenology the actual experience is less important than the ability to imagine the nuances 
and complexities of that experience. An object in phenomenology need not necessarily refer to a 
tangible thing one can put one's hands on. Rather, according to Husserl, an object here means an 
"object of consciousness"-or that which is intended by intentionality Edmund Husserl, Cartesian 
Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns, Springer Classic Titles in 
Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999) 42. An object in a phenomenological 
investigation, therefore, could be basset hound or a memory, a Chrysler Cordoba or an aesthetic 
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experience of literature. However, this is a line of inquiry that is beyond the scope of this present 
work. 
24 See my previous discussion of the potential dangers of banal literature. 
25 See the study in Demis Hassabis, Dharshan Kumaran, Seralynn D. Vann and Eleanor A. 
Maguire, "Patients with Hippocampal Amnesia Cannot Imagine New Experiences," Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 104.5 (2007). 
CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRE FALLS 
1 I should note an interesting exception to the idea that science ought to exclude such potentially 
contaminating language and perspectives as emotion. Evelyn Fox Keller's book on Barbara 
McClintock, considered for years a maverick scientist, details McClintock's belief in the 
relationship between science and emotions: "Good science cannot proceed without a deep 
emotional investment on the part of the scientist." In Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feelingfor the 
Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara Mcclintock (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1983) 198. 
2 See Chapter Four, "Intersubjectivity and the Need for Emotion." 
3 It is important, having raised the issue of Jimmy's character, to point out again the connection I 
wish to make between emotional attending and virtue. Virtue, according to Aristotle, is practiced 
from a "firm and unchanging state" (EN 11 05a31). Bad character, then, is also a platform for 
action and emotions that are ill formed. To the extent that one's character is bad, therefore, one 
will be prone to bad attending. Since Jimmy is presented to the reader as "sneaky and mean and 
envious and dangerous" (99), the reader is left to conclude that Jimmy's ability to attend to the 
emotional lives of others is distorted by his vicious character. 
4 Alasdair MacIntyre says something similar about an Aristotelian view of friendship: "Friendship 
of course, on Aristotle's view, involves affection. But that affection arises within a relationship 
defined in terms of a common allegiance to and a common pursuit of goods. The affection is 
secondary, which is not in the least to say unimportant. In a modem perspective afection is often 
the central issue; our friends are said to be those whom we like, perhaps whom we like very much. 
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'Friendship" has become for the most part the name of an emotional state rather than of a type of 
social and political relationship" in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 156. 
5 Laura Mulvey's work on the issue of the male gaze is important to note. She writes: "In a world 
ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and 
passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its phantasy on to the female figure which is 
styled accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and 
displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said 
to connote to-be-Iooked-at-ness. Women displayed as sexual object is the leitmotif of erotic 
spectacle: from pin-ups to striptease, from Ziegfeld to Busby Berkeley, she holds the look, plays 
to and signifies male desire." In Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," Media 
and Cultural Studies, eds. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 346. 
6 I say "almost reflexively," in that I realize that the cultivation of virtue requires more than just 
mindless repetition. There is a sense, though, that virtue allows one to cultivate habits in a 
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